Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BA329239. Patricia J. Titus, Judge. Affirmed.
Robert H. Pourvali, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Linda C. Johnson and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
DOI TODD, J.
Defendant and appellant Quiana Cherie Briggs was convicted by jury of evading a peace officer in violation of Vehicle Code section 2800.2, subdivision (a), with a willful and wanton disregard for safety. Imposition of sentence was suspended and she was placed on formal probation for five years and ordered to serve 90 days in county jail. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in (1) admitting into evidence two prior traffic tickets, and (2) denying her motion to reduce her offense from a felony to a misdemeanor. We affirm.
Vehicle Code section 2800.2 provides: “(a) If a person flees or attempts to elude a pursuing peace officer in violation of Section 2800.1 and the pursued vehicle is driven in a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property, the person driving the vehicle, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison, or by confinement in the county jail for not less than six months nor more than one year. The court may also impose a fine of not less than one thousand dollars ($1,000) nor more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or may impose both that imprisonment or confinement and fine. [¶] (b) For purposes of this section, a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property includes, but is not limited to, driving while fleeing or attempting to elude a pursuing peace officer during which time either three or more violations that are assigned a traffic violation point count under Section 12810 occur, or damage to property occurs.”
FACTS
Prosecution Case
On September 19, 2007 around 6:30 p.m. Los Angeles Police Department Officer Justin Bugarin was driving a black and white patrol car with his partner Officer Ramirez going eastbound on 7th Street in Los Angeles. They were stopped at a traffic light when they heard a vehicle approaching from behind at a high rate of speed. Officer Bugarin turned around and saw a four-door Chevrolet Malibu approaching in their lane. The Malibu changed lanes and passed them on the right, then weaved in and out of heavy traffic, causing other cars to brake. The Malibu ran a red light, then turned north onto Main Street and drove into oncoming traffic. Officer Bugarin attempted to pull the Malibu over by turning his lights and sirens on and off. The Malibu continued north and increased its speed to 45 to 50 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour speed zone.
From Main Street, the Malibu turned east onto Mission Street, almost hitting a pedestrian attempting to cross the street who had to jump back onto the curb. The car turned onto Whitsett Street, then north onto Los Angeles Street, traveling in the southbound lanes into oncoming traffic. At this point the officers turned on their patrol car’s full lights, sirens and rotating high beams.
The Malibu was now traveling about 50 to 60 miles per hour and ran another red light at the intersection of Los Angeles and 3rd Streets, then collided with a car driving west on 3rd Street. That car ended up on a sidewalk striking a fire hydrant. The two occupants of the car, a husband and wife, were rendered unconscious and transported to the hospital by ambulance. The husband had injuries to his head, shoulders, hands and knees and the wife had injuries to her head, eye, shoulder, chest, back, waist and knees. By this time other police units were responding to the scene.
After the collision, and without being ordered to do so, appellant got out of the driver’s side door of her vehicle with her hands up and laid down on the ground in a prone position facing the ground. Officer Bugarin arrested appellant, who was calm, but uncooperative in that she “just stood there” and would not answer any questions. She did not appear to be under the influence of any drugs or alcohol. She was eventually transported to the hospital by ambulance.
Two traffic tickets were found in the glove compartment of appellant’s vehicle. According to a certified printout from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunication System (CLETS), the tickets had been issued on August 3, 2007 for running a red light and on August 13, 2007 for speeding.
Defense Case
Appellant, who was 21 at the time of trial, testified that she had never been arrested or convicted of a crime before this incident. She denied that she had been speeding when she received the August 13, 2007 ticket, and admitted that she did not want to get another ticket.
Appellant was diagnosed with bipolar disorder when she was 13, and she has been in and out of psychiatric hospitals five or six times. She testified that on two or three occasions she could not “remember things.” She did not recall the events of September 19, 2007, other than dropping off her daughter with her parents that morning and waking up in the hospital. She remembered being handcuffed to a bed and examined by a doctor, and that she had a “couple scrapes” from the collision. The police later transported her, still handcuffed, to the police station and she did not ask them what was happening.
Appellant believed that the “episodes” in which she becomes manic and acts in an unsafe manner are brought on by stress. Although her arraignment and preliminary hearing had caused her stress, she remembered those proceedings.
