It is well settled that a defendant's right to counsel of choice must be measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41; People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 48. In balancing these interests," 'the court must inquire into the actual request to determine whether it is being used merely as a delaying tactic'" Tucker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 920 (quoting People v. Burrell, 228 Ill.App.3d 133, 142 (1992)).

The right to counsel of choice is measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41. "Therefore, the trial court may consider the defendant's reasons for seeking new counsel, whether the request is merely a guise to thwart effective prosecution, whether the defendant has cooperated with current counsel, and the length of time the defendant has been represented by current counsel." Id.

¶20 This Court has considered this issue and repeatedly held that the three-year MSR term is proper when a defendant is sentenced as a Class X offender based upon prior qualifying convictions and a current Class 1 or Class 2 felony conviction. People v. Wade, 2013 IL App. (1st) 112547 at ¶¶ 31-38; People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612 at ¶¶59-62; People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (1st Dist. 2011); People v. Lampley, 405 Ill. App. 3d, 13-14 (1st Dist. 2010); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1st Dist. 1995); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 78-83 (2nd Dist. 2010); People v. Holman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 645, 652-53 (2nd Dist. 2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (3rd Dist. 2009); People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3rd 1058, 1078 (4th Dist. 2011); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (4th Dist. 2010); People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (4th Dist. 2000); People v. Davis, 2012 IL App. (5th) 100044, ¶¶26-34. In reaching this conclusion, this Court has reasoned "the gravity of conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare, authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires lengthier watchfulness after prison release than violations of a less serious nature," so attaching a three-year MSR term to a Class X felony pursuant to the Statute is reasonable. A

730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(l) (West 2010). ¶ 22 This court has previously considered and consistently rejected defendant's argument. See, e.g., People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612; People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22 (2011); see also People v. Holman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 645 (2010); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764 (2009). Where a defendant qualifies for Class X sentencing, a three-year period of MSR is imposed.

This court has repeatedly interpreted this statutory scheme as requiring a defendant sentenced as a mandatory Class X offender receive the Class X MSR term of three years. People v. Davis, 2012 IL App (5th) 100044, ¶¶ 26-34; People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 58-62; People v. Lampley, 2011 IL App (1st) 090661-B, ¶¶ 47-49; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Holman, 402 Ill. App. 3d 645, 652-53 (2010); People v. McKinney, 399 Ill. App. 3d 77, 81-83 (2010); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); People v. Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995).

It is well settled that a defendant's right to counsel of choice must be measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41; People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 48.

It is well settled that a defendant's right to counsel of choice must be measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41; People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 48. In balancing these interests," 'the court must inquire into the actual request to determine whether it is being used merely as a delaying tactic'" Tucker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 920 (quoting People v. Burrell, 228 Ill.App.3d 133, 142 (1992)).

Defendant concedes this court has repeatedly held that a defendant sentenced as a Class X offender receives the Class X MSR term of three years. See People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 59-62; People v. Allen, 409 Ill. App. 3d 1058, 1078 (2011); People v. Rutledge, 409 Ill. App. 3d 22, 26 (2011); People v. Lee, 397 Ill. App. 3d 1067, 1072-73 (2010); People v. Watkins, 387 Ill. App. 3d 764, 766-67 (2009); People v Smart, 311 Ill. App. 3d 415, 417-18 (2000); People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541-42 (1995). Nevertheless, defendant claims that our supreme court's decision in People v. Pullen, 192 Ill. 2d 36 (2000), dictates that a defendant convicted of a Class 2 felony, but sentenced as a Class X offender, should receive the term of MSR for Class 2 felonies. ¶ 35 Defendant argues that Pullen stands for the proposition that Class X sentencing eligibility under section 5-5-3(c)(3) will not trump a sentencing statute written in terms of felonies committed.

See People v. Mimes, 2011 IL App (1st) 082747, ¶ 82 (holding the challenged provisions of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute are constitutional and the statute's "substantial and important goal is absolutely reasonable although arguably somewhat imperfect."). See also People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 56 (holding, "we conclude that the statute is constitutionally permissible despite its restrictions on the right of felons to bear arms, as it is a valid exercise of the important governmental interest in protecting the health, safety and general welfare of its citizens."). The unlawful use of a weapon by a felon statute has also been determined constitutional by this court.