Opinion
2-24-0414
10-11-2024
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BARKIEST T. BRADFORD, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County. No. 24-CF-1119 Honorable Julia A. Yetter, Judge, Presiding.
JUSTICE JORGENSEN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McLaren and Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
JORGENSEN, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: Trial court's detention decision was not an abuse of discretion, where defendant's criminal history and violation of pretrial release conditions supported the court's findings of a real and present threat to the community and that less-restrictive conditions would not mitigate that threat. Affirmed.
¶ 2 Defendant, Barkiest T. Bradford, timely appeals from the denial of his pretrial release under section 110-6.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022)), as amended. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 On May 30, 2024, defendant was charged with possession of: (1) more than 15 but less than 100 grams of cocaine with intent to deliver (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(A) (West 2022) (Class X)); (2) between 15 and 100 grams of cocaine (id. § 402(a)(2)(A)) (Class 1)); (3) less than 15 grams of a substance containing oxycodone (id. § 402(c)) (Class 4)); and (4) less than 15 grams of a substance containing alprazolam (id.) (Class 4)).
¶ 5 That same day, the State petitioned to deny defendant pretrial release, alleging that he was charged with detainable offenses and his pretrial release posed a real and present threat to community safety. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022). The petition further noted that defendant was on pretrial release for fleeing/attempt to elude and driving while license revoked in case No. 23-MT-8531. In addition, the petition noted that defendant has two felony convictions for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) in Kane County (two years' imprisonment) and Du Page County (one year of imprisonment). Further, it alleged that he has misdemeanor convictions for driving under the influence (DUI), obstructing identification, driving while license suspended/revoked, and fleeing/attempt to elude. Finally, defendant was adjudicated delinquent for attempted burglary.
¶ 6 At the hearing on the State's petition, the State explained to the court that, in January 2024, defendant was placed on pretrial release in case No. 23-MT-8531, with conditions including that he not commit any criminal offenses and not drive without a valid driver's license. Further, the State proffered, in February 2024, defendant was discharged from parole on the AUUW convictions, and, since November 2, 2019, after the DUI, his driver's license had been suspended or revoked. Two police synopses (for the present case and the Kane County AUUW conviction) were admitted into evidence.
¶ 7 The State continued that, according to the synopsis in this case, on May 29, 2024, police conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle that defendant was driving. They smelled cannabis, removed him from the car, and conducted a pat-down search of his person, locating a plastic bag containing 53.77 grams of cocaine. Further, during the search, officers found other controlled substances, including oxycodone and alprazolam, as well as, in defendant's pocket, a functioning scale with a white, powdery residue. After receiving Miranda warnings, defendant admitted to selling drugs and making approximately $200 to $300.
¶ 8 The State argued that defendant posed a real and present threat to the community, given he admitted that the drugs were not for personal use but, rather, he was selling them in the community. "I know that the court is aware of what drugs do to the community and that it creates drug users, it creates potential violence in that drugs and weapons tend to go hand in hand, particularly when those who are dealing drugs are trying to protect their product." The State conceded that, in this situation, defendant was not found to be in possession of a weapon. However, it argued, defendant admitted he was selling the drugs, and his criminal history reflects two prior weapons convictions. Accordingly, the State argued that defendant is a threat, because he has access to weapons, accessed weapons in the past when he was not permitted to do so, and made statements that he is a drug dealer.
