Opinion
09-29-2017
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Dewayne BROWN, Defendant–Appellant.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Craig P. Schlanger of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant. William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Nicole K. Intschert of Counsel), for Respondent.
Frank H. Hiscock Legal Aid Society, Syracuse (Craig P. Schlanger of Counsel), for Defendant–Appellant.
William J. Fitzpatrick, District Attorney, Syracuse (Nicole K. Intschert of Counsel), for Respondent.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., PERADOTTO, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of criminal possession of a firearm ( Penal Law § 265.01–b ). Contrary to defendant's contention, Supreme Court properly refused to suppress defendant's statements to the police, which included an admission that he accidentally shot himself with a firearm, inasmuch as defendant was not in custody at the time that he made the statements and Miranda warnings therefore were not required (see generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 ). "In determining whether a defendant was in custody for Miranda purposes, ‘[t]he test is not what the defendant thought, but rather what a reasonable [person], innocent of any crime, would have thought had he [or she] been in the defendant's position’ " ( People v. Kelley, 91 A.D.3d 1318, 1318, 937 N.Y.S.2d 514, lv. denied 19 N.Y.3d 963, 950 N.Y.S.2d 115, 973 N.E.2d 213, quoting People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589, 307 N.Y.S.2d 857, 256 N.E.2d 172, cert. denied 400 U.S. 851, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 89 ). Here, the evidence at the suppression hearing established that defendant voluntarily sought medical treatment at a walk-in clinic for a gunshot wound to his leg. The treatment provider reported defendant's gunshot injury to police, as required by Penal Law § 265.25, and the provider instructed defendant to wait for the police to arrive. A detective responded to the clinic and briefly questioned defendant in a patient room where defendant was waiting with his mother. The detective testified that he thought that defendant was a victim, rather than a suspect, and thus his initial questions were investigatory in nature. During the questioning, defendant was not placed under arrest, and was not handcuffed or otherwise restrained. Under these circumstances, we conclude that "a reasonable person in defendant's position, innocent of any crime, would not have believed that he or she was in custody, and thus Miranda warnings were not required" ( People v. Lunderman, 19 A.D.3d 1067, 1068–1069, 796 N.Y.S.2d 481, lv. denied 5 N.Y.3d 830, 804 N.Y.S.2d 44, 837 N.E.2d 743 ; see People v. Thomas, 292 A.D.2d 549, 550, 739 N.Y.S.2d 732 ). The fact that the detective's questions became accusatory after he observed gunpowder burns on defendant's leg, the presence of which seemed to conflict with defendant's initial statement that he did not see the person who shot him, did not render the questioning custodial in nature (see People v. Davis, 48 A.D.3d 1086, 1087, 850 N.Y.S.2d 307, lv. denied 10 N.Y.3d 861, 860 N.Y.S.2d 487, 890 N.E.2d 250 ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.