Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. CRF06536
BLEASE, Acting P. J.
Defendant John Aralt Broderick appeals from the judgment and sentence after the trial court found he violated probation and imposed a three year prison term.
On appeal, he challenges the amount of victim restitution on the grounds there is a conflict between the reporter’s transcript, which states the amount is $1,079, and the clerk’s transcript, which states the amount is $1,779. He also contends the trial court erroneously imposed a second court security fee after it revoked probation.
We find no error and shall affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The underlying facts in this case are not at issue. Suffice it to say, on August 4, 2006, defendant stole a vehicle belonging to Dora Garcia while the vehicle was parked next to a Walgreens in Marysville. Two days later, defendant was stopped and then arrested by Marysville police officers while he was driving that vehicle.
Defendant entered a plea of no contest to vehicular theft. (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) On November 13, 2006, the trial court imposed a three year prison term, suspended execution of the sentence, and placed defendant on probation for three years. He was ordered to pay $1,779 in victim restitution (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)) plus various fines and fees including a $20 court security fee. (§ 1465.8.)
All further section references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
A probation revocation petition was filed alleging defendant failed to report to the probation officer and others as required and, on January 3, 2007, the trial court found defendant was in violation of probation. The court subsequently revoked probation and ordered the sentence to be executed. The court also re-imposed the same fines and fees, including the $20 court security fee. (§ 1465.8.)
DISCUSSION
I
Victim Restitution
Defendant contends the abstract of judgment should be corrected to conform to the amount of restitution the court imposed in its oral pronouncement. That order is reflected by the reporter’s transcript, which shows an order for $1,079 in victim restitution while the clerk’s minute order shows the amount imposed is $1,779. Respondent contends the minute order and abstract of judgment are controlling under the circumstances in this case. We agree with respondent.
At issue is the discrepancy between the reporter’s transcript of the original sentencing hearing and the rest of the record, which consistently reflects a victim restitution order in the amount of $1,779.
The probation report prepared for the initial sentencing hearing indicates the victim’s losses included the value of the stolen vehicle and two car seats. The probation officer calculated the value of the victim’s economic loss as follows: “[a]ccording to Kelly Blue Book, a 1993 Acura Integra is blue book valued at $1,575 in ‘good’ condition. Wal-Mart advised a car seat ranges from $49 to $159 with the average being $102. The average of two car seats and the blue book value of the vehicle total $1,779.” Based upon these figures, the probation officer recommended that “the Court find the defendant has the future financial ability to pay the following: [¶] Pay $1,779 restitution to Dora Garcia . . . .”
At the sentencing hearing, the trial court informed the parties it had read and considered the proposed conditions of probation. Defense counsel did not argue that the amount of victim restitution recommended by the probation report was in error. Rather, he asked for a disposition of time served, which he argued would allow defendant to work so he could pay the victim restitution of “$1,079.”
The reporter’s transcript indicates that the trial court made the following statement: “[t]he Court is going to make the findings that have [sic] future financial ability to pay the following $1,079 restitution to Dora Garcia . . . .” The court then stated that “[r]ather than placing you on probation, I would rather see Ms. Garcia paid in full as soon as possible . . . .” The clerk’s minute order for that hearing indicates the trial court imposed victim restitution in the amount of $1,779.
A supplemental probation report filed after defendant was found in violation of probation recommended that defendant “pay $1,779 restitution to Dora Garcia . . . .” At the sentencing hearing on January 22, 2007, the trial court pronounced sentence and again addressed the issue of victim restitution stating, “[a]s was previously ordered, you’ll pay restitution to Dora Garcia in the sum of $1,779.” That amount is also reflected in the clerk’s minute order and in the abstract of judgment.
Defendant relies on People v. Zackery (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 380 at page 385 for the principle that when there is a discrepancy between an oral pronouncement of judgment and the minute order, the oral pronouncement controls. We disagree.
The Supreme court has affirmed the general rule that when “‘the record is in conflict it will be harmonized if possible; but where this is not possible that part of the record will prevail, which, because of its origin and nature or otherwise, is entitled to greater credence [citation]. Therefore, whether the recitals in the clerk's minutes should prevail as against contrary statements in the reporter's transcript, must depend upon the circumstances of each particular case.’” (People v. Smith (1983) 33 Cal.3d 596, 599, quoting In re Evans (1945) 70 Cal.App.2d 213, 216; People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 768.) Thus, the clerk’s transcript was held to control over a conflicting reporter's transcript where the clerk's transcript was detailed and more reliable. (People v. Malabag (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th 1419, 1426.)