¶ 9 Finally, the State argued that no conditions would mitigate the threat that defendant posed to the community. It noted that defendant was on pretrial release for fleeing and attempting to elude a peace officer and driving while license was suspended or revoked. On January 5, 2024, defendant was ordered to not commit any new criminal offenses or to drive without a valid license, yet, on May 29, 2024, he was not only driving without a license, but he was also in possession of drugs. The State noted that defendant's license was not recently revoked; rather, in 2019 and 2020, he had three convictions for driving while license suspended or revoked. Further, defendant had a 2018 conviction for fleeing, attempting to elude. Accordingly, the State argued, defendant has demonstrated an inability to comply with court orders, as well as police commands. "[T]his is not somebody that is going to comply with conditions." Further, the State argued that GPS or electronic home monitoring (EHM) might confine him but would not prevent him from accessing drugs or weapons and taking them out into the community during the times he is allowed out. Due to the nature of these offenses and his past offenses, the State argued, EHM would not stop him from committing additional offenses. Finally, the State asserted that ordering defendant to not commit offenses, drive without a license, or possess weapons or drugs, would be ineffective, because he had already shown he could not follow similar instructions.
¶ 10 Defense counsel asked that the court find no clear and convincing evidence that defendant committed the alleged offenses, as the State's argument on that point was based solely on the synopsis and facts therein. In addition, counsel argued that defendant was not a real and present threat, where the alleged offenses were nonviolent and, despite his past convictions, defendant did not claim to have any weapons, nor were any found. Counsel noted that defendant was working and going to school to advance his career. Finally, counsel argued that conditions such as EHM could mitigate any risk of potential threat and that monitoring would be effective and would serve as a deterrent.
¶ 11 On May 30, 2024, the court (Judge Salvatore LoPiccolo) granted the State's petition. The court noted that it had considered the factors for determining dangerousness as set forth in section 110-6.1(g) of the Code as amended (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022)), as well as the petition and evidence presented, including the police synopsis, and found that the State had proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof was evident and presumption great that defendant committed the offense of unlawful possession with intent to deliver, a Class X felony and detainable offense. The court also found that the State satisfied its burden of establishing that defendant posed a real and present threat to the community. The court specifically noted that it would not, generally, find this factor satisfied for this offense, however, "[t]he difference between this case and other cases in which I did not find that the defendant was to be a threat to the community was that this defendant has two prior aggravated unlawful use of weapons convictions" and was on pretrial release at the time this offense was committed, conditions of which included that he not commit new offenses and not drive without a valid license, both of which he violated. The court continued that defendant acknowledged selling drugs and, combined with his history of accessing weapons, "drug dealers frequently have firearms to protect themselves, to protect their product, and protect the money that they make from selling that product." The court found that these factors combined to render defendant a danger to the community. Finally, the court found that the State met its burden of establishing that no less restrictive conditions of pretrial release could mitigate the real and present threat defendant posed, given that defendant had demonstrated that he does not follow conditions of pretrial release. Further, EHM would not prevent defendant from possessing firearms or possessing and selling drugs, nor would it protect the community from the dangers that accompany selling drugs.
¶ 12 On June 14, 2024, defendant filed a motion for relief, asking the court to reconsider his detention and arguing that the court erred in granting the State's petition. In sum, defendant argued first that the State failed to satisfy its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he committed the charged offenses because it relied on a police report synopsis, which requires only the lower probable-cause standard. Second, defendant argued that the State failed to meet its burden to establish that he posed a real and present threat to community safety, where the charges in this case did not reflect any actual injury or access to weapons, and defendant's status as a felon does not constitute evidence of a real and present threat to the community at large. Finally, defendant argued, generally, that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any real and present threat he posed.
¶ 13 On June 27, 2024, the court (Judge Julia Yetter) heard argument on defendant's motion. At that time, defense counsel focused the argument on the State's alleged failure to demonstrate that less restrictive conditions could not be imposed. Counsel elaborated that EHM would have been a "very reasonable alternative," as defendant had a place to stay (counsel provided the name and address) in De Kalb, within the parameters of the Kane County EHM program. In addition, counsel noted that the EHM device is attached as a constant reminder about the importance of following the court's conditions. Finally, counsel argued in mitigation that defendant has a four-year-old daughter, and he is unable to be with her while incarcerated.