A court-appointed psychologist, Dr. Ronald Fairbanks, performed two psychological evaluations of appellant and reviewed her psychiatric records, which consisted of 12 pages. He diagnosed appellant as having a bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, dissociative disorder, and possibly a paranoid schizophrenic condition. Dr. Fairbanks explained that a dissociative disorder, which he admitted is a rare diagnosis, involves a dissociative period during which a person does not have control over her actions. He agreed that “[m]erely because someone is diagnosed with a mental health disorder doesn’t necessarily mean one is significantly impaired mentally as to not know what they are doing.”
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Admitting Evidence of Appellant’s Recent Prior Traffic Tickets.
Prior to trial, defense counsel objected to evidence of appellant’s prior traffic tickets on the grounds of relevance. The prosecutor argued that the evidence was relevant to the issue of motive, to show that appellant was trying to evade the police because she did not want another speeding ticket. The trial court concluded that the prior tickets were admissible to prove motive, finding that “because the traffic tickets were recent, that could be reasonably argued as a motive for [appellant] to be fleeing for that purpose, trying to evade further tickets.... She may have been trying to flee because she didn’t want another citation.” Appellant contends on appeal that evidence of her two prior traffic tickets was irrelevant and prejudicial.
“‘Relevant evidence is defined in Evidence Code section 210 as evidence ‘having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.’ The test of relevance is whether the evidence tends ‘“logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference” to establish material facts such as identity, intent, or motive. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] The trial court has broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence [citations] but lacks discretion to admit irrelevant evidence.’” (People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, 973.) “Under the abuse of discretion standard, ‘a trial court's ruling will not be disturbed, and reversal of the judgment is not required, unless the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” (People v. Hovarter (2008) 44 Cal.4th 983, 1004.)
Appellant argues that no relationship existed between her two prior traffic tickets (for running a red light and speeding) and the incident in this case, that the events have no overlapping characteristics, and that her prior traffic tickets do not have any tendency in reason to prove a motive or intent to flee from the police on a subsequent occasion. Appellant relies on People v. Scheer (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1009, in which the court stated that “‘the intermediate fact of motive’ may be established by evidence of ‘prior dissimilar crimes.’ [Citation.] ‘Similarity of offenses [is] not necessary to establish this theory of relevance’ for the evident reason that the motive for the charged crime arises simply from the commission of the prior offense. [Citation.] The existence of a motive requires a nexus between the prior crime and the current one, but such linkage is not dependent on comparison and weighing of the similar and dissimilar characteristics of the past and present crimes. [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1018.) The Scheer court concluded that the defendant’s prior conviction for evading an officer with willful disregard for safety was not admissible to establish a motive for his charged hit-and-run offense. (Id. at p. 1019.) The court found that no relationship existed between the defendant’s 1993 flight from police following his failure to obey a red light and his 1997 flight from civilian eyewitnesses after a collision between his vehicle and another. The court noted that the individuals involved in each accident were wholly unconnected to each other and found that the events themselves did not have any apparent overlapping characteristics. (Id. at p. 1020.)
Appellant argues that most motorists on the road have probably received a traffic citation at one time or another and that fact does not mean they are more likely to evade the police the next time they are signaled to pull over. While that may be true, appellant’s moving violations were recent, having occurred within the preceding month, and involved conduct similar to the current incident, i. e., running red lights and speeding. We cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of appellant’s recent prior traffic tickets for the purpose of establishing her motive to evade the police.
But even assuming this evidence was improperly admitted, appellant has not demonstrated that its admission was prejudicial. “[T]he erroneous admission of prior misconduct evidence does not compel reversal unless a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reasonably probable if such evidence were excluded. [Citations.]” (People v. Scheer, supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1018–1019; see also People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1258 [evaluating error in admitting evidence as harmless under the standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].) Appellant argues that evidence of her prior traffic tickets undermined her defense that at the time of the incident she was suffering from a manic episode that left her unaware of what she was doing. She argues that it permitted the jury to conclude that she was a repeat traffic violator who had sped and run a red light on prior occasions and therefore had the motive and propensity to do so again. She also asserts that “[i]t is difficult to imagine evidence which is any more emotionally charged in a criminal prosecution than that pertaining to the criminal history of the accused.” But there is nothing “emotionally charged” about two prior traffic tickets. As appellant herself acknowledged, most motorists have received traffic tickets. Even the prosecutor admitted in closing argument that he had been pulled over by the police. Moreover, as discussed below, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was substantial. We therefore conclude that it is not reasonably probable that the jury would have reached a different result had the prior traffic tickets been excluded.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion In Denying Appellant’s Motion to Reduce Her Offense to a Misdemeanor.
