People v. Brown

31 Citing cases

  1. People v. Mink

    186 Ill. App. 3d 316 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 3 times

    ( Crilly, 108 Ill.2d at 306.) The reason for the reversal should control the decision whether or not there should be another trial. ( People v. Brown (1968), 99 Ill. App.2d 281, 302 (supplemental opinion upon denial of petition for rehearing).) Where reversal is based on insufficient evidence, a new trial would subject defendant to double jeopardy.

  2. Sumpter v. DeGroote

    552 F.2d 1206 (7th Cir. 1977)   Cited 14 times
    In Sumpter v. DeGroote, 552 F.2d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 1977), we noted that the Ball rule "[e]mbodies the Court's judgment that the societal cost of immunizing the guilty from retrial outweighs the heavy burdens that reprosecution imposes on the accused" (footnote omitted).

    Ball itself, like its progeny on which Bryan relies, is premised on the view that a defendant waives the right to claim double jeopardy following reversal of a conviction on appeal. Though Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 192, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957), later exposed the presumptive-waiver theory as a doctrinal fiction, the Court's dicta in Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416, 426, 80 S.Ct. 481, 4 L.Ed.2d 412 (1960), suggests that the theory retains some vitality, much to the chagrin of its many critics. E. g., United States v. Wiley, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 382, 517 F.2d 1212, 1215-17 (1975); People v. Brown, 99 Ill.App.2d 281, 241 N.E.2d 653, 661-62 (1st Dist. 1968); C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 470, at 272-73; Cahan, Granting the State a New Trial After an Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence, 57 Ill.B.J. 448, 452-55 (1969); Fisher, Double Jeopardy: Six Common Boners Summarized, 15 U.C.L.A.L.Rev. 81, 82-83 (1967); Mayers Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 6-7, 19-22 (1960); Thompson, Reversals for Insufficient Evidence: The Emerging Doctrine of Appellate Acquittal, 8 Ind.L.Rev. 497, 507-10 (1975); Note, Double Jeopardy: A New Trial After Appellate Reversal for Insufficient Evidence, 31 U.Chi.L.Rev. 365, 367 (1964). A second traditional justification offered for the rule is the "continuing jeopardy" theory first advanced by Justice Holmes in dissent to Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134-37, 24 S.Ct. 797, 49 L.Ed. 114 (1904).

  3. People v. Woodall

    329 N.E.2d 203 (Ill. 1975)   Cited 12 times
    In Woodall, the court emphasized that the trial judge had observed that his granting of a new trial "was tantamount to a decision of not guilty."

    He noted that the defendant in his post-trial motions had not made any claim that prosecution was barred under section 3-4(a)(1) or under any constitutional provision against double jeopardy. He said further that had he been aware of such decisions as People v. McCoy, 44 Ill.2d 458, and People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App.2d 281, he might well have allowed the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. We would observe that the statement of the judge that he might have allowed the motion seems restrained when one considers that he also said that the discrepancies and contradictions of the prosecution's witness had added up to a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.

  4. People v. Castiglione

    75 Ill. App. 3d 469 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 3 times

    Before a new trial commenced, Castiglione presented a motion to the new judge seeking the dismissal of the indictment on the ground that reprosecution would subject him to double jeopardy in violation of the Federal and Illinois constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. V; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 3-4(a)(1)). In support of this motion, Castiglione relied on several decisions including Burks v. United States (1978), 437 U.S. 1, 57 L.Ed.2d 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141; People v. Woodall (1975), 61 Ill.2d 60, 329 N.E.2d 203; People v. Hammond (1974), 18 Ill. App.3d 693, 310 N.E.2d 485; and People v. Brown (1968), 99 Ill. App.2d 281, 241 N.E.2d 653, all of which held that a second prosecution was barred after an earlier determination that the evidence was insufficient to warrant a conviction. The new judge allowed the motion and dismissed the indictment.

