Opinion
3-12-0002
08-15-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DONALD R. BROWN, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court
of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
Will County, Illinois,
Appeal No. 3-12-0002
Circuit No. 10-CF-1625
Honorable
Carla Alessio-Policandriotes,
Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Carter and Schmidt concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: (1) The State proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's attempt to lure a child into his vehicle was for other than a lawful purpose. (2) The trial court was not authorized to order the defendant to register as a sex offender because it failed to make a finding that the offense was sexually motivated. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, the defendant, Donald R. Brown, was found guilty of child abduction (720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 2010)), and was sentenced to 30 months' probation. On appeal, the defendant argues that: (1) the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he acted with other than a lawful purpose; and (2) he should not be required to register as a sex offender because the trial court made no finding that the underlying offense was sexually motivated. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the cause with directions.
¶ 3 FACTS
¶ 4 On September 16, 2010, the defendant was charged with child abduction. 720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 2010). The indictment alleged that on June 22, 2010, the defendant attempted to lure M.E. into a vehicle, without the consent of M.E.'s parent, for other than a lawful purpose. ¶ 5 The cause proceeded to a bench trial on June 21, 2011. The evidence indicated that at approximately 8 a.m. on June 22, 2010, M.E., who was 11 years old, was waiting for his school bus near a four-way intersection. M.E. was sitting on the curb, approximately 15 to 20 feet from the line where a vehicle would stop for the stop sign. No one else was present. A tan Ford Crown Victoria approached and stopped in front of M.E. According to M.E., the driver, later identified as the defendant, told him "baby boy get in my car." M.E. saw the defendant texting on his cellular telephone. M.E. stood up and ran as fast as he could toward his approaching school bus. Thereafter, the car turned right at the intersection. ¶ 6 When M.E. got onto the bus, he explained the incident to his bus driver, Jeanette McDonald. McDonald stated that when M.E. got onto the bus, he had a scared look on his face. After explaining what happened, McDonald approached the bus stop looking for the car, but did not see the car or anyone near the intersection. When M.E. arrived at school, he also explained what happened to the assistant principal, Jarod Krause. When Krause spoke to M.E., he appeared nervous and shaken up from the encounter. Krause notified the police and M.E.'s mother. M.E.'s mother stated that she did not know the defendant and did not give him permission to take M.E. in his car. ¶ 7 At approximately 11 a.m., the police located the vehicle described by M.E. in an apartment parking lot near the intersection. M.E. came to the scene and identified the vehicle as the one that had approached him earlier that day. Officer Frank Gonzales located the defendant in his apartment with his girlfriend, Corrina Vieyra. When the defendant stepped outside of his apartment, M.E. identified him as the man he had seen earlier that morning. Gonzales asked the defendant if he had spoken to a child at the nearby intersection that morning. Initially, the defendant denied the conversation, but then admitted to telling the boy to "keep [his] head up." ¶ 8 Officer James Hargrow later interviewed the defendant at the police station. The defendant told him that he worked at the Wal-Mart warehouse and got off work that day at 5:30 a.m. After work, the defendant stopped at a coworker's house and had a couple of beers. At approximately 8 a.m., the defendant was heading home and saw M.E. sitting on the curb. The defendant pulled up next to him and told him to "keep [his] head up." The defendant then turned right at the intersection to go home and meet his girlfriend. When police initially questioned him, he did not recall speaking to a child, but remembered when the officers gave the location of the intersection. ¶ 9 At trial, the defendant stated that on the morning of the incident, he got off work from Georgia Pacific at 4:30 a.m. After having two beers at a coworker's house, the defendant texted Vieyra to come to his apartment, which Vieyra confirmed. On his way home, the defendant stopped at the stop sign at an intersection near his apartment. He observed a young man sitting on the curb with his feet extending into the street. The young man was looking down at the ground with a frown on his face. The defendant told him to "keep [his] head up." The young man looked at the defendant, but did not get up from the curb. The defendant continued texting on his cellular telephone and then turned right toward his apartment. The defendant parked his car in the parking lot of his apartment building and waited for Vieyra to arrive. When police arrived and questioned him about the incident, the defendant admitted that he had initially forgotten about talking to the young man. ¶ 10 The trial court found the defendant guilty of child abduction, noting that it found M.E.'s version of events more credible. On July 18, 2011, the defendant filed a posttrial motion, arguing that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ¶ 11 On August 25, 2011, the trial court denied the defendant's motion and proceeded to sentencing. The trial court then asked the State and defense counsel whether the instant offense automatically subjected the defendant to a sex offender assessment or sex offender registration. Both attorneys responded that it did not. The court noted that the statute required it to make a finding based on the nature of the underlying facts, and the State agreed. The court then stated, "I think that also the [c]ourt should find that that would be the case." The court then ordered a sex offender risk assessment. ¶ 12 Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced the defendant to 30 months' probation and ordered him to register as a sex offender. The defendant appeals.
