Furthermore, numerous general-intent crimes have been held to evince moral turpitude. (See, e.g., People v. White, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 1301 [§ 246 (shooting at inhabited building)]; People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 671 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 570] [§ 273d (corporal punishment of child resulting in trauma)]; People v. Zataray (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 390, 400 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 33] [§ 207 (simple kidnapping)].)(2b) Defendant next asserts that the trial court "set too low a standard to decide whether a crime was one of moral turpitude."
Similarly, the willful infliction of "'cruel or inhuman corporal punishment or injury'" on a child in violation of section 273d involves moral turpitude. (People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 671-672.) Accordingly, the trial court appropriately determined that both incidents were relevant to impeach defendant's credibility.
Further, numerous general intent crimes have been classified as involving moral turpitude. ( People v. Campbell, supra, 23 Cal.App.4th at p. 1493, citing, e.g., People v. White (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1301 [ 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 259] [Pen. Code, § 246 (shooting at inhabited building)]; People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 671 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 570] [Pen. Code, § 273d (corporal punishment of child resulting in trauma)]; People v. Zataray (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 390, 400 [ 219 Cal.Rptr. 33] [Pen. Code, § 207 (simple kidnapping)].) We find "a readiness to do evil" is present in a section 273.5 violation because the offense is defined by a willful infliction of injury upon, as Rodriguez put it, "a person of the opposite sex in a special relationship for which society rationally demands, and the victim may reasonably expect, stability and safety, and in which the victim, for these reasons among others, may be especially vulnerable."
Moral turpitude has also been defined as involving an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a person owes to others or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people. (People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 671.) Whether a particular offense involves moral turpitude or a readiness to do evil must be determined on a felony-by-felony basis (People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 316), and the court must evaluate whether the least adjudicated elements of the felony necessarily involve moral turpitude.
The Third Appellate District recently found that the offense described in section 273d (willful infliction of cruel or inhuman corporal punishment on a child resulting in traumatic condition) involves moral turpitude. ( People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669 [ 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 570].) We, however, have previously distinguished sections 273a, subdivision (1), and 273d as being "different crimes with different elements."
E.g., Speed v. Scott, 787 So.2d 626, 633 (Miss. 2001); Benitez v. Dunevant, 198 Ariz. 90, 7 P.3d 99, 104 (2000); In re Sims, 861 A.2d 1, 3 n. 2 (D.C.App. 2004); State v. Miller, 172 Ariz. 294, 836 P.2d 1004, 1005 (1992); People v. Brooks, 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 570 (1992); Bane v. State, 73 Md.App. 135, 533 A.2d 309, 314 (1987). It is not deploying any insights that it might have obtained from adjudicating immigration cases. Since the Board hasn't done anything to particularize the meaning of "crime involving moral turpitude," giving Chevron deference to its determination of that meaning has no practical significance. It is only the second issue, the one that divides the courts, that has any significance — the issue of deciding which crimes involve moral turpitude.
Defendant's other priors are all crimes of moral turpitude. (People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 672 [unlawful corporal punishment of or injury to a child]; People v. Thornton (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 419, 424 [criminal threat]; People v. Standard (1986) 181 Cal.App.3d 431, 435 [possession of marijuana for sale].) As such, they "support an inference of readiness to lie."
Such crimes involve an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a person owes to others or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people. ( People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 671, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 570.) A. Possession of an assault weapon
Such crimes involve an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties which a person owes to others or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people. ( People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 671, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 570.) A. Possession of an assault weapon
Confirming this principle, a number of general intent crimes have been held to involve moral turpitude. (Ibid.;see alsoPeople v. White (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1299, 1301 [a violation of § 246, shooting into an inhabited dwelling, is a crime of moral turpitude admissible for impeachment]; People v. Brooks (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 669, 671–672 [a violation of § 273d, infliction of corporal punishment or injury to a child, is a crime of moral turpitude admissible for impeachment].) For this reason, appellant’s reliance on People v. Thurston (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1055, footnote 3, is misplaced, as the court there determined only that a violation of section 273.5 is a general intent crime.