Opinion
A156345
02-05-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICHARD A. BRELO, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCTM CRCR 18-94775 )
Defendant Ricard A. Brelo appeals from trial court orders finding him incompetent to stand trial and authorizing the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication. Brelo's appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), identifying no issues and requesting that this court review the record to determine whether any arguable issue exists on appeal. After doing so, as well as considering several issues personally raised by Brelo, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In July 2018, the Mendocino County District Attorney filed a criminal complaint, charging Brelo with two counts of felony vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd. (b)(1)), one count of felony criminal threats (§ 422), one count of misdemeanor battery against a police officer (§ 243, subd. (b)), and one count of misdemeanor assault on a police officer (§ 241, subd. (b)). At Brelo's first court appearance, the trial judge was initially unable to take the bench as Brelo was making statements and threats regarding the people in the courtroom in a loud voice. The court arraigned Brelo later that day. When told he was entitled to court-appointed counsel, Brelo said he would spit on any attorney who came near him. The court was unable to advise Brelo of his constitutional rights because he would not stop speaking about an impending attack upon the citizens of this country. He listed numerous specific law enforcement agencies and churches to be contacted, referenced the Las Vegas and Parkland mass shootings and various church shootings, and suggested a conspiracy involving 50 million Americans. He was adamant the public needed to be warned. When the judge attempted to intervene, Brelo repeatedly responded disrespectfully. He was removed from the courtroom after spitting on the jury box.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
After a deputy public defender was appointed to represent him, Brelo was returned to the courtroom. Amidst threats and profanity, Brelo continued to rant about the alleged conspiracy. When his attorney spoke on his behalf, Brelo asked for a Faretta hearing (Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806) and stated, "[G]et this fucking piece of shit away from me." Defense counsel and the court each expressed a doubt as to Brelo's competency. The court suspended the underlying criminal proceedings and both a psychologist and a psychiatrist were appointed to evaluate him. Brelo stated he had been "forced and medicated and beaten so many times over this" and it was not going to happen again.
Brelo engaged in similar behavior at several additional hearings, twice becoming physically violent. He refused to speak with the evaluators. Nevertheless, both professionals reviewed relevant documents, including the hearing transcripts, and filed reports supporting a finding of incompetence. In addition, the psychiatrist suggested a diagnosis of unspecified schizophrenia spectrum disorder and issued opinions supporting an involuntary medication order.
On August 9, 2018, the court denied Brelo's Faretta motion, concluding he was unable to focus on the issues at hand or follow basic rules of decorum in the courtroom. On December 6, 2018, the court heard and denied Brelo's Marsden motion (People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118). Defense counsel later waived a jury trial on the competency issue over Brelo's objection. When the competency trial commenced on December 10, 2018, Brelo accused the district attorney and every judge, public defender, and sheriff in the county of conspiring to overthrow the government and asked for independent counsel. At the conclusion of the court trial, which included the testimony of Brelo and both evaluators, the trial court found Brelo incompetent based on his inability to cooperate in a rational manner with his trial counsel. On January 18, 2019, after Brelo's conduct again necessitated his removal from the courtroom, the trial court ordered him placed at Napa State Hospital and issued an order permitting the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication.
DISCUSSION
Brelo appealed from the trial court's December 2018 finding of incompetence and January 2019 involuntary medication order. We appointed counsel to represent him in this matter. After examining the record, counsel filed a Wende brief raising no issues on appeal and requesting that we independently review the record. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436.) Brelo was advised by his attorney of the opportunity to file a supplemental brief with this court, and he has submitted a number of documents asserting claims of error, including voluminous and repetitive notices of appeal. We have examined the entire record, including the contentions personally raised by the defendant, and are satisfied that no arguable issue exists.
A trial court's decision whether to grant a competency hearing is reviewable for abuse of discretion and must be based on substantial evidence raising "a reasonable doubt about the defendant's ability to stand trial." (People v. Ramos (2004) 34 Cal.4th 494, 507.) Brelo argues that it was error to order a competency hearing in this case based on defense counsel's statement alone, citing People v. Stewart (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 992, 996 and People v. Hays (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 755, 759. However, "[s]ubstantial evidence of incompetence may arise from separate sources, including the defendant's own behavior." (Ramos, at p. 507.) Here, the trial court cited Brelo's conduct as the basis for ordering a competency hearing, not defense counsel's expression of doubt. Brelo's behavior overwhelmingly supported the trial court's decision to hold a competency hearing in this matter, and thus no abuse of discretion can be argued on this record.