¶ 13 ANALYSIS
¶ 14 I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 15 The defendant first argues he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of child abduction because the State failed to prove he acted with an unlawful purpose. ¶ 16 When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1 (2011); People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237 (1985). It is not this court's function to retry a defendant who challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213 (2009). Rather, in a bench trial, the trial court remains responsible for determining the credibility of witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence, and this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court on these matters. Id. A conviction will only be overturned where the evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it creates a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1. ¶ 17 To convict the defendant of child abduction, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally lured or attempted to lure a child under the age of 16 into a motor vehicle, without the consent of the child's parent, for other than a lawful purpose. 720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 2010). Other than a lawful purpose implies actions which violate the Criminal Code of 1961. People v. Velez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101325. Proving that a defendant acted with an unlawful purpose is essentially a statement of the criminal intent. People v. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286 (2006). Evidence of intent is usually inferred from the surrounding circumstances. Id. ¶ 18 In arguing that there was no evidence presented to prove his unlawful purpose, the defendant cites to Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286. In Woodrum, the supreme court struck down a section of the child abduction statute, which, prior to August 2012, stated that the luring or attempted luring of a child into a vehicle without the consent of the child's parent shall be prima facie evidence of other than a lawful purpose. See 720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 1998). The court found this mandatory presumption unconstitutional because it shifted the burden of production on this element to the defendant. Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286. ¶ 19 The defendant asserts that the trial court in the instant case violated Woodrum by inferring his unlawful purpose based on his asking M.E. to get into his car. We disagree. In Woodrum, the court held that requiring the fact finder to presume the existence of an unlawful purpose upon proof that the defendant lured a child into a vehicle without the consent of the child's parent was unconstitutional. This holding, however, did not restrict the fact finder from drawing reasonable inferences from the evidence to support unlawful purpose. See Woodrum, 223 Ill. 2d 286 (noting that the State may properly rely on certain permissive presumptions or inferences in proving elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt). ¶ 20 In the instant case, there is no indication in the record that the trial court applied the mandatory presumption struck down in Woodrum in reaching its guilty finding. Instead, the trial court relied on the circumstances of the offense to reasonably infer that the defendant's attempt to lure M.E. into his car was for an unlawful purpose. See Velez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101325 (allowing the jury to infer unlawful purpose where the defendant pursued a 14-year-old girl in his van, calling her "baby girl" and asking if she wanted a ride home, and then he fled the scene, altered his appearance, and denied the encounter when questioned by police). The evidence the court found credible at trial indicated that the defendant stopped short of a stop sign near his apartment in order to speak to an 11-year-old boy sitting alone on the curb. The defendant told M.E., "baby boy get in my car." M.E. was scared and ran toward his approaching school bus. The defendant then left the intersection before the bus driver approached, and, when questioned by the police, he initially denied the encounter with M.E. ¶ 21 Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have found that the defendant acted for an unlawful purpose. See Beauchamp, 241 Ill. 2d 1. Accordingly, we find that the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of child abduction.
¶ 22 II. Sex Offender Registration
¶ 23 The defendant next argues that the order requiring him to register as a sex offender must be vacated because the trial court did not make a specific finding that the offense was sexually motivated. ¶ 24 Initially, the defendant admits that he did not properly preserve this issue before the trial court, but requests that we review the issue under the plain error doctrine. See People v. Black, 394 Ill. App. 3d 935 (2009) (reviewing the defendant's registration as a sex offender under the plain error doctrine). However, before conducting a plain error analysis, we must first determine whether a clear or obvious error occurred. People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539 (2010). ¶ 25 The Sex Offender Registration Act (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2010)) requires a person convicted of child abduction (720 ILCS 5/10-5(b)(10) (West 2010)) to register as a sex offender if the offense was sexually motivated. 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.9) (West 2010). An offense is sexually motivated if one or more of the facts of the underlying offense indicates conduct that is of a sexual nature or shows an intent to engage in behavior of a sexual nature. 20 ILCS 4026/10(e) (West 2010). Before requiring a defendant to register as a sex offender, the trial court must make a specific determination that the offense was sexually motivated. See Velez, 2012 IL App (1st) 101325; Black, 394 Ill. App. 3d 935. A court's compliance with statutory procedure is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Barber, 381 Ill. App. 3d 558 (2008). ¶ 26 Here, despite ordering the defendant to register as a sex offender, the trial court made no finding as to sexual motivation of the offense. See 730 ILCS 150/2(B)(1.9) (West 2010). The court merely agreed with the attorneys that a finding should be made before the defendant could be ordered to register, but then failed to articulate such a finding. Having found that the trial court committed error, we conclude that the defendant has satisfied the second prong of the plain error doctrine because this sentencing error affected his substantial rights. See Black, 394 Ill. App. 3d 935 (finding reversible error under the second prong where the trial court failed to determine whether the offense was sexually motivated). Accordingly, we vacate the portion of the sentencing order requiring the defendant to register as a sex offender and remand the cause for the trial court to make a specific factual determination on whether the defendant's offense was sexually motivated. See 20 ILCS 4026/10(e) (West 2010).
¶ 27 CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed in part and vacated in part, and the cause is remanded for the trial court to make a finding as to whether the offense was sexually motivated. ¶ 29 Affirmed in part and vacated in part; cause remanded with directions.