It is well settled that a defendant's right to counsel of choice must be measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41; People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 48. In balancing these interests," 'the court must inquire into the actual request to determine whether it is being used merely as a delaying tactic'" Tucker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 920 (quoting People v. Burrell, 228 Ill.App.3d 133, 142 (1992)).

Under these circumstances, the court did not act arbitrarily in denying the defendant's request for a continuance so that he could attempt to hire Williams. ¶ 17 Although the defendant contends that his argument is a due process claim that is subject to de novo review, he cites in support of his argument several cases in which circuit courts were found to have abused their discretion in denying continuances to newly-hired attorneys to give them time to prepare (People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 39; People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 410 (1995)) and to a defendant whose newly-hired attorney was not in court (People v. Little, 207 Ill.App.3d 720, 727-28 (1990)). These cases all occurred at the trial level rather than in postconviction proceedings and involved the sixth amendment right to counsel rather than the due process right to obtain privately-retained counsel.

The right to counsel of choice is measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41. "Therefore, the trial court may consider the defendant's reasons for seeking new counsel, whether the request is merely a guise to thwart effective prosecution, whether the defendant has cooperated with current counsel, and the length of time the defendant has been represented by current counsel." Id.

¶ 21 Indeed, that the attorney seeking leave to appear needs time to prepare for trial, "alone, has never been held a sufficient basis to effectively deny a motion to substitute." People v. Brisco , 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 45, 47, 361 Ill.Dec. 365, 971 N.E.2d 20. "This is particularly true where the trial court did not even inquire as to the length of time counsel would need," as here. Id. ¶ 47.

No attorney appeared ready, willing, and able to appear for defendant to begin trial. ¶ 75 Defendant argues that the trial court's requirement that a new attorney be ready for trial was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. Defendant relies on People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, for support. In that case, a new attorney sought to substitute as counsel for posttrial proceedings, but requested additional time to supplement a previously filed motion for a new trial.

¶ 13 Nevertheless, defendant contends that the trial court erred because the fact that private counsel was not prepared to proceed to trial was not a basis for denying a continuance, the court improperly relied upon consideration of the expense to the taxpayers, it was difficult for defendant to hire an attorney because he was incarcerated, the court failed to inquire about defendant's efforts to hire private counsel, and the trial court failed to consider the fact that defendant was not cooperating with counsel.¶ 14 Defendant relies on this court's decision in People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, for his argument that private counsel not being ready to proceed to trial was not a valid reason to deny his request for a continuance. In Brisco, this court vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded for new posttrial proceedings where the trial court erred in denying his motion to substitute counsel for posttrial proceedings.

Rather, to show bias, a defendant must demonstrate "active personal animosity, hostility, ill will or distrust toward him" by the court. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 29, 971 N.E.2d 20.¶ 49 Our review of the record reveals defendant's allegations of judicial bias are without merit. For example, defendant alleges the trial court interrupted him and gave legal advice to the State.

Officers Stinar and Pierri alleged that they were on patrol when they spotted Brisco at the entrance of an alley, robbing a man on a bicycle. Id. at ¶ 14 (summarizing the police report); People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, at ¶ 6, 361 Ill. Dec. 365, 971 N.E.2d 20 (2012). When Brisco saw the officers, he took off, running into a nearby building.

It is well settled that a defendant's right to counsel of choice must be measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41; People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 48.

It is well settled that a defendant's right to counsel of choice must be measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41; People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 48. In balancing these interests," 'the court must inquire into the actual request to determine whether it is being used merely as a delaying tactic'" Tucker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 920 (quoting People v. Burrell, 228 Ill.App.3d 133, 142 (1992)).