Opinion
C079532
01-09-2017
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOSEPH LYNEILL BRIDGERS, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 14F05764)
Defendant Joseph Lyneill Bridgers was sentenced to 13 years in state prison after a jury found him guilty of two counts of carjacking, two counts of assault with a firearm, and two counts of making criminal threats, and found related firearm enhancements true. On appeal, defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the carjacking convictions. We affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court's judgment (People v. Boyer (2006) 38 Cal.4th 412, 479-480), is as follows:
In February 2014, defendant purchased a 2004 Chevy Tahoe financed through Lobel Financial, an auto loan company (Lobel). Defendant's last payment on the auto loan was on May 30, 2014. Despite numerous efforts by Lobel to contact defendant, no arrangements were made to bring the account current and Lobel initiated repossession, assigning the matter to Northern Valley Recovery, a vehicle repossession company.
Andy Williams and his brother Johnny Smith, both employees of Northern Valley Recovery, repossessed vehicles using a 2011 Chevy Silverado tow truck with "a Minute Man XD" wheel lift on the back. Once they received the repossession order from Lobel, Williams searched online and confirmed defendant's account was "still active," as was his practice.
On July 27, 2014, Williams and Smith went to defendant's home to repossess the Chevy Tahoe, which was parked in the driveway facing the house. Smith lowered the tow bar and backed the tow truck up to the rear of the Tahoe while Williams verified the vehicle identification number (VIN) on the Tahoe and gave Smith the "thumbs up." Smith attached the tow bar to the rear wheels of defendant's car, and lifted up the back of the car. Both Williams and Smith testified that, although the straps were not yet attached to the rear wheels, they could have driven off with the Tahoe in tow.
Defendant's wife came out of the house. Smith got out of the tow truck and he and Williams showed her the paperwork from Lobel and explained that they were there to repossess the Tahoe. Defendant's wife told Williams she had spoken to the finance company and had made arrangements to make a payment.
After speaking with Williams for a few minutes, defendant's wife went back inside the house and emerged within 30 seconds with defendant, who was wearing just his boxer shorts. Defendant wandered over to the driver's side of the Tahoe. Williams and Smith explained to defendant that they were there to repossess the Tahoe, and offered him the opportunity to collect personal items out of the car before it was repossessed. Defendant opened the car door and stood in the doorway for a couple of minutes, and then said, "I gotta go to work tonight. I can't let you take it." He pulled a handgun out of the car, pointed it at Williams as he walked to within two feet of Williams and said, "Drop the car." Williams immediately backed up and said, "[O]kay, we'll get out of here. Don't worry about it." Williams told Smith to drop the car. Smith quickly walked to the tow truck, followed by defendant who was now pointing the gun at him. Smith and Williams got into the tow truck and Smith lowered defendant's car using the control pad. Williams heard defendant say, "[Y]ou guys aren't moving fast enough. I'm going to start shooting at your truck." Once defendant's car was lowered, Smith raised the tow bar and he and Williams drove away, scraping the tow bar on the curb. They stopped several houses down on the opposite side of the street and called the police. As Williams dialed 911, defendant got into the Tahoe and drove away.
Smith testified defendant said something like, "[Y]ou better hurry, or I'm going to shoot at your truck and shoot at you."
Approximately one month later, Sacramento County Sheriff's Detective Mike French stopped defendant as he was backing out of his driveway in the Chevy Tahoe. French found a loaded .45-caliber handgun in a nylon holster between the driver's seat and the center console.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was charged by amended felony complaint with two counts of carjacking (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a)—counts one & two), two counts of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)(2)—counts three & four), and two counts of making criminal threats (§ 422—counts five & six). The amended complaint alleged defendant personally used a firearm in the commission of counts one and two (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and personally used a firearm in the commission of counts three through six, causing those offenses to become serious and violent felonies (§§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)).
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
Following a trial, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts and found true each of the firearm enhancements.
The trial court denied probation and sentenced defendant to 13 years in state prison, comprised of the low term of three years on count one, plus 10 years for the related firearm enhancement, a concurrent three-year term on count two, and a concurrent 10-year term for the related firearm enhancement. The court also imposed but stayed pursuant to section 654 a three-year term on count three, a four-year term for the firearm enhancement, a three-year term on count four, plus a four-year term for the firearm enhancement; a two-year term on count five, plus four years for the firearm enhancement; and a two-year term on count six, plus four years for the firearm enhancement. The court awarded defendant 92 days of presentence custody credit (80 actual days plus 12 days of conduct credit).
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
"A conviction for carjacking requires proof that (1) the defendant took a vehicle that was not his or hers (2) from the immediate presence of a person who possessed the vehicle or was a passenger in the vehicle (3) against that person's will (4) by using force or fear and (5) with the intent of temporarily or permanently depriving the person of possession of the vehicle. (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a); People v. Hill (2000) 23 Cal.4th 853, 858-859.)" (People v. Magallanes (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 529, 534.)
Defendant contends his convictions for carjacking were not supported by substantial evidence. Finding support in People v. Coleman (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 1363 (Coleman), he claims Williams and Smith were not occupants of the Tahoe, were not abducted from it, and had only minimal possession of it, and the risk to the public at large was no greater than it would be during the course of a second degree robbery. The claim lacks merit.
