Under these circumstances, the court did not act arbitrarily in denying the defendant's request for a continuance so that he could attempt to hire Williams. ¶ 17 Although the defendant contends that his argument is a due process claim that is subject to de novo review, he cites in support of his argument several cases in which circuit courts were found to have abused their discretion in denying continuances to newly-hired attorneys to give them time to prepare (People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 39; People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 410 (1995)) and to a defendant whose newly-hired attorney was not in court (People v. Little, 207 Ill.App.3d 720, 727-28 (1990)). These cases all occurred at the trial level rather than in postconviction proceedings and involved the sixth amendment right to counsel rather than the due process right to obtain privately-retained counsel.

The right to counsel of choice is measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41. "Therefore, the trial court may consider the defendant's reasons for seeking new counsel, whether the request is merely a guise to thwart effective prosecution, whether the defendant has cooperated with current counsel, and the length of time the defendant has been represented by current counsel." Id.

¶ 21 Indeed, that the attorney seeking leave to appear needs time to prepare for trial, "alone, has never been held a sufficient basis to effectively deny a motion to substitute." People v. Brisco , 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 45, 47, 361 Ill.Dec. 365, 971 N.E.2d 20. "This is particularly true where the trial court did not even inquire as to the length of time counsel would need," as here. Id. ¶ 47.

Although defendant suggests that the length of the MSR term imposed should be based on the classification of the underlying felony conviction rather than the classification of the requisite sentencing range, this argument has been repeatedly rejected by reviewing courts. See, e.g., People v. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ¶¶ 36-38 (recognizing that defendant's subject to Class X sentences are subject to the Class X three-year MSR term); People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62 (same); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011) (same); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010) (same); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 82-83 (2010) (same); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541 (1995) (same). Courts have reasoned that "the gravity of the conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires lengthier watchfulness after prison release than violations of a less serious nature."

We agree with the State that the invitee exemption is not an element of the offense of AUUW. ¶ 42 Defendant, however, cites People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 16, for the proposition that the invitee exemption was "a necessary element of the offense of AUUW after August 25, 2009." We do not find Brisco persuasive because it stated that proposition without any analysis or discussion of sections 24-2(b)(5) and 24-2(h).

This court has repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a mandatory Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. See People v. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ¶¶ 36-38 (recognizing that defendants subject to Class X sentences are subject to the Class X three-year MSR term); People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81-83 (2010); People v. Holman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 645, 652-53 (2010); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); and People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (2009). We will not depart from these well-reasoned decisions.

The State responds that it was respondent's burden to raise and prove the exception for invitees. ¶ 10 Our supreme court has held that the exceptions listed in the body of the AUUW statute are elements of the offense which the State must disprove. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (1998); see also People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 16 (a defendant's status, or lack thereof, as an invitee is a necessary element of the offense of AUUW). When an exception appears as part of the body of a substantive offense, the State has the burden to disprove the exception beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a conviction.

Furthermore, this court has repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a mandatory Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. See People v. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ¶¶ 36-38 (recognizing that defendants subject to Class X sentences are subject to the Class X three-year MSR term); People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81-83 (2010); People v. Holman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 645, 652-53 (2010); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); and People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (2009). We will not depart from these well-reasoned decisions.

However, our court has reached the contrary conclusion and held that a defendant sentenced as a Class X offender is subject to the Class X three-year term of MSR. See, e.g., People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-60; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st)090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 767 (2009); People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995).

This court has repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a mandatory Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. See, e.g., People v. Lenoir, 2013 IL App (1st) 113615, ¶¶ 22-25; People v. Wade, 2013 IL App (1st) 112547, ¶¶ 31-38; People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 58-62. Defendant argues that these cases are cast into doubt by our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), where a defendant convicted of multiple burglaries and sentenced as a Class X offender to consecutive prison terms totaling 30 years challenged his consecutive sentencing on the basis that his aggregate sentence exceeded the statutory maximum.