¶ 14 The court rejected defendant's arguments, noting that it had reviewed the exhibits and complaint, and found that the State met its burden of proving that the proof was evident and presumption great that defendant committed the detainable offense of possession with intent to deliver. Further, the State met its burden to establish defendant presents a real and present threat to the community. "Certainly, the case law is clear that merely being charged with the offense that we are dealing with here is not sufficient in and of itself to make a finding of dangerousness." However, the court noted that, at the time that he allegedly committed this offense, defendant was on pretrial release for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer and other traffic charges, and, further, defendant had a history of felony convictions for AUUW. The court also noted defendant's other prior convictions and adjudication. Given that defendant was found in possession of what the court characterized as "a significant amount" of cocaine and that he has a "history of criminality that includes violence and access to weapons" as well as attempting to evade or obstruct law enforcement, the court found that the State satisfied its burden of establishing a real and present threat. Finally, although defendant argued that EHM was an appropriate less restrictive condition, the court found that he had "quite a history of noncompliance with the law." He was on conditions of release when he allegedly committed the charged offenses, and the evidence reflected that defendant would not and does not comply with court orders. Further, although EHM can restrict movement and monitor an individual, "knowing where someone is does not prevent that person from engaging in the very activity which brings us here to court." As such, the court did not find that EHM was a sufficient condition to address the real and present threat defendant posed.
¶ 15 On July 16, 2024, defendant filed a notice of appeal. The Office of the State Appellate Defender filed a memorandum on defendant's behalf pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). The State has submitted a memorandum opposing defendant's appeal.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 Pretrial release is governed by article 110 of the Code. 725 ILCS 5/110 (West 2022). Under the Code, as amended, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial release, and a defendant's pretrial release may be denied only in certain statutorily limited situations. Id. §§ 110-2(a), 110-6.1(e). As relevant here, upon filing a verified petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has committed a detainable offense (id. § 110-6.1(e)(1)), that the defendant's pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community (id. § 110-6.1(e)(2)), and that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate that risk (id. § 110-6.1(e)(3)). "Evidence is clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth of the proposition in question." Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023 IL 127712, ¶ 74.
¶ 18 We review defendant's arguments under a bifurcated standard of review: the court's factual determinations are reviewed to determine whether they are against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the court's ultimate determination regarding denial of pretrial release is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion occurs when the court's decision is unreasonable. Id. Likewise, a decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the court's determination is unreasonable. Id.
¶ 19 On appeal, defendant does not challenge the court's finding that he committed the charged offense. Instead, he argues only that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) he posed a threat to the community and (2) the alleged threat could not be mitigated by measures short of detention. Defendant's arguments here fail, as neither reflects the court's findings were contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence or that it abused its discretion.
¶ 20 First, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden to establish that he poses a real and present threat to community safety. He argues that the State improperly emphasized the general risk of societal harm from drug crimes, and the court improperly found defendant dangerous "primarily based on the general notion that drug crimes hurt society." Defendant contends that, where there were no allegations of violence or weapons in this case, or evidence that he had ever threatened any person or had used a weapon to protect his drugs, the State and court improperly relied on the general notion that drug sales harm society and not on facts specific to defendant or this case. We disagree.
¶ 21 While the State is correct that the charges alone are not sufficient to establish dangerousness, because all criminal defendants, even those accused of drug offenses, are presumed eligible for pretrial release (see, e.g., 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022); People v. Norris, 2024 IL App (2d) 230338-U, ¶ 37), both judges who issued detention decisions here expressly recognized that principle and distinguished the general harm from drug offenses with the harm here, based on defendant's particularized situation. Again, Judge LoPiccolo found that, although he would not, generally, find this factor satisfied for this type of offense, "[t]he difference between this case and other cases in which I did not find that the defendant was to be a threat to the community was that this defendant has two prior aggravated unlawful use of weapons convictions" and was on pretrial release at the time this offense was committed, conditions of which included that he not commit new offenses and not drive without a valid license, both of which he violated. He continued that defendant acknowledged selling drugs and, combined with his history of accessing weapons, "drug dealers frequently have firearms to protect themselves, to protect their product, and protect the money that they make from selling that product." Finally, he found that those factors combined to render defendant a danger to the community.