  5. United States v. Wiley

    517 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1975)   Cited 13 times

    See, e. g., United States v. Dotson, 440 F.2d 1224, 1225 (10th Cir. 1971) ("We are unable to perceive why the government's position should be improved by failing to recognize the defect until the appeal stage. If the defendant should have been acquitted for insufficient proof, he ought not be subsequently penalized for his effort to rectify the original error."); People v. Brown, 99 Ill.App.2d 281, 293 n. 2, 241 N.E.2d 653, 659 n. 2 (1968); Thompson, supra note 7, at 514; cf. Mayers and Yarbough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and Successive Prosecutions, 74 Harv.L.Rev. 1, 13 (1960) ("If the state cannot have a new trial following an erroneous acquittal, it certainly should not have this advantage when the acquittal was erroneously denied."). D.

  6. Gray v. State

    254 Md. 385 (Md. 1969)   Cited 65 times
    Concluding that "the practice of remanding for a new trial after reversal for insufficiency of the evidence rather than remanding for entry of a judgment of acquittal, is permissible"

    See also Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 1 L.Ed.2d 1356 (1957), in which the Court reversed Smith Act convictions of a number of appellants, remanding some for a new trial and ordering acquittals to be entered as to others. In People v. Brown, 241 N.E.2d 653 (1968), the Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, read Sapir and Forman to permit it to find impermissible double jeopardy in a retrial after reversal for insufficiency of evidence although a new trial after reversal for other errors in the trial would, it thought, constitute "permissible double jeopardy." The Court said (241 N.E.2d at pp. 659, 663-664):

  7. People v. Hammond

    310 N.E.2d 485 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974)   Cited 7 times

    The order of the circuit court providing for a new trial upon the specific finding by that court that the evidence was insufficient to convict by reason of the failure to prove ownership of the burglarized premises is in error. In People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App.2d 281, 241 N.E.2d 653, this issue was discussed in much detail. The conclusion reached in Brown was that when the evidence is insufficient to convict, a new trial is not ordered but a conviction would be reversed.

  8. People v. Urban

    45 Mich. App. 255 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973)   Cited 9 times

    A new trial is ordered since it appears that the failure of proof may be due to inadvertence to which no objection or motion was made. Cf. People v. Baker, 19 Mich. App. 480 (1969); People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App.2d 281; 241 N.E.2d 653 (1968). At any new trial the prosecution must carry its burden of establishing that defendant was, on the date alleged, in possession of d-lysergic acid diethylamide otherwise than (1) for the personal use of himself or of a member of his household, or (2) for administration to an animal owned by him or a member of his household.

  9. People v. Moore

    6 Ill. App. 3d 932 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972)   Cited 13 times
    In People v. Moore (1972), 6 Ill. App.3d 932, 287 N.E.2d 130, a conviction was reversed when the court held that when the rapist was described as being black and wearing a white "t-shirt," khaki pants and white gym shoes, the basis of the identification was insufficient to sustain a conviction.

    ( People v. Appleby, 104 Ill. App.2d 207, 212, 244 N.E.2d 395.) In People v. Brown, 99 Ill. App.2d 281, 241 N.E.2d 653, we emphasized the function of this scrutiny when we said that "[b]ecause of the nature of the crime, reviewing courts are charged with an extraordinarily high standard of care in examining the evidence in a rape case." It is in the exercise of this standard of care that we examine the facts of this case as shown by the evidence.

  10. People v. Baker

    19 Mich. App. 480 (Mich. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 8 times

    It is apparent from the foregoing review that the United States Supreme Court has found that this area of the law presents thorny problems and has deferred to a later date a rationalization of its decisions in this area with the due process and the double jeopardy clauses. See People v. Brown (1968), 99 Ill. App.2d 281 ( 241 N.E.2d 653) which discusses Bryan, Sapir and Forman. See People v. Brown, supra, holding that a new trial may not be ordered in such a case.