People v. Brown

2 Citing cases

  1. People v. McKay

    138 Ill. App. 3d 446 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 7 times

    Defendant argues that the trial court placed too much emphasis on his prior criminal record as compared to his family situation or his past good conduct, but cites no authority to support his argument. In light of defendant's extensive criminal record (nine convictions, seven incarcerations, one parole violation), it can hardly be said that a prison sentence of seven years for residential burglary is excessive (see People v. Morton (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 280 (six-year sentence for burglary not excessive); People v. Davis (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 517 (6 2/3- to 20-year sentence for burglary not excessive in light of two prior burglary convictions and parole violation); People v. Brown (1969), 118 Ill. App.2d 41 (12- to 20-year sentence not excessive in light of two robbery convictions and parole violation)), or amounted to cruel and unusual punishment ( People v. Brown (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 269 (10- to 20-year sentence for burglary was within statutory limits and was not cruel and unusual punishment)). For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the circuit court of Du Page County is affirmed.

  2. People v. Drew

    36 Ill. App. 3d 807 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 18 times
    In Drew, 36 Ill. App.3d 807, 810, defendant alleged that his "prior relations with public defenders have proven fruitless and frustrating."

    This sworn certificate indicated that the public defender (1) consulted with the defendant both by mail and in person to discern what constitutional rights were infringed, (2) obtained and examined the report of the trial proceedings and (3) prepared and filed a supplemental petition in addition to the defendant's pro se petition so as to adequately present his claim of deprivation of constitutional rights. Therefore, even though the initial certificate of compliance was somehow misplaced, we believe that the record amply evinced that the concerted efforts of the public defender did comply with Supreme Court Rule 651(c) and that the purpose of such edict, namely, to insure that indigents are provided proper representation when presenting claims of constitutional deprivation under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act ( People v. Brown, 52 Ill.2d 227, 230, 287 N.E.2d 663, 665, aff'd on remand, 29 Ill. App.3d 269, 330 N.E.2d 291; People v. Gillery, 24 Ill. App.3d 564, 566, 321 N.E.2d 342, 344), was accomplished in the instant case. • 3 We also believe that there is no propriety to the defendant's second contention. While the defendant maintains that the record on appeal is devoid of any action by the trial court with regard to his motion for appointment of counsel other than the public defender, it must be remembered that an indigent defendant is entitled to counsel other than the public defender only upon a showing of good cause ( People v. Johnson, 24 Ill. App.3d 152, 159, 320 N.E.2d 69, 75; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 34, par. 5604; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 113-3(b)) and, in the absence of a showing of good cause, it is within the trial court's discretion to deny such a request.