Furthermore, as to the defendant's "as applied" theory, it is well settled that where, as here, there has been no evidentiary hearing or any findings of fact in the lower court, the reviewing court cannot make an "as applied" determination of the constitutionality of a statute. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶57. We, therefore, decline to consider the defendant's "as applied" challenge to the statute since he failed to raise this issue in the trial court and has therefore forfeited a review.

See People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 82 (holding the challenged provisions of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute are constitutional and the statute's "substantial and important goal is absolutely reasonable although arguably somewhat imperfect."). See also People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 56 (holding, "we conclude that the statute is constitutionally permissible despite its restrictions on the right of felons to bear arms, as it is a valid exercise of the important governmental interest in protecting the health, safety and general welfare of its citizens."). The unlawful use of a weapon by a felon statute has also been determined constitutional by this court.

We find that defendant was properly sentenced, as we concur with the overwhelming number of cases which have determined that a Class X sentence includes the MSR period set out for one who has been convicted of a Class X offense. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v.Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Anderson 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). ¶ 12 For the reasons set out in this order, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. ¶ 13 Affirmed.

This court has clearly and repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. E.g., People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 60-62, People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 80-83 (2010); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). We decline defendant's invitation to abandon these well-reasoned cases, which specifically addressed the MSR statute, in favor of People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), which addressed the consecutive sentencing statute.

See People v. Young, 207 Ill. App. 3d 130, 134, 565 N.E.2d 309, 312 (1990) (trial court advised the defendant's family had retained private counsel, and counsel was present and ready, willing, and able to make an entry of appearance). Compare Staple, 402 Ill. App. 3d at 1104, 932 N.E.2d at 1069 (trial court properly denied motion to continue on day of trial, where defendant had not hired substitute counsel and did not allege counsel was ready, willing, and able to represent her), with People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, 971 N.E.2d 20 (denial of motion to substitute counsel error where new defense counsel was present in court and ready to file an appearance), and Tucker, 382 Ill. App. 3d at 923-24, 889 N.E.2d at 739-40 (denial of motion to substitute counsel error where defendant's counsel informed trial court the defendant did not want him as his attorney and he had hired a new attorney). Defendant's motion made no reference why new counsel was sought at this time—when he had answered ready for trial five days earlier—nor did it articulate why court-appointed counsel could not—on the day of trial—continue to represent him.

This court has repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a mandatory Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. People v. Davis, 2012 IL App (5th) 100044, ¶¶ 26-34; People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 58-62; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Holman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 645, 652-53 (2010); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81-83 (2010); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). Defendant argues that these cases are cast into doubt by our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), where a defendant convicted of multiple burglaries and sentenced as a Class X offender to consecutive prison terms totaling 30 years challenged his consecutive sentencing on the basis that the aggregate sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.

We find that defendant was properly sentenced, as we concur with the overwhelming number of cases which have determined that a Class X sentence includes the MSR period set out for one who has been convicted of a Class X offense. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). ¶ 10 For the reasons set out in this order, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence. ¶ 11 Affirmed.

Pullen, however, has been fully addressed by this court and found not to change the conclusion that a defendant sentenced as a Class X offender shall receive the same three-year MSR term imposed on defendants convicted of Class X felonies. See People v. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ¶¶ 36-38; People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 62; People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1073 (2010); and People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 83 (2010). We agree with these decisions and likewise conclude that the three-year MSR term was correctly applied here.

We find that defendant was properly sentenced, as we concur with those cases which have determined that a defendant who is Class X by background is subject to the same MSR period as one who has been convicted of a Class X offense. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Anderson 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). ¶ 15 For the reasons set out in this order, we affirm defendant's conviction of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver but we vacate his conviction of possession of a controlled substance.

Defendant observes that the language in the Class X offender statute does not change the classification of his underlying Class 2 felony offense and, therefore, argues that the two-year MSR term for the Class 2 felony should apply. However, our court has reached the contrary conclusion and held that a defendant "sentenced as a Class X offender" is subject to the Class X three-year term of MSR. See, e.g., People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-60; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 767 (2009); People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). ¶ 7 Defendant takes issue with these holdings and cites to People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), for support.