Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
Superior Court County No. F387768, of San Luis Obispo, John A. Trice, Judge.
Charles M. Bonneau for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, William H. Shin, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
GILBERT, P.J.
Christopher Brillon appeals an order determining him to be a mentally disordered offender (MDO), and recommitting him to the Department of Mental Health for treatment. (Pen. Code, § 2962 et seq.) We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless stated otherwise.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On October 20, 2003, Brillon was convicted of stalking in violation of a restraining order. (§ 646.9, subd. (b).) The Sutter County Superior Court sentenced him to four years and eight months' imprisonment.
On April 21, 2006, the Board of Prison Terms determined that Brillon was an MDO pursuant to the criteria of section 2962. As a condition of parole, it required him to accept treatment from the Department of Mental Health. Brillon filed a petition pursuant to section 2966, subdivision (b), to contest the decision of the Board of Prison Terms. A jury trial followed.
At trial, psychologists John Riley, Amy Phenix, and Beth Gier testified that Brillon met the recommitment criteria of section 2972, subdivision (c). The psychologists based their opinions upon interviews with Brillon and reviews of his medical and psychiatric records.
Doctor Riley opined that Brillon suffers from a persecution-delusion disorder and a depressive disorder, not otherwise specified. He stated that Brillon believes that "anyone he comes in contact with is in some way out to harm him," including a former spouse, attorneys, treatment staff, and jailers. Riley also stated that Brillon believed that he had renewed a relationship with his former wife. He opined that Brillon is not in remission and presents a substantial physical danger to others by reason of his severe mental disorder, in part because he refuses medication and participation in treatment.
Doctor Phenix opined that Brillon suffers from a delusion disorder and a depressive disorder, not otherwise specified. She described Brillon's delusions as entrenched, grandiose, and persecutory: "[A]lmost everyone that he has come into contact with has some type of conspiracy against him [and] is trying to hurt and harm him in some way." Phenix opined that Brillon is not in remission and presents a substantial physical danger to others by reason of his mental disorder in part because he refuses medication and has threatened others with violent harm.
Doctor Beth Gier testified that she treated Brillon at Atascadero State Hospital for several months. She opined that he suffers from a delusional disorder that impairs his daily functioning. She stated that Brillon "targeted" and intimidated people through telephone calls regarding his delusional beliefs. Gier opined that Brillon is "not open to adjusting his course" when confronted by his victims' requests that he not disturb them. She also stated that Brillon was not in remission and presents a substantial physical danger to others by reason of his mental disorder because he refuses treatment, does not recognize his psychological problems, and has a low tolerance for frustration.
Brillon's Expert Witness
Prior to trial, Brillon sought a ruling from the trial court to permit an expert witness, attorney Tamiya Davis, to testify regarding the merits of his legal claims. Brillon asserted that the expert opinion testimony would establish that his legal complaints are not delusional. Thus, Davis would testify concerning reinstatement of the appeal of the underlying criminal conviction, grounds for the appeal (the denial of a motion to suppress evidence), the termination of his parental rights in 2003 and his rights as an Indian under federal law, the sale of his vehicle by his former attorneys, and the misappropriation of his apartment furnishings. The trial court ruled that the evidence was relevant, but that it would confuse the jury and require an undue consumption of time to determine the merits of Brillon's legal complaints. (Evid. Code, § 352.) It denied Brillon's motion.
The jury determined that Brillon met the requirements of section 2972, subdivision (c), beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial court ordered him recommitted to the Department of Mental Health for treatment.
Brillon appeals and contends that the trial court erred by: 1) not permitting expert witness Tamiya Davis to testify regarding the merits of his legal matters, and 2) instructing that the prosecution need not prove his commission of a recent overt act.
DISCUSSION
I.
Brillon argues that the trial court erred by not permitting attorney Davis to testify as an expert witness regarding the merits of his legal claims. He asserts that her testimony would counter the prosecution evidence that he is delusional and preoccupied with legal matters. Brillion adds that the jury would decide only if his claims are legitimate, not whether he would ultimately prevail. He contends that the trial court's ruling denied him the constitutional right to present a defense. (Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302 ["Few rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense."].)
Evidence Code section 352 grants the trial court broad discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will necessitate undue consumption of time or create substantial danger of undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 440.) We review the trial court's ruling pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1124-1125.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the legal expert's opinion testimony because its slight probative value is outweighed by the undue consumption of time and likelihood of jury confusion. The proposed expert testimony concerns legal issues of recall of remittitur, a motion to suppress evidence, termination of parental rights, and conversion of personal property. The evidence possesses slight relevance because it does not counter Brillon's delusions that "almost everyone that he has come into contact with has some type of conspiracy against him" or his inappropriate responses, including persistent telephone calls to many persons, despite the existence of restraining orders. As Doctor Gier explained: "[I]t's perfectly normal to be really bummed about legal issues, and a divorce, and losing custody. . . . At some point, [one] sort of ha[s] to accept things and fight for them in legitimate ways . . . . Mr. Brillon's ways for fighting [for] them have gone beyond norm and safety."
Moreover, application of the ordinary rules of evidence does not impermissibly infringe upon a defendant's right to present a defense. (People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th 408, 440.) A defendant has no constitutional right to present all relevant evidence in his favor, no matter how limited in probative value, and preclude the trial court's exercise of discretion pursuant to Evidence Code section 352. (People v. Reeder (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 543, 553.)
II.
Brillon argues that the trial court improperly instructed that "'Substantial Danger of Physical Harm' does not require proof of a recent overt act." He asserts that the instruction is argumentative, diminishes the defense evidence that he had not committed any recent violent acts, and improperly shifts the burden of proof in violation of due process of law. Brillon contends that the instruction implies that the lack of a recent violent act is irrelevant to the MDO determination.
The trial court did not err by instructing with this special instruction. Section 2962, subdivision (f), states: "As used in this chapter, 'substantial danger of physical harm' does not require proof of a recent overt act." The instruction correctly states applicable law regarding the element of present dangerousness.
The trial court properly instructed with the required elements of the recommitment determination: "A person fits the criteria of Mentally Disordered Offender if the evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that he meets the following criteria as of the date of the Board of Prison Terms hearing: 1. The person has a severe mental disorder; 2. The severe mental disorder is not in remission, or cannot be kept in remission without treatment; and 3. By reason of his severe mental disorder, the person represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." The trial court also instructed that the prosecutor must "prove the criteria beyond a reasonable doubt," and absent such proof, defendant was entitled to a finding that he did not meet the MDO criteria. The instructions as a whole directed the jury to find each of the MDO criteria proved beyond a reasonable doubt and to "compare and consider all the evidence that was received throughout the entire trial." We presume the jury understands and follows the trial court's instructions. (People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 773.)
The order of commitment is affirmed.
We concur: YEGAN, J., COFFEE, J.