Opinion
May 5, 1997
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Queens County (McGann, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the trial court's Ventimiglia ruling (see, People v. Ventimiglia, 52 N.Y.2d 350) was proper. The bad acts committed by the defendant after the offense for which he was charged related to his consciousness of guilt (see, People v. Taylor, 232 A.D.2d 293; People v. Reyes, 162 A.D.2d 357). Although evidence of consciousness of guilt is weak evidence, it is admissible nonetheless (see, People v. Marin, 65 N.Y.2d 741, 746; People v. Reyes, supra, at 357; People v. Warner, 126 A.D.2d 788, 790).
A trial court's authority to alter its Sandoval ruling is limited once the defendant takes the stand in good-faith reliance on its ruling (see, People v. Fardan, 82 N.Y.2d 638, 646; People v. Grant, 234 A.D.2d 475; People v. Beniquez, 215 A.D.2d 678, 679). Here, the trial court improperly altered its Sandoval ruling by permitting the prosecutor to cross-examine the defendant about his stabbing of Marie Brown. The error, however, was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt (People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242) and because the matter was properly elicited on the People's direct case pursuant to the trial court's Ventimiglia ruling.
The defendant's remaining contentions are either unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05; People v. Tardbania, 72 N.Y.2d 852; People v. Nuccie, 57 N.Y.2d 818) or without merit.
Bracken, J.P., Ritter, Sullivan and Pizzuto, JJ., concur.