An offense under Vehicle Code section 2800.2 is a “wobbler” punishable either by imprisonment in the state prison or by confinement in the county jail. Such an offense is deemed a felony unless charged as a misdemeanor or reduced to a misdemeanor by the sentencing court under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b). (People v. Statum (2002) 28 Cal.4th 682, 685.)
Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b) provides that when a crime is punishable, in the discretion of the court, by imprisonment in the state prison or by fine or imprisonment in the county jail, it is a misdemeanor under certain enumerated circumstances.
Prior to sentencing, appellant moved for reduction of her offense to a misdemeanor pursuant to Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b). After hearing argument, the trial court denied the motion without explanation and turned to the issue of sentencing. Following further argument and appellant’s statements to the court, the court stated: “In finding that the conduct in this case was not misdemeanor conduct, I am going to be sentencing the defendant to jail time. However, I don’t feel this was a state prison or warranted [sic] in this case and the sentence is going to be 90 days. With respect to my assessment of the evidence, although driving erratically prior to the police seeing her, once they got behind her, she started weaving in and out of traffic, driving on the wrong side of the street, suggesting that she was aware that the police were behind her. And when she crashed into the two victims, that when she got out of the car, she immediately proned herself on the ground. So that suggests to me that she was aware of what was going on around in her immediate vicinity. It would have been different if she stayed in the car in a catatonic state. So the court is not willing to reduce it to a misdemeanor for that reason.... [B]ut... considering her mental issues, I will give her some credit in that regard and not require her to go to state prison or serve a full six months....”
Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion to reduce her offense to a misdemeanor. “Trial courts have broad authority in ruling on motions under [Penal Code] section 17 to reduce a crime to a misdemeanor.” (People v. Hawkins (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1428, 1457, citing People v. Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 977.) In Alvarez, our Supreme Court stated: “On appeal, two additional precepts operate: ‘The burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ [Citation.] Concomitantly, ‘[a] decision will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment of the trial judge.” [Citations.]’” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), supra, at pp. 977–978.) The Alvarez court further stated that in light of scant judicial authority setting forth any criteria guiding the exercise of discretion under Penal Code section 17, subdivision (b), “since all discretionary authority is contextual, those factors that direct similar sentencing decisions are relevant, including ‘the nature and circumstances of the offense, the defendant’s appreciation of and attitude toward the offense, or his traits of character as evidenced by his behavior and demeanor at the trial.’ [Citations.].... The corollary is that even under the broad authority conferred by section 17(b), a determination made outside the perimeters drawn by individualized consideration of the offense, the offender, and the public interest ‘exceeds the bounds of reason.’” (People v. Superior Court (Alvarez), supra, at p. 978, fn. omitted.)
Appellant argues that she did not display a pattern of conduct threatening the safety of the neighborhood and that the incident was an “isolated offense” due to her documented medical condition. The trial court disagreed and we find substantial evidence to support the court’s determination. When the officers attempted to pull over appellant’s vehicle, she increased her speed, ran red lights, drove into oncoming traffic, and almost hit a pedestrian. She hit a car which landed on the sidewalk and struck a fire hydrant. The car’s occupants were rendered unconscious, suffered severe injuries and were transported by ambulance to the hospital. Following that collision, appellant got out of her car with her hands up and laid down on the ground in a prone position, without being ordered to do so, conduct which suggested appellant was aware of what was happening. Additionally, appellant never asked why she was being arrested and later she never asked why she was being transported in handcuffs from the hospital to the police station.
Appellant points out that her trial counsel explained to the court that she was not medicated at the time of the incident because she had stopped taking her medication due to her pregnancy, that she had not taken any medicine nor had any episodes for two years and was voluntarily seeking psychiatric help. The trial court did not ignore appellant’s mental health issues. To the contrary, the court considered them in deciding not to impose a state prison term and not to require appellant to serve a term of six months in county jail.
Appellant argues that the trial court failed to properly consider her other circumstances, including that she is a single mother enrolled at California State University, Long Beach and has accepted a paid position in the Department of African Studies; that having a felony conviction will make it difficult for her to find work after graduation; and that she was respectful at trial and displayed remorse by apologizing for the incident during the sentencing hearing. While these factors certainly weighed in appellant’s favor, the trial court could nevertheless reasonably conclude that the nature and circumstances of the offense and appellant’s blatant disregard for the safety of others outweighed these factors. On the record before us, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion to reduce her offense to a misdemeanor was an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: BOREN, P. J., CHAVEZ, J.