People v. Brant

11 Citing cases

  1. People v. Rodriguez

    2018 Ill. App. 153641 (Ill. App. Ct. 2018)

    ¶ 24 Evidence of a defendant's intoxication, without more, does not support an inference of carelessness that is sufficient to satisfy the element of this offense. People v. Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d 847, 851-52 (1980). Moreover, this court has repeatedly found that proof that a defendant was driving too fast for conditions or failed to reduce speed cannot be inferred from the mere fact that a collision occurred.

  2. People v. Galarza

    2023 IL 127678 (Ill. 2023)   Cited 29 times

    Specifically, the court stated, "[t]he very fact that defendant hit the tree establishes that he failed to reduce speed to avoid this accident." Id. The court acknowledged that People v. Brant, 82 Ill.App.3d 847, 852 (1980), and People v. Sampson, 130 Ill.App.3d 438, 444 (1985), had reached the opposite conclusion, finding the "failure to reduce speed cannot be inferred from the fact that a defendant was involved in an accident because any individual involved in an accident would then be guilty of the offense." 2021 IL App (3d) 190129-U, ¶ 21.

  3. People v. McAllister-Grum

    2014 Ill. App. 4th 130240 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    ¶ 16 To prove a defendant guilty of failing to reduce speed to avoid an accident, the State must show that the defendant drove carelessly and that he failed to reduce his speed to avoid colliding with another person. People v. Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d 847, 851, 403 N.E.2d 282, 285-86 (1980). "Conviction for that offense does not require proof that the defendant was exceeding the speed limit because the offense can be committed regardless of the speed of the defendant's vehicle or the relevant speed limit."

  4. People v. Hodge

    2013 Ill. App. 112639 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    At least three courts of review have considered this issue and applied the reasonable doubt standard, and we will do the same here. See People v. Sturgess, 364 Ill. App. 3d 107, 116 (2006); People v. Sampson, 130 Ill. App. 3d 438, 444 (1985); and People v. Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d 847, 851(1980). In order to prove a defendant guilty of failure to reduce to avoid an accident, the State must establish that the defendant drove carelessly and that the defendant failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding with persons or property. 625 ILCS 5/11-601(a) (West 2010); and Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d at 851.

  5. State v. Veilleux

    439 A.2d 277 (Vt. 1981)   Cited 7 times

    It is not every potential explanation, every speculative or remote possibility of which the imagination is capable which will rise to the level of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence. People v. Brant, 82 Ill. App.3d 847, 850, 403 N.E.2d 282, 284-85 (1980). The trier of fact is not required to search out a series of potential explanations compatible with innocence, and elevate them to the status of a reasonable doubt.

  6. People v. Daggett

    2014 Ill. App. 3d 130042 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

    People v. Sturgess, 364 Ill. App. 3d 107 (2006).¶ 13 Defendant relies on People v. Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d 847 (1980), to claim that evidence of his intoxication and the fact that a collision occurred, without more, were insufficient to sustain his conviction. Brant, however, is inapposite.

  7. People v. Rodriguez

    2013 Ill. App. 111022 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    Further, symptoms similar to defendant's, including bloodshot eyes, a smell of alcohol, slurred speech, and a lack of balance or coordination, have been found sufficient to find that a defendant was under the influence of alcohol. See Hires, 396 Ill. App. 3d at 319 (officer smelled alcohol in vehicle, and defendant slurred his speech, fumbled to pull out his identification card, and stumbled out of the driver's seat, nearly falling to the ground, and was incapable of performing field sobriety tests); Diaz, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 345 (officer observed defendant with bloodshot eyes and mumbled speech, there was a moderate odor of alcohol, and defendant exhibited a balance problem and failed to complete a field sobriety test); People v.Mathews, 304 Ill. App. 3d 514, 516 (1999) (officer concluded defendant was intoxicated based on odor of alcohol and defendant's speech, poor balance, and manner of walking); People v. Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d 847, 849 (1980) (officer smelled alcohol in the air, defendant's eyes appeared droopy and bloodshot, defendant's speech was slurred, and defendant stated repeatedly that he was going to be sick). ¶ 14 We are not persuaded by defendant's citation to cases where the testimony that a defendant smelled of alcohol was not sufficient to prove that the defendant was intoxicated. In those cases, the defendant had been in a vehicle collision that could have caused the symptoms of the alleged intoxication (People v. Thomas, 34 Ill. App. 3d 578, 580-81 (1975); People v. Holtz, 19 Ill. App. 3d 781, 788 (1974); People v. Clark, 123 Ill. App. 2d 41, 44-45 (1970)), or a collision had occurred and the only evidence that intoxication was the cause was an odor of alcohol (People v. Barham, 337 Ill. App. 3d 1121, 1131-32 (2003); People v. Boomer, 325 Ill. App. 3d 206, 210 (2001); People v. Winfield, 15 Ill. App. 3d 688, 690 (1973)).

  8. People v. Sturgess

    364 Ill. App. 3d 107 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that officers' act in arranging for defendant's transport to ensure her safe removal from a congested highway construction zone was a valid community caretaking activity

    Luka, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 86. Defendant relies on People v. Sampson, 130 Ill. App. 3d 438 (1985), and People v. Brant, 82 Ill. App. 3d 847 (1980), for the proposition that guilt of failure to reduce speed cannot be inferred from the mere fact that a defendant was involved in an accident. •7 Here, the evidence established that the area of Interstate 57 where the accident took place was under construction and was highly congested.

  9. People v. Sampson

    130 Ill. App. 3d 438 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 14 times
    In Sampson, the stipulated facts showed that the defendant was intoxicated and lost control of the car, hitting a telephone pole.

    In view of our resolution of this issue, we need not address the sufficiency of admonitions given defendant under Rule 402, which this court recently discussed in People v. Sutherland (1984), 128 Ill. App.3d 415. • 3 Defendant next argues that he was not proved guilty of driving too fast for conditions, citing People v. Holtz (1974), 19 Ill. App.3d 781, 313 N.E.2d 234, and this court's decision in People v. Brant (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 847, 403 N.E.2d 282. The State claims that, although the fact of the collision standing alone might not be sufficient evidence for a conviction, the exercise of due care may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances shown to exist prior to the collision ( Ruspantini v. Steffek (1953), 414 Ill. 70, 110 N.E.2d 198), and that the law presumes where a vehicle runs into a parked vehicle or object at the side of the road, the accident would not have occurred had due care been used ( Pearlman v. W.O. King Lumber Co. (1939), 302 Ill. App. 190, 23 N.E.2d 826).

  10. People v. Schumann

    120 Ill. App. 3d 518 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983)   Cited 11 times
    In Schumann, the appellate court found the trier of fact could infer that the defendant was driving carelessly and failed to reduce speed based on the facts surrounding the accident.

    Necessary proof is that the defendant drove carelessly and failed to reduce speed to avoid colliding with a person or vehicle. In re Vitale (1978), 71 Ill.2d 229, 238, vacated and remanded on different grounds (1980), 447 U.S. 410, 65 L.Ed.2d, 228, 100 S.Ct. 2260; People v. Brant (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 847, 851. The fact that, as defendant argues, the State failed to present any evidence as to the speed of his vehicle does not create a reasonable doubt.