"On appeal, the test of legal sufficiency is whether there is substantial evidence, i.e., evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.] Evidence meeting this standard satisfies constitutional due process and reliability concerns. [Citations.] [¶] While the appellate court must determine that the supporting evidence is reasonable, inherently credible, and of solid value, the court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the [judgment], and must presume every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citations.] Issues of witness credibility are for the jury. [Citations.]" (People v. Boyer, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 479-480; accord, People v. Smith (2005) 37 Cal.4th 733, 739 [assessing the credibility of witnesses remains the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury].)
"A single witness's uncorroborated testimony, unless physically impossible or inherently improbable, is sufficient to sustain a conviction [citation]." (People v. Elwood (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1365, 1372; accord, People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181 [uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain conviction].) To be inherently improbable, the inaccuracy of the testimony " ' "must be apparent without resorting to inferences or deductions. [Citations.] Conflicts and even testimony which is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.]" ' " (People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 150.)
We acknowledge that the circumstances here are unlike the classic carjacking scenario, where an armed perpetrator approaches a vehicle, uses force or fear to take the vehicle from the driver, and drives the car away. Nonetheless, there is substantial evidence here that defendant carjacked the Tahoe from Williams and Smith.
Both Williams and Smith testified that defendant pulled a gun on them and threatened them, telling them to "drop the car" and telling them he would shoot at their truck because they were moving too slow. Both men testified unequivocally that, when defendant pulled out the gun and threatened them, the tow mechanism was connected to the Tahoe and the back of the Tahoe had been lifted a sufficient distance to enable them to drive off with the vehicle in tow. At that point, the repossession was complete, the Tahoe, which was in the possession and immediate presence of Williams and Smith, was no longer defendant's vehicle. In response to defendant's armed threats, Williams and Smith "dropped" the Tahoe, disengaged the tow mechanism from the rear wheels, and drove off in the tow truck. Williams and Smith testified, and defendant did not dispute, that he got into the Tahoe and drove away with the intent to deprive Williams and Smith of its possession. These facts substantiate a carjacking.
The jury was instructed that "[a] repossession is complete if the collateral becomes connected to the repossessor's tow vehicle." Defendant did not object to the instruction and does not dispute it on appeal. --------
Defendant's reliance on Coleman to support his claim of insufficient evidence is misplaced. There, a shop owner drove his Chevy Silverado to the shop, put the keys in a work area in the back of the shop, and drove away from the shop in a different truck. (Coleman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1366.) During the owner's absence, the defendant entered the shop, pointed a gun at the office manager, and demanded she give him the keys to the Silverado. (Ibid.) The office manager retrieved the Silverado's keys from the back of the shop and gave them to the defendant. (Ibid.) A jury convicted the defendant of robbery and carjacking. (Id. at p. 1365.) The Court of Appeal reversed the carjacking conviction. (Id. at p. 1374.) Acknowledging that "a carjacking may occur where neither the possessor nor the passenger is inside or adjacent to the vehicle," the appellate court found the circumstances were "simply too far removed from the type of conduct that [the carjacking statute] was designed to address" because the office manager "was not within any physical proximity to the Silverado, the keys she relinquished were not her own, and there was no evidence that she had ever been or would be a driver of or passenger in the Silverado." (Id. at p. 1373.)
Here, unlike Coleman, Williams and Smith were both in close proximity to the Tahoe, which they had connected to the tow truck and lifted off the ground. At that point, the repossession of the Tahoe was complete and in the possession and immediate presence of Williams and Smith, who were preparing to tow it away. While at gun point and under threat, they relinquished possession and control of the vehicle by "dropping" it (i.e., disconnecting it from the tow truck). Defendant then immediately used the keys to drive the vehicle away. Coleman is distinguishable.
Without challenging any of the elements of carjacking required by section 215, subdivision (a), defendant claims Williams and Smith were "no more vulnerable or at greater risk of harm than the victim in Coleman." The claim is errant and irrelevant. The Coleman court found there was insufficient evidence to support the carjacking conviction based on the fact that the office manager was nowhere near the Silverado, she relinquished keys to a vehicle that did not belong to her, and there was no evidence she ever was or would be a driver or a passenger of that vehicle. (Coleman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.) While the Coleman court noted the Legislature's reason for enacting the carjacking statute was that " 'carjacking is a particularly serious crime that victimizes persons in vulnerable settings' and, because of the nature of the offense, creates the great potential for harm to not only the victim and perpetrator but also the public at large' [citations]" (Id. at p. 1369), it did not add a particular level of vulnerability or risk of harm to the public as additional elements to those required by the statute. In any event, defendant's conduct did in fact create a significant potential for harm to Williams, Smith, defendant himself (had Williams or Smith attempted to disarm defendant or otherwise defend themselves), defendant's wife, and anyone in the vicinity. And there is no question Williams and Smith were in a vulnerable setting given they were standing in front of defendant's house attempting to repossess defendant's vehicle, an emotionally charged situation at the very least.
Defendant makes much of the fact Williams and Smith were neither occupants of the Tahoe nor were they abducted from it. He also argues their degree of possession of the Tahoe was lesser than that of a driver, as "[o]nly the tow mechanism" was connected to the Tahoe. These claims are untenable. The jury was instructed and found connection of the tow mechanism to the Tahoe completed the repossession. Moreover, section 215 does not require the victim to be abducted from the vehicle and, as the Coleman court noted, "a carjacking may occur where neither the possessor nor the passenger is inside or adjacent to the vehicle." (Coleman, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 1373.)
We conclude there was substantial evidence to support defendant's convictions for carjacking.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NICHOLSON, Acting P. J. We concur: ROBIE, J. HOCH, J.