Opinion
2017-02582 Ind. No. 1229/15
12-15-2021
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Edward BROOKS, appellant.
Patrick Michael Megaro, Forest Hills, NY, for appellant. Joyce A. Smith, Acting District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Tammy J. Smiley and Hilda Mortensen of counsel), for respondent.
Patrick Michael Megaro, Forest Hills, NY, for appellant.
Joyce A. Smith, Acting District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Tammy J. Smiley and Hilda Mortensen of counsel), for respondent.
LEONARD B. AUSTIN, J.P., ROBERT J. MILLER, PAUL WOOTEN, JOSEPH A. ZAYAS, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Jerald S. Carter, J.), rendered February 7, 2017, convicting him of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts) and criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree (two counts), upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing pursuant to a stipulation in lieu of motions (Patricia A. Harrington, J.), of the suppression of physical evidence.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant was indicted on various drug charges arising from the alleged sale of heroin and cocaine to an undercover detective. A cell phone recovered from the defendant when he was arrested allegedly was used to arrange the drug sale. Following a suppression hearing, at which the defendant was permitted to represent himself, the Supreme Court denied suppression of the cell phone, finding that it was recovered incident to a lawful arrest.
After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
A court must determine that a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is made competently, intelligently, and voluntarily before allowing that defendant to represent himself or herself (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255 ). In order to make that evaluation, the court "must undertake a ‘searching inquiry’ designed to ‘insur[e] that a defendant [is] aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel’ " ( id. at 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255, quoting People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 582, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 ). Here, the Supreme Court failed to conduct the requisite inquiry before allowing the defendant to represent himself during the suppression hearing (see People v. Lemmo, 192 A.D.3d 1143, 141 N.Y.S.3d 711 ). However, under the circumstances of this case, a new suppression hearing is not warranted. Since the People did not rely on any evidence pertaining to the cell phone at trial, the result at trial could not have been affected by the suppression hearing (see People v. Wardlaw, 6 N.Y.3d 556, 559–560, 816 N.Y.S.2d 399, 849 N.E.2d 258 ; People v. Rodriguez, 158 A.D.3d 143, 153–154, 66 N.Y.S.3d 488 ; cf. People v. Costan, 169 A.D.3d 820, 822, 94 N.Y.S.3d 131 ).
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence. In fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 ), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053 ; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 ). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15[5] ; People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902 ).
Also contrary to the defendant's contention, the record as a whole demonstrates that he received the effective assistance of counsel under both the federal and state constitutional standards (see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 ; People v. Benevento, 91 N.Y.2d 708, 712, 674 N.Y.S.2d 629, 697 N.E.2d 584 ; People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147, 444 N.Y.S.2d 893, 429 N.E.2d 400 ).
Furthermore, contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in conducting portions of the trial in his absence. "[A] waiver of the right to be present at a criminal trial may be inferred from certain conduct engaged in by the defendant after the trial has commenced" ( People v. Parker, 57 N.Y.2d 136, 139, 454 N.Y.S.2d 967, 440 N.E.2d 1313 ). "[A] defendant who engages in disruptive behavior during a trial may be held to have, in effect, waived his [or her] right to be present" ( People v. Connor, 137 A.D.2d 546, 549, 524 N.Y.S.2d 287 ). Here, a waiver of the defendant's right to be present may be inferred from his repeated disruptive conduct despite the court's admonitions (see People v. Ramos, 179 A.D.3d 842, 843–844, 117 N.Y.S.3d 96 ; People v. Paige, 134 A.D.3d 1048, 1052, 22 N.Y.S.3d 220 ).
The defendant's contention that the Supreme Court violated his constitutional rights by having him handcuffed in the presence of the jury is unpreserved for appellate review (see People v. Woods, 138 A.D.3d 1153, 1154, 28 N.Y.S.3d 905 ), and we decline to reach that issue in the exercise of our interest of justice jurisdiction.
AUSTIN, J.P., MILLER, WOOTEN and ZAYAS, JJ., concur.