" The court reasoned that the twenty year sentence plus the three year mandatory release period was still considerably shorter than the possible forty year sentence that the defendant was told he could receive, and it was thus "most unlikely," given the nature of the crimes, that "knowledge of the parole term would be anything more than an academic factor in the defendant's decision to plead guilty." Miller, 63 Ill. Dec. at 718, 438 N.E.2d at 649, quoting People v. Briner, 57 Ill.App.3d 327, 328, 14 Ill.Dec. 902, 904, 373 N.E.2d 33, 35 (1978). The Illinois Appellate Court also ruled that the trial court's failure to admonish Miller that by pleading guilty he was waiving his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to confront witnesses was harmless error.
Subsequent to Wills, the Illinois Appellate Court has rejected a number of challenges to the voluntary and intelligent character of guilty pleas based solely on the absence of an admonition concerning a mandatory parole term. People v. Wills, supra; People v. Ring, supra; People v. Briner, 57 Ill. App. 327, 14 Ill.Dec. 902, 373 N.E.2d 33 (1978); People v. Irons, 54 Ill. App.3d 50, 12 Ill.Dec. 61, 369 N.E.2d 558 (1977); People v. Cox, supra; People v. Miller, 36 Ill. App.3d 943, 344 N.E.2d 760 (1976); People v. McLean, 35 Ill. App.3d 965, 338 N.E.2d 902 (1975); People v. Bosse, 32 Ill. App.3d 422, 336 N.E.2d 216 (1975). Although such cases at first glance seem to indicate that the post-conviction remedy could be considered futile, they fail to establish that the Illinois courts have firmly adopted a hostile stance toward Baker-type claims.
"It is most unlikely * * * that given this advice in this case and considering the vicious nature of the crime that knowledge of the parole term would be anything more than an academic factor in defendant's decision to plead guilty." People v. Briner (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 327, 328, 373 N.E.2d 33, 35. In dealing with a similar factual situation, the supreme court in People v. McCoy said, "The * * * sentence imposed, together with the mandatory parole period, are [ sic] substantially less than the maximum * * * to which defendant knew he could be sentenced.
( Wills.) Although such a failure to admonish is not sufficient, by itself, to render a plea of guilty either involuntary or unintelligent ( People v. Briner (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 327, 373 N.E.2d 33), it is a factor to be considered on the issue of voluntariness. Wills.
At least in this instance, the petitioner was informed that a period of parole accompanied his sentence, albeit a shorter period than was actually required by statute. Under the Illinois law applicable to this case, the erroneous admonition raises no constitutional question (see People v. Briner (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 327, 373 N.E.2d 33; People v. Irons (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 50, 369 N.E.2d 558), but is one factor to be considered in determining whether petitioner's pleas were intelligently and voluntarily entered. The record, as a whole, indicates that the petitioner was in all respects other than the length of the period of mandatory parole, fully and correctly admonished of the consequences of his pleas.
People v. Dudley, 58 Ill.2d 57, 60-61 (1974). See also People v. Ellis, 59 Ill.2d 255, 257 (1974); People v. Van Gilder, 26 Ill. App.3d 152, 153-55 (1975); People v. Briner, 57 Ill. App.3d 327 (1978). • 5 We also conclude that the defendant's sentence was not an abuse of discretion in light of the wanton cruelty that accompanied the death of the victim.