People v. Brisco

51 Citing cases

  1. People v. Tolbert

    2014 Ill. App. 122343 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)   Cited 2 times

    The invitee exception was an element of the crime of AUUW and the State bore the burden of disproving its existence. See People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 22; see also People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330, 335 (1998) ("When an exception appears as part of the body of a substantive offense, the State bears the burden of disproving the existence of the exception beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain a conviction for the offense."); People v. Price, 375 Ill. App. 3d 684, 687 (2007) (finding the State must disprove the abode exception as an element of AUUW).

  2. People v. Heineman

    2021 Ill. App. 2d 190689 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)   Cited 1 times

    It is well settled that a defendant's right to counsel of choice must be measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41; People v. Curry, 2013 IL App (4th) 120724, ¶ 48. In balancing these interests," 'the court must inquire into the actual request to determine whether it is being used merely as a delaying tactic'" Tucker, 382 Ill.App.3d at 920 (quoting People v. Burrell, 228 Ill.App.3d 133, 142 (1992)).

  3. People v. Guice

    2021 Ill. App. 3d 190389 (Ill. App. Ct. 2021)

    Under these circumstances, the court did not act arbitrarily in denying the defendant's request for a continuance so that he could attempt to hire Williams. ¶ 17 Although the defendant contends that his argument is a due process claim that is subject to de novo review, he cites in support of his argument several cases in which circuit courts were found to have abused their discretion in denying continuances to newly-hired attorneys to give them time to prepare (People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 39; People v. Childress, 276 Ill.App.3d 402, 410 (1995)) and to a defendant whose newly-hired attorney was not in court (People v. Little, 207 Ill.App.3d 720, 727-28 (1990)). These cases all occurred at the trial level rather than in postconviction proceedings and involved the sixth amendment right to counsel rather than the due process right to obtain privately-retained counsel.

  4. People v. Pabon

    2015 Ill. App. 133653 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    Because this issue involves a question of statutory interpretation, our review is de novo. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 59.¶ 6 Section 5-4.5-95(b) of the Unified Code of Corrections directs that when a defendant is convicted of a Class 1 or 2 felony, and has previously been convicted twice of offenses classified

  5. People v. Bulski

    2015 Ill. App. 140985 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    The right to counsel of choice is measured against the trial court's interest in trying the case with diligence and the orderly process of judicial administration. People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 41. "Therefore, the trial court may consider the defendant's reasons for seeking new counsel, whether the request is merely a guise to thwart effective prosecution, whether the defendant has cooperated with current counsel, and the length of time the defendant has been represented by current counsel." Id.

  6. People v. Cox

    2014 Ill. App. 121174 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    We agree with the State. ¶ 30 "The law is clear that when a defendant qualifies for Class X sentencing, a three-year period of MSR is necessarily imposed." People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 60. In People v. Anderson, 272 Ill. App. 3d 537, 541 (1995), this court explained the reasoning behind imposing a three-year MSR period on an offender who was Class X eligible by background, but not convicted of a Class X offense, stating "the gravity of the conduct offensive to the public safety and welfare, authorizing Class X sentencing, justifiably requires lengthier watchfulness after prison release than violations of a less serious nature."

  7. People v. Tolbert

    2016 IL 117846 (Ill. 2016)   Cited 19 times
    In Tolbert, the court found the language "not apply to or affect" demonstrated a "clear statement from the General Assembly indicating its intent to withdraw or exempt" invitees from the reach of section 24-1.6(a)(1).

    ¶ 8 With respect to defendant's conviction under section 24–1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I), the appellate court concluded that the State's charging instrument was fatally defective. Relying on People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, 361 Ill.Dec. 365, 971 N.E.2d 20, and People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill.2d 330, 233 Ill.Dec. 639, 701 N.E.2d 489 (1998), the appellate court held that the invitee requirement in section 24–1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I), which states that there is no criminal liability if the person is “on the land or in the legal dwelling of another person as an invitee with that person's permission,” is an element of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/24–1.6(a)(1), (a)(3)(I) (West 2012).

  8. People v. Jenkins

    2020 Ill. App. 172422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2020)   Cited 8 times
    In Jenkins, the defendant was appointed counsel at his arraignment and a few months later, the court held a Rule 402 conference.

    ¶ 21 Indeed, that the attorney seeking leave to appear needs time to prepare for trial, "alone, has never been held a sufficient basis to effectively deny a motion to substitute." People v. Brisco , 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶¶ 45, 47, 361 Ill.Dec. 365, 971 N.E.2d 20. "This is particularly true where the trial court did not even inquire as to the length of time counsel would need," as here. Id. ¶ 47.

  9. People v. Forero-Gomez

    2019 Ill. App. 161245 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    First, unlike several cases upon which the defendant relies, the trial court specifically found that the defendant's attempt to substitute counsel was a delay tactic. See People v. Adams, 2016 IL App (1st) 141135, ¶ 17; People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, ¶ 42; Childress, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 411. Second, the defendant had been represented by Amatore for more than three years and had never complained about him or expressed a desire to obtain different counsel.

  10. People v. Chaffin

    2016 Ill. App. 143962 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016)   Cited 1 times

    No attorney appeared ready, willing, and able to appear for defendant to begin trial. ¶ 75 Defendant argues that the trial court's requirement that a new attorney be ready for trial was unreasonable and an abuse of discretion. Defendant relies on People v. Brisco, 2012 IL App (1st) 101612, for support. In that case, a new attorney sought to substitute as counsel for posttrial proceedings, but requested additional time to supplement a previously filed motion for a new trial.