Colo. RPC 1.5 cmt. 1. 840 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Colo. 1992).Id .

The hearing board did find, however, that the respondent's improper assertion of a charging lien over Doner's share of the estate proceeds violated DR 1-102(A)(5) (a lawyer shall not engage in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). See People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Colo. 1992) (attorney's improper assertion of retaining lien violated DR 1-102(A)(5)); People v. Smith, 830 P.2d 1003, 1005 (Colo. 1992) (lawyer's unauthorized recordation of charging lien and subsequent failure to release the lien violated DR 1-102(A)(5)). The hearing board also concluded that the respondent's violation of his professional duty "was unintentional and due either to negligence or confusion, or some combination of the two."

The PDJ granted OARC's motion for summary judgment with respect to the claim that Abrams violated Colo. RPC 1.5(a), citing People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Colo. 1992) (ruling that an attorney may not charge a client for time spent responding to a grievance filed with OARC). The remaining claims went to a hearing.

Respondent also charged an improper or unreasonable fee by billing his client for the costs of defending the grievance.People v. Brown , 840 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Colo. 1992).Id. at 1088-89.

To fully appreciate the significance and novelty of the majority's holding, some understanding of the history and development of the statutory source of the lien is essential.¶ 45 By statute in this jurisdiction, attorneys have long been provided with what we have referred to as charging and retaining liens, to assist in securing payment of their reasonable attorney fees, see § 12–5–119, 120, C.R.S. (2015), but no right to an attorney's lien beyond these statutory rights exists in the jurisdiction, People v. Brown , 840 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Colo.1992). With regard to the former category, the statute grants attorneys a lien on any money, property, choses in action, or claims and demands in their hands, on any judgment they may have obtained or assisted in obtaining, and on any claims and demands in suit for any fees due or to become due from any client. § 12–5–119.

To fully appreciate the significance and novelty of the majority's holding, some understanding of the history and development of the statutory source of the lien is essential.¶ 45 By statute in this jurisdiction, attorneys have long been provided with what we have referred to as charging and retaining liens, to assist in securing payment of their reasonable attorney fees, see § 12–5–119, 120, C.R.S. (2015), but no right to an attorney's lien beyond these statutory rights exists in the jurisdiction, People v. Brown , 840 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Colo.1992). With regard to the former category, the statute grants attorneys a lien on any money, property, choses in action, or claims and demands in their hands, on any judgment they may have obtained or assisted in obtaining, and on any claims and demands in suit for any fees due or to become due from any client. § 12–5–119.

No common law right to a retaining lien exists in Colorado. People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Colo.1992). Instead, retaining liens are statutory constructs, id., and, “[t]herefore, strict compliance with [section 12–5–120] is required,” People v. Gray, 35 P.3d 611, 618 (Colo.O.P.D.J.2001).

In Colorado, there is no common law right to an attorney's lien. People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Colo. 1992). The right to a retaining or charging lien arises by statute.

In Colorado, there is no common law right to an attorney's lien. People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Colo. 1992). The right to a retaining or charging lien arises by statute.

A determination that the respondent's testimony is not credible, or is incredible, may under some circumstances be sufficient to sustain a finding of the submission of false evidence for the purpose of ABA Standards 9.22(f). See, e.g., People v. Brenner, No. 92SA474, slip op. at 6 (Colo. May 24, 1993) (hearing board concluded that the respondent's testimony as to what happened between him and a client were not credible and found existence of submission of false evidence as an aggravating factor); People v. Brown, 840 P.2d 1085, 1088-89 (Colo. 1992) (finding existence of submission of false evidence under standard 9.22(f) because a portion of the respondent's testimony was not credible). The respondent's misconduct in representing Hardin-Arthur constitutes an additional aggravating factor.