In this case there is no real conflict between the clerk’s transcript and the reporter’s transcript because the reporter’s transcript of the January 22, 2007, hearing also indicates that the amount of the victim restitution order is $1,779. Thus, contrary to defendant’s claim, the court’s oral pronouncement of judgment accurately stated the amount of restitution.
To the extent there is a conflict, the conflict is between the reporter’s transcript of the two sentencing hearings and as to that conflict, we find the transcript of the first hearing is not as reliable as the transcript of the later hearing. The reporter’s transcript of the first hearing is inconsistent with the detailed clerk’s minute order and with the court’s clear statement of intent that the victim be “paid in full.” This conclusion is further supported by the trial court’s choice of words, which appear to track those of the probation report although there is a nonsensical error that could only be an error of transcription - “The Court is going to make the findings that have [sic] future financial ability to pay . . . .” Thus, the trial court either misspoke the amount of victim restitution after hearing defense counsel misstate the amount or the reporter erred again when transcribing the amount of the victim restitution. Either way, the court’s intent was clear, namely to impose restitution for the full value of the victim’s economic loss as required by law. (§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) We therefore conclude the reporter’s transcript of the November 13th hearing fails to accurately reflect the court’s intention and the abstract of judgment is controlling.
We note the reporter’s transcript contains several transcription errors.
Subdivision (f) of section 1202.4 mandates that the trial court “order full restitution unless it finds compelling and extraordinary reasons for not doing so, and states them on the record.”
II
Security Fee
Defendant contends the trial court erred by imposing a second $20 court security fee under section 1465.8 when it revoked his probation and imposed sentence. Respondent concedes this claim. We find a second fee was not imposed.
Section 1465.8, subdivision (a)(1) requires that the trial court impose a twenty dollar ($20) court security fee “on every conviction for a criminal offense, including a traffic offense, except parking offenses as defined . . . or any local ordinance adopted pursuant to the Vehicle Code.” (Italics added.) The parties are therefore correct in concluding that since defendant was convicted of only one qualifying offense, he could only be ordered to pay one court security fee. (See People v. Schoeb (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 861, 865-866 [section 1465.8 requires that a $20 fee be imposed for “every conviction for a criminal offense . . . .”].)
When the trial court initially granted defendant probation, it imposed a $20 court security fee (§ 1465.8) and several restitution fines. (§§ 1202.4, subds. (b) and (f) and 1202.45.) When the court subsequently revoked probation and pronounced sentence as previously imposed, it also reiterated the prior orders to pay various restitution fines and fees, including the court security fee. The abstract of judgment is consistent with the court’s oral pronouncement.
According to the reporter’s transcript of that hearing, the trial court stated as follows: “As was previously ordered, you will pay a restitution fine of $200. The $200 probation revocation fine that was suspended, suspension is lifted. That is now due and payable. [¶] I will now impose a $200 parole revocation fine. That is suspended. Suspension lifted upon revocation of parole. [¶] As was previously ordered, you’ll pay restitution to Dora Garcia in the sum of $1,779. . . . [¶] I’ll impose a $20 court security fee.”
The abstract of judgment in a criminal case is a document described in section 1213, which states in pertinent part that “[w]hen a probationary order or a judgment . . . has been pronounced, a copy of the entry of that portion of the probationary order ordering the defendant confined in a city or county jail as a condition of probation, or a copy of the entry of the judgment, or, if the judgment is for imprisonment in a state prison, either a copy of the minute order or an abstract of the judgment as provided in Section 1213.5, certified . . . and a Criminal Investigation and Identification (CII) number shall be forthwith furnished to the officer whose duty it is to execute the probationary order or judgment, and no other warrant or authority is necessary to justify or require its execution.”
Thus, the certified abstract of the judgment is the order sending the defendant to prison and constitutes the warden’s authority to carry out the judgment and sentence. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185; In re Black (1967) 66 Cal.2d 881, 889-890.)
The abstract of judgment must therefore digest or summarize the judgment (People v. Prater (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 695, 703), which includes fees (People v. Sanchez (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1329, 1332) and fines. (People v. Hong (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1071, 1080.) The court in Hong found that this conclusion was “consistent with the unmistakable legislative intention that the Department of Corrections be apprised of the amount of the restitution fine so that it can fulfill its obligations to secure payment from inmates and parolees.”
In accordance with these authorities, after defendant was sentenced to prison, an abstract of judgment was prepared that properly summarized the fines and fees imposed on defendant, including the $20 court security fee. Defendant does not contend otherwise. Since that fee appears only once on the abstract of judgment, we find no error.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: MORRISON, J., CANTIL-SAKAUYE, J.