( People v. Forrest (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 70, 272 N.E.2d 813.) However, while malice is an essential element of murder, it may be expressed or implied ( People v. Dampher (1963), 28 Ill.2d 136, 190 N.E.2d 705; People v. Muldrow (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 209, 332 N.E.2d 664), and it will be implied where the acts of the defendant exhibit a wanton and reckless disregard for human life ( People v. Dampher; People v. Forrest (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 70, 272 N.E.2d 813; People v. Brooks (1964), 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265)."

( People v. Forrest (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 70, 272 N.E.2d 813.) However, while malice is an essential element of murder, it may be expressed or implied ( People v. Dampher (1963), 28 Ill.2d 136, 190 N.E.2d 705; People v. Muldrow (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 209, 332 N.E.2d 664), and it will be implied where the acts of the defendant exhibit a wanton and reckless disregard for human life ( People v. Dampher; People v. Forrest (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 70, 272 N.E.2d 813; People v. Brooks (1964), 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265). We are satisfied that the facts of this case are sufficient to establish malice on the part of defendant in that his unprovoked actions exhibit a clear disregard for human life.

The propriety of allowing leading questions is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is not a ground for reversal unless the court abused that discretion and the abuse of discretion resulted in substantial injury to the defendant. ( People v. Merritt, 367 Ill. 521, 12 N.E.2d 7; People v. Brooks, 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265; People v. Taylor, 132 Ill. App.2d 473, 270 N.E.2d 628.) We conclude that the defendant suffered no substantial injury. There was no objection to the testimony concerning the defendant's statement that the tire was not his. This was in accordance with the officer's testimony that he observed the defendant placing the stolen tire in the trunk of his car.

Moreover, the record shows that the jury was repeatedly cautioned by the prosecutor, defense attorneys, and the court that both opening and closing arguments were not evidence and were to be disregarded if not based on the evidence adduced at trial. ( People v. Brooks (1st Dist. 1964), 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265.) We believe that the statements were made in good faith and were not of such character as to have prejudicially affected the verdict.

This conflict, and the minor discrepancies in the testimony of other witnesses, totally fails to substantiate the assertion of perjury. • 3 The evidence established that the defendant was guilty of murder, not manslaughter. The shooting of Medina was deliberate, and the direct and natural result of the defendant's voluntary act was the destruction of another's life. ( People v. Brooks (1964), 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265.) A finding of voluntary manslaughter would be warranted only if the evidence established that the defendant was seriously provoked or believed, albeit unreasonably, that he shot in self-defense.

In any event, the propriety of allowing leading questions is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and is not a ground for reversal unless it appears that this discretion has been palpably abused and has resulted in substantial injury to the defendant. ( People v. Brooks, 52 Ill. App.2d 473; McCann v. People, 226 Ill. 562.) We find no such abuse of discretion here, and we conclude that both defendants were proven guilty of the crimes for which they were convicted beyond any reasonable doubt.

• 3, 4 The propriety of allowing leading questions is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and is not a ground for reversal unless it appears that this discretion has been abused and has resulted in substantial injury to the defendant. ( People v. Brooks, 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265.) In the case at bar, the defendant has failed to show that the alleged leading questions to Clark concerning the defendant's receipts for the tires he purchased resulted in injury to the defendant.

After the trier of fact has made its finding, this court will not set it aside unless it is palpably contrary to the evidence, or if the State's evidence is so unsatisfactory that it raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. People v. Brooks (1964), 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265. • 7 The State's evidence was sufficient to sustain the trial court's finding that Saunders committed two murders. It was the court's responsibility to determine the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.

Every sane man is presumed to intend all the natural and probable consequences of his act, and if he voluntarily and willfully does an act the tendency of which is to destroy another's life, the conclusion, in the absence of qualifying facts, is that the destruction of that life was intended. People v. Brooks (1964), 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265. • 6, 7 Wilson argues that there was sufficient evidence that Farland had a weapon to justify the reversal of his conviction; he also argues that he acted in self-defense and if he committed any offense it was voluntary manslaughter.

[3, 4] The question of identification is a matter to be determined by the jury and the jury's decision should not be upset unless the evidence is unsatisfactory and implausible as to create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. People v. Brooks, 52 Ill. App.2d 473, 202 N.E.2d 265 (1964); People v. Napper, 78 Ill. App.2d 451, 223 N.E.2d 194 (1967). [5] Defendant further contends that the lineup in which he appeared violated his right to due process of law.