Upon the defendant's conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, the defendant was sentenced, inter alia, to a period of postrelease supervision of three years. Under Penal Law § 70.45(2)(b), the period of postrelease supervision applicable to a sentence imposed pursuant to Penal Law § 70.70(2) for a conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree must be between one and two years (seePeople v. Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134, 1135, 141 N.Y.S.3d 364 ). Accordingly, the County Court exceeded the statutorily authorized maximum when it imposed a three-year term of postrelease supervision on that count (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][b] ; People v. Brown, 192 A.D.3d at 1135, 141 N.Y.S.3d 364 ; see alsoPeople v. Tate, 84 A.D.3d 1416, 1417, 924 N.Y.S.2d 285 ).

Upon the defendant's conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, the defendant was sentenced, inter alia, to a period of postrelease supervision of three years. Under Penal Law § 70.45(2)(b), the period of postrelease supervision applicable to a sentence imposed pursuant to Penal Law § 70.70(2) for a conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree must be between one and two years (see People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134, 1135). Accordingly, the County Court exceeded the statutorily authorized maximum when it imposed a three-year term of postrelease supervision on that count (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][b]; People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d at 1135; see also People v Tate, 84 A.D.3d 1416, 1417).

Upon the defendant's conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, the defendant was sentenced, inter alia, to a period of postrelease supervision of three years. Under Penal Law § 70.45(2)(b), the period of postrelease supervision applicable to a sentence imposed pursuant to Penal Law § 70.70(2) for a conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree must be between one and two years (see People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134, 1135). Accordingly, the County Court exceeded the statutorily authorized maximum when it imposed a three-year term of postrelease supervision on that count (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][b]; People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d at 1135; see also People v Tate, 84 A.D.3d 1416, 1417).

Upon the defendant's conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, the defendant was sentenced, inter alia, to a period of postrelease supervision of three years. Under Penal Law § 70.45(2)(b), the period of postrelease supervision applicable to a sentence imposed pursuant to Penal Law § 70.70(2) for a conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree must be between one and two years (see People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134, 1135). Accordingly, the County Court exceeded the statutorily authorized maximum when it imposed a three-year term of postrelease supervision on that count (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][b]; People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d at 1135; see also People v Tate, 84 A.D.3d 1416, 1417).

Upon the defendant's conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree, the defendant was sentenced, inter alia, to a period of postrelease supervision of three years. Under Penal Law § 70.45(2)(b), the period of postrelease supervision applicable to a sentence imposed pursuant to Penal Law § 70.70(2) for a conviction of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree must be between one and two years (see People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134, 1135). Accordingly, the County Court exceeded the statutorily authorized maximum when it imposed a three-year term of postrelease supervision on that count (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][b]; People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d at 1135; see also People v Tate, 84 A.D.3d 1416, 1417).

[1] As the defendant contends, and as the People correctly concede, the period of postrelease supervision imposed was illegal (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][e]). Accordingly, we modify the judgment by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed to the extent indicated herein (see People v. McGowan, 210 A.D.3d 909, 910, 177 N.Y.S.3d 726; People v. Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134, 1135, 141 N.Y.S.3d 364). [2] The record demonstrates that the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to appeal (see People v. Sanders, 25 N.Y.3d 337, 340–342, 12 N.Y.S.3d 593, 34 N.E.3d 344; People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256–257, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145).

As the defendant contends, and as the People correctly concede, the period of postrelease supervision imposed was illegal (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][e]). Accordingly, we modify the judgment by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed to the extent indicated herein (see People v McGowan, 210 A.D.3d 909, 910; People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134, 1135).

As the People correctly concede, the period of postrelease supervision imposed on the conviction of strangulation in the second degree was illegal (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][e]). Accordingly, we modify the judgment by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed on that conviction to the extent indicated herein (see People v Wright, 199 A.D.3d 1025; People v Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134).

As the People correctly concede, the period of postrelease supervision imposed on the conviction of strangulation in the second degree was illegal (see Penal Law § 70.45[2][e] ). Accordingly, we modify the judgment by reducing the period of postrelease supervision imposed on that conviction to the extent indicated herein (seePeople v. Wright, 199 A.D.3d 1025, 154 N.Y.S.3d 814 ; People v. Brown, 192 A.D.3d 1134, 141 N.Y.S.3d 364 ). The defendant's valid waiver of his right to appeal precludes appellate review of his contention that the terms of imprisonment imposed were excessive (seePeople v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ).