Opinion
C082653
11-20-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CHRISTOPHER RUEL BRILLON, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 62141165)
A jury found defendant Christopher Ruel Brillon guilty of stalking, making a criminal threat, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the allegations he had a prior conviction for stalking and had served a prior prison term.
On appeal, defendant contends his conviction for making a criminal threat must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence. He further contends his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm must be reversed because of improper venue. Anticipating that he may have forfeited his claims, defendant alternatively argues he received ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We only summarize the facts relevant to the claims raised on appeal. Because defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for stalking Felisha, we do not attempt to summarize all the evidence supporting that conviction.
The victim, Stephanie Gaetz, is the daughter of Ronald Gaetz and Felisha Floyd. At the time of trial, Stephanie was 31 years old. She testified, in relevant part, as follows: Following her parents' divorce, Felisha married defendant. They had one child together in 2000 named Crystal. Felisha and defendant separated less than a year after they were married.
We recount this detail about defendant's long abusive history with the victim to place the facts of this case in context.
Stephanie was 15 or 16 years old when defendant moved into the family home. Stephanie's younger sister, Elizabeth, was 11 or 12 years old. Felisha and Ronald shared custody of their children. Stephanie and Elizabeth stayed with Ronald every other weekend.
Stephanie did not like living with defendant. She was intimidated, scared, and wary of him. She described defendant as having a short fuse; he would get upset "fairly quickly." And when he got upset at her or Elizabeth, he would get real close to their face and yell and swear at them. He would also threaten to knock their "lights out" to teach them a lesson.
Stephanie recounted an incident where she and defendant got into an argument after he had screamed and swore at Elizabeth because she did not want to put sauce on her pasta. During the argument, Stephanie yelled at defendant, flipped him off, and told him to "F off." In response, defendant threatened to "kick [her] butt" and teach her a lesson by "knock[ing] [her] lights out." He also threatened to punch her and raised his fist as if he was going to hit her. Felisha intervened in the argument and pulled defendant away from Stephanie.
Although defendant never touched Stephanie in anger, and Stephanie never saw defendant strike Elizabeth, Stephanie saw defendant shove her mother on several occasions. She described an incident where defendant argued with and assaulted Felisha after she allowed Stephanie and Elizabeth to eat breakfast in their bedroom. During the argument, defendant yelled and screamed at Felisha and then shoved her into the frame of a doorway so hard she fell to the ground. When Felisha got up and followed defendant, he shoved her into a closet door, causing her to fall to the ground again. Felisha and defendant continued to argue until Stephanie heard a loud crash. Stephanie later learned that defendant had shoved Felisha so hard she fell and hit a dresser. Shortly after this incident, defendant moved out. Felisha subsequently told Stephanie that "there were times" when defendant had hit her, causing bruises on her arms and legs.
After defendant moved out of the family home in November 2001, he harassed Felisha and her children. He frequently called the apartment and left messages. In some of the messages, he would accuse Felisha of sleeping around and claim he had people watching her. Defendant also drove around Felisha's apartment complex, parked down the street from the complex and looked into the apartment with binoculars, came to the apartment uninvited and pounded on the windows or the door, and showed up at Felisha's job. Stephanie estimated that Felisha called the police on defendant more than 10 times over a two- to three-month period.
Stephanie described two incidents involving Crystal that made her scared of defendant. In the first incident, which occurred in November or December 2001, Felisha agreed to meet defendant in a public place with Crystal in an attempt to convince him to leave her family alone. During the meeting, defendant grabbed Crystal and took off running through a department store. Felisha was able to get Crystal back but only after a bystander intervened and stopped defendant. In the second incident, which occurred in December 2001 or January 2002, defendant broke into Felisha's apartment in violation of a restraining order, unplugged her phone, grabbed Crystal, and ran toward the front door. As he was running toward the door, he shoved Felisha's mother into an entertainment center. Felisha chased after defendant and got halfway inside his car before he drove off. Defendant drove through the apartment complex while Felisha's body was hanging out of the car. Defendant eventually stopped when Felisha's mother "jumped" in front of his car. Following this incident, Felisha's hand was "all bruised up" from defendant slamming the car door on her.
Stephanie also described how defendant harassed her father. He threatened Ronald, followed him, went to his apartment complex, and told him to leave Felisha alone. At one point, defendant used his car to block Ronald's car while Ronald was parked at his apartment complex. Ronald, Stephanie, and Elizabeth were inside Ronald's car. Stephanie and Elizabeth were hysterical, crying, and scared. They begged their father not to get out of the car. Less than a minute later, defendant drove away. During a second incident at Ronald's apartment complex, Stephanie pulled behind defendant's car and honked her horn to let him know he was in violation of a restraining order. After defendant drove away, Stephanie went to the police station and filed a police report.
Stephanie recounted an incident in January 2002 involving defendant and Ronald that made her scared of defendant. She explained that Ronald was driving to work when he noticed defendant was following him. After Ronald was unable to evade defendant by driving at a high rate of speed, Ronald called 911. A police officer pulled both cars over. A search of defendant's car revealed the following items: a billy club, a sawed-off shotgun, duct tape, a .30-caliber rifle, multiple knives, and paperwork pertaining to a private investigator defendant had hired to investigate Stephanie's family. In discussing this incident, Stephanie noted that defendant had called Ronald two days earlier and warned him that there would be "consequences." In Stephanie's opinion, defendant would have killed Ronald had the police not intervened.
Following this incident, defendant pled guilty to stalking and possession of a weapon. Stephanie spoke at the sentencing hearing because she wanted the judge to know what she had gone through, how terrified she was of defendant, and that she believed defendant was going to do something to her family if he was not incarcerated. Stephanie noted that defendant "stared [her] down" while she was speaking. The trial court sentenced defendant to four years eight months in prison.
After defendant went to prison, Felisha moved to Canada with Crystal and a man named Alaine Clairmont. Stephanie explained that Felisha moved, in part, to hide from defendant. To protect herself, Felisha enrolled in an address confidentiality program for victims of violent crimes. She also obtained a permit to carry a concealed firearm.
When defendant was released from prison in May 2008, Stephanie was living in Roseville. In November 2008, Stephanie was contacted by the Roseville Police Department. She was told that defendant had spoken to a Verizon customer service representative and said that he was looking for Felisha and wanted to kill her. Ronald, who was living in Tennessee at the time, subsequently informed Stephanie that he had received phone calls from a 916 area code that he believed were from defendant. Ronald also told Stephanie that his neighbor had received a strange voice mail in which the caller explained what Ronald looked like and requested to be notified if the neighbor saw Ronald or Felisha.
In May 2009, Stephanie contacted the Roseville Police Department after she received several e-mails from defendant, which were forwarded to her personal e-mail account from a website used to locate people. The first e-mail was sent on May 4, 2009. It stated, in relevant part: "What do you want? I know the truth and you and your mother lied to put me in prison. And I hope that you get the same cancer she had and die. Even though I saved her life, I fed you, paid bills, bought you presents, you're a little rotten, spoiled bitch that should have your ass beaten just like your wimp father, talks big, is a coward. Are you scared? You should be for lying, for following me around when you were on the restraining order. . . ." At trial, Stephanie said she considered this e-mail to be a threat given defendant's temper and prior violent behavior. She explained that she was afraid defendant would find her and hurt her. She feared he would torture her until she told him where Felisha was and then kill her.
On May 6, 2009, Stephanie received a second e-mail from defendant. It stated, "Where is my daughter?" When she read this e-mail, Stephanie thought to herself, "Oh, my gosh, he's really going to do this. He is going to do this all over again. He is going to follow us. He is going to find us. And this time, . . . maybe there won't be anybody to stop him from hurting us." At trial, Stephanie said this e-mail made her scared for Crystal.
Stephanie provided both e-mails to a Roseville police officer named Mary Green. Thereafter, Stephanie received a third e-mail from defendant, which she also provided to Officer Green. In this e-mail, defendant asked Stephanie whether she felt guilty that he had not seen Crystal since January 2002, and stated that he hoped she "rot[s] in hell." The e-mail also stated that Ronald is a wimp, and that defendant "will beat [Ronald's] ass" when he sees Ronald. The e-mail concluded by stating, "I know [Felisha] isn't in California, or is she? She is not married to Alaine Clairmont. Another trick, she doesn't speak French."
When Stephanie met with Officer Green, she was scared. At the end of the interview, she broke down; she was hysterical and really upset. Stephanie noted that Felisha was panicked and afraid when she learned about the e-mails. She was scared defendant was coming for Stephanie and then her.
In early June 2009, Stephanie received several voice mail messages from defendant. In one of the messages, defendant made a comment about her drinking a lot of beer to "drown out [her] problems." This message made Stephanie really scared because she believed defendant had gone through her trash, as her garbage had recently contained an abnormal amount of beer cans from a party. In another voice mail, defendant mentioned Quebec, which shocked Stephanie and made her afraid for Crystal and Felisha because they lived in Quebec. After hearing this message, Stephanie believed defendant was coming for her or Felisha. At this point, Stephanie left her apartment.
A GPS device placed on defendant's vehicle in May 2009 revealed he had driven near Stephanie's residence on numerous occasions in late May and early June 2009. On June 8, 2009, a patrol officer contacted defendant about a quarter of a mile from Stephanie's residence. Defendant had several knives on his person. A search of his car revealed several cameras, binoculars, a stun gun, and a full can of gasoline.
On June 16, 2009, Stephanie contacted Officer Green and informed her that Felisha had received voice mails from defendant. Stephanie explained she was "really, really, really, really, really afraid" after learning about the voice mails because defendant knew Felisha lived in Quebec. When Stephanie listened to the voice mails, she felt "[d]isgusted, frustrated, angry, [and] so scared." She believed defendant intended to harm her family. The messages were played for the jury. Defendant, among other things, called Felisha a "lyin,' bitch, whore." He also indicated that the world would be better off if Felisha were dead, and that he was coming for her because she "cost" him seven years of his life. He told Felisha that he was waiting for her "around the block," and that he had a "big gift" for her. Defendant also said he would pursue Felisha until his "last breathing breath."
A search warrant was executed at defendant's residence on June 16, 2009. Among the various items found by the police was a loaded .45-caliber handgun in a closet in the master bedroom. The police also found paperwork inside defendant's car and residence evidencing his efforts to find Felisha and Stephanie.
In this case, defendant was charged in Placer County Superior Court with stalking Stephanie, stalking Felisha, making a criminal threat to Stephanie, and possession of a firearm by a felon. It was also alleged that defendant had a prior conviction for stalking and had served a prior prison term.
A jury trial commenced in June 2016. At the conclusion of the People's case, the trial court granted defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the staking charge pertaining to Felisha. Thereafter, the jury found defendant guilty of the remaining charges. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court found true the enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of seven years four months in prison.
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
Sufficiency Of The Evidence
When determining whether the evidence is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, " ' "we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence--that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value--from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." ' " (People v. McCurdy (2014) 59 Cal.4th 1063, 1104.) We presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence. (Ibid.) Reversal is not warranted "unless it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support [the conviction].' " (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331.) We must accept logical inferences the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if we would have concluded otherwise. (People v. Solomon (2010) 49 Cal.4th 792, 811-812.)
In order to find a defendant guilty of making a criminal threat (Penal Code section 422) the prosecution must prove: "(1) that the defendant 'willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,' (2) that the defendant made the threat 'with the specific intent that the statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent of actually carrying it out,' (3) that the threat--which may be 'made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic communication device'--was 'on its face and under the circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat,' (4) that the threat actually caused the person threatened 'to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety,' and (5) that the threatened person's fear was 'reasonabl[e]' under the circumstances." (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227-228.)
Further undesignated references are to the Penal Code. --------
In this case, defendant's conviction for making a criminal threat was predicated on his May 4, 2009 e-mail to Stephanie. As previously indicated, the e-mail stated, in relevant part: "What do you want? I know the truth and you and your mother lied to put me in prison. And I hope that you get the same cancer she had and die. Even though I saved her life, I fed you, paid bills, bought you presents, you're a little rotten, spoiled bitch that should have your ass beaten just like your wimp father, talks big, is a coward. Are you scared? You should be for lying, for following me around when you were on the restraining order. . . ."
Defendant contends the evidence adduced at trial is insufficient to show the e-mail contained a statement that was so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate and specific as to convey to Stephanie a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat. He argues the statement indicating Stephanie "should have [her] ass beaten just like [her] wimp father" could not have been construed by any reasonable person as a true threat of harm, as it was a conditional statement of what he believed should happen to his stepdaughter for her misconduct. It was not a statement of what he intended to do. He further argues the statement "could not have been construed as a threat of death or great bodily injury as it was a statement that Stephanie should have received a common punishment for misbehavior, namely, a spanking--something that [he] was entitled to carry out on his stepdaughter." Defendant also asserts that no reasonable juror could believe "an expressed desire for an individual to die of cancer . . . constitute[s] an unequivocal, immediate, and specific threat sufficient to convey an immediacy of purpose and execution of the threat." We conclude there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction for making a criminal threat. Because we reach the merits of defendant's claim, we need not, and do not, address his alternative claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve the substantial evidence issue for appeal.
"To constitute a criminal threat, a communication need not be absolutely unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific. The statute includes the qualifier 'so' unequivocal, etc., which establishes that the test is whether, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the communication was sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the victim a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution." (In re Ryan D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 854, 861.) In determining whether a particular threat is a criminal threat, we consider all of the circumstances surrounding the threat including the words used, the manner in which the communication is made, the prior relationship of the parties, and the actions of the accused after communicating the threat. (Id. at p. 860.) "[I]t is the circumstances under which the threat is made that give meaning to the actual words used. Even an ambiguous statement may be a basis for a violation of section 422." (People v. Butler (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 745, 753.) The jury is "free to interpret the words spoken from all of the surrounding circumstances of the case." (People v. Mendoza (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 1333, 1341; People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 339 [the term " 'unconditional' " in § 422 " 'was not meant to prohibit prosecution of all threats involving an "if clause, but only to prohibit prosecution based on threats whose conditions precluded them from conveying a gravity of purpose and imminent prospect of execution' "].)
" 'A threat is sufficiently specific where it threatens death or great bodily injury. A threat is not insufficient simply because it does "not communicate a time or precise manner of execution, section 422 does not require those details to be expressed." [Citation.]' [Citation.] In addition, section 422 does not require an intent to actually carry out the threatened crime. [Citation.] Instead, the defendant must intend for the victim to receive and understand the threat, and the threat must be such that it would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or the safety of his or her immediate family. [Citation.] 'While the statute does not require that the violator intend to cause death or serious bodily injury to the victim, not all serious injuries are suffered to the body. The knowing infliction of mental terror is equally deserving of moral condemnation.' " (People v. Wilson (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 789, 806.)
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment, substantial evidence supports the jury's determination defendant made a threat to Stephanie that was so "unequivocal, unconditional, immediate, and specific" as to convey to Stephanie "a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of execution" of the threat. In his May 4, 2009 e-mail, defendant indicted that he had been incarcerated because Stephanie and Felisha had lied. He told Stephanie that he hoped she got cancer and died, and that she was a "rotten, spoiled bitch that should have [her] ass beaten just like [her] wimp father." He also told Stephanie that she should be scared "for lying" and for following him around when a restraining order prohibited him from being near her. In arguing the evidence is insufficient, defendant ignores the surrounding circumstances and focuses on the words of the e-mail. However, we must look to all the circumstances surrounding the threat to determine whether the jury could have reasonably found a criminal threat.
When the language of the threat is viewed in the context in which it was made, sufficient evidence supports defendant's conviction. At trial, Stephanie testified in detail about defendant's history of harassing conduct and violent behavior. Prior to sending the May 4, 2009 e-mail, defendant had threatened to "kick [Stephanie's] butt" and threatened to teach her a lesson by "knocking [her] lights out." Defendant had also threatened to punch her during an argument and raised his fist as if he was going to do so. In addition, defendant pushed Felisha to the ground several times and punched her on multiple occasions. After defendant moved out of the family home in November 2001, he repeatedly called Felisha, hung out near Felisha's apartment, watched the apartment with binoculars, banged on the windows and door of the apartment, and went to Felisha's work. He also tried to take Crystal on two occasions. During one of those occasions, he broke into Felisha's apartment, shoved Felisha's mother, and slammed Felisha's hand in a car door as he tried to drive away with Crystal while Felisha was hanging halfway out of his car. Defendant also threatened Ronald, harassed him, and warned him there would be "consequences" a couple of days prior to chasing him at high speeds in his car while armed with multiple weapons, including two guns. At the sentencing hearing following defendant's prior conviction for stalking, Stephanie testified against defendant while he "stared [her] down." After defendant was released from prison in May 2008, Stephanie learned that he had threatened to find and kill Felisha. After that, defendant sent the e-mail providing the basis for the criminal threat charge. In the context of these circumstances, Stephanie testified that she considered the e-mail to be a threat given defendant's temper and prior violent behavior. At the time, she was afraid defendant would find her and hurt her. She feared he would torture her until she told him where Felisha was and then kill her.
A reasonable jury could have concluded defendant made a threat that was so unconditional as to convey a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect of execution. This is particularly so given defendant's behavior following the e-mail. Shortly after defendant sent the May 4, 2009 e-mail, he sent additional e-mails and voice mails to Stephanie that were harassing and/or threatening in nature. He also called Felisha and left harassing and/or threatening voice mails indicating he was coming for her. He also drove his car near Stephanie's house while possessing multiple weapons, including several knives and a stun gun. In view of the evidence adduced at trial, defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge to his conviction for making a criminal threat fails. Defendant's claim that his May 4, 2009, e-mail did not constitute a criminal threat because it merely threatened a spanking is meritless.
II
Venue For Firearm Charge
Defendant contends his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm must be reversed because venue was improper in Placer County as all the elements of the crime occurred in Sacramento County. We disagree. Because we reach the merits of defendant's claim, we need not, and do not, address his alternative claim that trial counsel was ineffective in failing to object to venue.
At the preliminary examination, the evidence showed that after defendant separated from Felisha in 2001, he harassed Stephanie's family and was convicted of stalking Ronald. Following his release from prison, defendant acquired a firearm and was obsessed with finding Felisha "in a dangerous kind of way." He threatened to kill Felisha numerous times. He said he was going to kill her, take his daughter (Crystal), and kill anybody who tried to stop him. On at least one occasion in 2009, he drove to Roseville looking for Felisha and Crystal. In June 2009, defendant left several vulgar and threatening voice mail messages for Felisha. In these messages, defendant indicated, among other things, that he was coming for her, had a "big gift for [her]," and would pursue her until his "last breathing breath."
Stephanie lived in Placer County at the time she received several harassing and/or threatening e-mails and voice mails from defendant in May and June 2009, including the e-mail providing the basis for the criminal threat charge. In addition to sending these communications, defendant also drove near Stephanie's residence on multiple occasions in May and June 2009. On one of those occasions, defendant was contacted by law enforcement. A search of his person revealed several knives. A search of his car revealed two cameras, binoculars, a stun gun, and a can full of gasoline.
When defendant's residence and vehicle were searched in June 2009, he lived in Sacramento County. During the search, various items were found in his vehicle, including duct tape, a flashlight, a bill from a private investigator with Felisha's name on it, a gas can, a pair of binoculars, and a camera. Inside his residence, police found paperwork related to searches for Felisha and a bag containing a loaded .45-caliber handgun in the master bedroom closet.
At the conclusion of the preliminary examination, defense counsel argued the court did not have "jurisdiction" over the felon in possession of a firearm charge because "all aspects of that crime were committed in Sacramento County." The People disagreed, arguing that venue was proper in Placer County because a sufficient nexus existed between the firearm charge and the stalking and making a criminal threat charges. The People asserted the gun was an "instrumentality of [defendant's] stalking of Stephanie and Felisha." The People also noted that defendant had expressed a desire to kill Felisha to more than one person, and that there was evidence he was looking for Felisha and Crystal in Placer County. Without a discussion of the venue issue, defendant was held to answer on all the charges.
Following the preliminary examination, defendant filed a motion to set aside the information pursuant to section 995. He argued, among other things, that the felon in possession of a firearm charge should be set aside for lack of jurisdiction because there was no evidence presented at the preliminary hearing showing how any part of the charge occurred in Placer County. After a hearing, the trial court issued a written order denying defendant's motion, finding that "the necessary elements and venue" of each charged offense had been sufficiently established to support the magistrate's holding.
In his trial brief, defendant sought dismissal of the firearm charge on the ground the trial court lacked "jurisdiction." The trial court denied defendant's request, reasoning that the firearm charge was part of a continuous course of conduct by defendant in his efforts to pursue Stephanie and Felisha, and that the firearm was "just part of the instrumentality of that course of conduct and efforts on his part."
"Venue is a question of law that is governed by statute." (People v. Thomas (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1276, 1282.) "In general, the proper venue for the prosecution of a criminal offense is in the superior court of the county where the crime was committed." (Id. at p. 1281; see § 777 ["[E]xcept as otherwise provided by law the jurisdiction of every public offense is in any competent court within the jurisdictional territory of which it is committed"].) However, the Legislature has carved out exceptions to this rule. Section 781 states that where an offense is committed in more than one jurisdictional territory "or the acts or effects thereof constituting or requisite to the consummation of the offense occur in two or more jurisdictional territories, the jurisdiction of such offense is in any competent court within either jurisdictional territory." Courts have held that "a defendant who commits a crime in one county with effects in another county that are 'requisite to. . . the achievement of the [defendant's] unlawful purpose' may be tried in the latter county under section 781, even though the effects were not elements of the offense." (Thomas, at p. 1285.)
" ' "Section 781 is remedial and, thus, we construe the statute liberally to achieve its purpose of expanding criminal jurisdiction beyond rigid common law limits. [Citations.] We therefore interpret section 781 in a commonsense manner with proper regard for the facts and circumstances of the case rather than technical niceties." ' [Citation.] The prosecution has the burden of proving the facts supporting venue by a preponderance of the evidence, and '[o]n review, a trial court's determination of territorial jurisdiction will be upheld as long as there is "some evidence" to support its holding.' " (People v. Thomas, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 1283.)
We conclude the trial court did not err in determining Placer County was the proper county for trial of the felon in possession of a firearm charge. While the evidence demonstrates the firearm in question was found in Sacramento County, there is "some evidence" supporting the trial court's venue determination. The evidence from the preliminary examination shows that the effects of defendant's unlawful possession of the firearm in Sacramento County were felt in Placer County. Following his release from prison for stalking Ronald, defendant acquired a firearm and told more than one person he wanted to kill Felisha. There was evidence that defendant was looking for Stephanie and Felisha in Placer County and that defendant's possession of a firearm was part of his larger plan to find and kill Felisha.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Robie, J. We concur: /s/_________
Raye, P. J. /s/_________
Hoch, J.