Citing People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764 (Stanley) and People v. Stankewitz (1982) 32 Cal.3d 80, Brelo also claims that he was entitled to independent counsel in the trial court because his competency proceedings were an attempt to cover up criminal misconduct by the sheriff, court, and counsel. In Stanley, the Supreme Court opined that, once "there has been a prima facie showing of incompetence, the attorney representing the defendant is required to 'advocate the position counsel perceives to be in the client's best interests even when that interest conflicts with the client's stated position.' " (Stanley, at p. 804.) Stankewitz, however, articulates an exception to this rule where appointment of substitute counsel could obviate the need for a competency trial, such as when there is a fundamental disagreement between the defendant and defense counsel as to trial tactics and the defendant's inability to cooperate with an attorney is limited to particular counsel. (Stankewitz, at pp. 92-94; see Stanley, at p. 805.)
In the present case, Brelo appears to believe that, had his attorney agreed to subpoena the numerous witnesses he identified at prior court hearings, he would have been able to prove his competence by establishing that everything he said about the extensive conspiracy he alleged was true. Although there was a clear tactical disagreement between Brelo and his attorney on this point, we are confident from our review of the record that substitution of counsel would not have avoided a competency hearing in this case, given the breadth of the conspiracy embraced by Brelo and the severity of his behavior. (See People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal.4th 786, 857 [motion for substitute counsel reviewable for abuse of discretion].) Since independent counsel was unnecessary, Brelo's trial counsel was free to make tactical decisions that were in his client's best interests such as waiving a jury trial or refusing to subpoena his myriad conspiracy witnesses. (Stanley, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 804; see People v. Masterson (1994) 8 Cal.4th 965, 972-973 [counsel may waive the right to a jury trial in competency proceedings, even over the express objection of the defendant].)
Brelo also attacks the trial court's competency finding by arguing that the expert opinions in this matter were insufficient evidence of his incompetence because neither court-appointed professional had sufficient opportunity to examine him, given that he refused to speak with them. He cites the following statement from People v. Beivelman (1968) 70 Cal.2d 60, 71: "The substantial-evidence test is satisfied '[i]f a psychiatrist or qualified psychologist . . . who has had sufficient opportunity to examine the accused, states under oath with particularity that in his professional opinion the accused is, because of mental illness, incapable of understanding the purpose or nature of the criminal proceedings being taken against him or is incapable of assisting in his defense or cooperating with counsel.' " (Italics added.) Here, however, both experts relied on other sources of information, including the transcripts of prior court hearings, to conclude that Brelo was incompetent to stand trial because he was unable to mount a defense or rationally assist his defense counsel. And the psychiatric expert opined that Brelo's incompetence was due to some type of schizophrenia spectrum disorder. We conclude that this constitutes substantial evidence supporting the trial court's competency determination. (People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1004, disapproved on another ground by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) Even if the expert opinions were somehow insufficient on their own to support a finding of incompetence, the record as a whole contains substantial evidence supporting the trial court's determination.
We reject Brelo's related assertion that the court was required to appoint two psychiatrists and two psychologists on the issue of competency. Brelo misreads the relevant statute and court rule. (§ 1369, subd. (a)(1) ["If the defendant or the defendant's counsel informs the court that the defendant is not seeking a finding of mental incompetence, the court shall appoint two psychiatrists, licensed psychologists, or a combination thereof. One of the psychiatrists or licensed psychologists may be named by the defense and one may be named by the prosecution."]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.130(d)(1)(B) [same].) --------
Finally, although Brelo asks this court to issue a preliminary injunction or a restraining order to stop his forced medication, he raises no specific legal challenge to the trial court's involuntary medication order. Since we conclude that substantial evidence supports the trial court's decision on involuntary medication (People v. Lameed (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 381, 397; § 1370, subd. (a)(2)(B)(i)), we need take no further action.
DISPOSITION
The judgment of incompetence and involuntary medication order are affirmed.
/s/_________
Sanchez, J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
Humes, P. J. /s/_________
Margulies, J.