¶ 22 Similarly, in rejecting defendant's argument in his motion for relief, Judge Yetter recognized that "[c]ertainly, the case law is clear that merely being charged with the offense that we are dealing with here is not sufficient in and of itself to make a finding of dangerousness." However, she continued, here, defendant was on pretrial release for fleeing and attempting to elude a police officer and other traffic charges, and, further, defendant had a history of felony convictions for AUUW, as well as other prior convictions and a juvenile adjudication. Judge Yetter found defendant dangerous because he was in possession of "a significant amount" of cocaine and has a "history of criminality that includes violence and access to weapons," as well as attempting to evade or obstruct law enforcement. It is, therefore, clear that the court's finding that defendant posed a danger was not based on generalities of the nature of the crime but, rather, on his particularized circumstances and criminal history. These findings were not unreasonable.
¶ 23 Defendant also argues that the State failed to prove he was dangerous, because it proffered no evidence that he ever harmed or threatened harm to anyone or that his prior weapons convictions involved the use of violence. However, the Code expressly allows the court, when assessing dangerousness, to consider a defendant's prior criminal history (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g)(2)(A) (West 2022)) and, here, the court considered not only his criminal history of multiple weapons convictions, but also that history combined with the threat of danger from defendant's repeated failures to comply with court-ordered conditions of release. In sum, the court's finding of dangerousness was not unreasonable.
¶ 24 Next, defendant argues that the State failed to meet its burden of proving that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate any threat he posed. Defendant argues that the State did not dispute that he was employed, attending school, and had a young daughter. Instead, he contends, it primarily relied on the nature of the present charges and the fact that the current allegations constituted violations of his pretrial release in case No. 23-MT-8531, without identifying any "other compelling evidence" that he would be unlikely to comply with conditions. Defendant argues that the court could have ordered EHM and GPS monitoring, with an "around-the-clock home detention order" and an order to comply with pretrial services, random drug screens, house searches, and the surrender of all drugs and weapons. He contends that regular checks from pretrial services would effectively serve to curb any possession of weapons and the possession and sale of drugs. He further posits that the court could have provided additional motivation to ensure compliance of an around-the-clock detention by incentivizing him that compliance for a specified period would result in an amendment allowing him to leave home to go to work or school. Finally, defendant argues, the court could have ordered him to have no contact with anyone other than immediate family and work associates and to refrain from possessing and selling illegal drugs, to alleviate its concern about EHM not preventing the conduct alleged here. We disagree.
¶ 25 The court considered factors such as defendant's criminal history, the weight of evidence against him, and the fact that he was on release at the time of the current offense, all proper considerations for assessing whether pretrial release conditions would reasonably ensure the safety of the community "and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all conditions of pretrial release." (Emphasis added.) 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A)-(B) (West 2022). Frankly, that defendant had been court ordered, merely four months prior to the alleged offense, to not commit further crimes and to not drive without a valid license, but then did both of those things, is significant evidence demonstrating that he would be unlikely to comply with the conditions that he suggests now (many of the details of which, we note, are being asserted for the first time on appeal). Moreover, the evidence also reflected that defendant's criminal history involved failing to obey police orders, so it would not be unreasonable for the court to find it unlikely he would comply with orders from probation personnel. As to weight of the evidence, the court considered that defendant was illegally driving a vehicle, found in possession of a large quantity of drugs, and admitted to selling them. In total, the court's finding that, with respect to the conduct alleged here, GPS and EHM might monitor his location but would not adequately serve to accomplish the goal of protecting the public, was not unreasonable. The court's finding that less restrictive conditions would not mitigate the risk of harm defendant poses was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 26 In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State's petition to deny defendant pretrial release.
¶ 27 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 28 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County is affirmed.
¶ 29 Affirmed.