Opinion
C095655
10-18-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BOBBY EUGENE BOYTER, Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. PR940004.
HULL, Acting P. J.
In 1994, defendant Bobby Eugene Boyter pleaded no contest to three offenses committed when he was 17 years old. In April 2021, defendant filed a request pursuant to People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 (Franklin) and In re Cook (2019) 7 Cal.5th 439 (Cook) to make a record of evidence relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing. The trial court denied defendant's motion on the ground that defendant had a sufficient opportunity to submit evidence related to his youth and immaturity at his 1994 sentencing hearing. The parties agree that the trial court erred in denying defendant's request. We agree with the parties and reverse the court's order and remand this matter for further proceedings.
Facts and History of the Proceedings
In March 1994, defendant pleaded no contest to kidnapping with intent to commit robbery (former Pen. Code, §§ 207, 209, statutory section citations that follow are found in the Penal Code); first degree burglary (§§ 459, 460, subd. (a)); and assault with intent to commit rape (former §§ 220, 261; § 240). In June 1994, the trial court imposed a mandatory sentence of life with the possibility of parole for kidnapping (former § 209, subd. (a)), plus five years for defendant's admission of a firearm enhancement (former § 12022.5, subd. (a)), and imposed a determinate term of seven years four months, consisting of the upper term of six years for burglary (former § 461, subd. (1)) plus one year four months (one third the middle term) for assault (former § 220).
After changes to the law governing parole for youth offenders, defendant filed a request in April 2021 to initiate a Franklin proceeding to place on the record evidence that may be relevant at an eventual youth offender parole hearing. The trial court appointed counsel, and defendant filed a statement of views pursuant to section 1203.01 and Cook. Defendant attached to the statement of views documents from the court file for defendant's trial-including defendant's statement in mitigation, a transcript of the sentencing hearing, and a transcribed confession of a coparticipant in the offenses explaining that she and defendant were influenced by the older participant-a psychological evaluation intended to make a record of "factors relevant to [defendant's] emotional functioning and developmental maturity, which may have influenced his decision-making and judgment at the time of the commission said offense"; and several statements from family members and the other coparticipant describing defendant's youthful characteristics at the time of the offense.
In December 2021, the trial court held what it referred to as a hearing to determine whether defendant was entitled to a Franklin proceeding. The trial court found that defendant had a sufficient opportunity to offer evidence related to his youth at his 1994 sentencing hearing, so it denied defendant's request to submit any evidence that had not been reviewed by the sentencing judge. The trial court did agree to forward to the Board of Parole Hearings (Board) three documents that had been reviewed by the sentencing judge but had not been included in the sentencing record.
Defendant timely appealed.
Discussion
Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it denied him the opportunity to place additional evidence on the record. Defendant asserts the changes in the law since his sentencing hearing have created new incentives and procedures for placing youthful offender information on the record, and the trial court unfairly denied him the opportunity to benefit from those procedures. The People agree remand is required. We agree with the parties.
Almost 20 years after defendant's sentencing hearing, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 260 (2013-2014 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2013, ch. 312, §§ 1-5), which added sections 3051 and 4801, subdivision (c) to the Penal Code. (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 276.) These provisions ensure that youth offenders receive "youth offender parole hearings" and require the Board "not just to consider but to 'give great weight to the diminished culpability of juveniles as compared to adults, the hallmark features of youth, and any subsequent growth and increased maturity of the prisoner in accordance with relevant case law.' (§ 4801, subd. (c).)" (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 277.) In other words, these provisions "create a process by which growth and maturity of youthful offenders can be assessed and a meaningful opportunity for release established." (Ibid.)
Our Supreme Court decided that, as an integral part of this process, the parties must have the opportunity "to make an accurate record of the juvenile offender's characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense so that the Board, years later, may properly discharge its obligation to 'give great weight to' youth-related factors (§ 4801, subd. (c)) in determining whether the offender is 'fit to rejoin society.'" (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 284.) Even youth offenders whose sentences are otherwise final are entitled to this evidence preservation process, called a Franklin proceeding, because "the possibility that relevant evidence will be lost may increase as years go by." (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 450-451.)
For defendants whose sentences are final, "the proper avenue [to initiate a Franklin proceeding] is to file a motion in superior court under the original caption and case number, citing the authority of section 1203.01 and [Cook]. The motion should establish the inmate's entitlement to a youth offender parole hearing and indicate when such hearing is anticipated to take place, or if one or more hearings have already occurred." (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 458; see People v. Benzler (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 743, 748-749.)
Here, defendant's motion met the initial requirements for eligibility. Defendant filed his motion in the trial court under the original caption and case number, cited Cook's holding that he could file a motion in the trial court, stated he was entitled to a youth offender parole hearing under section 3051 because he was 17 years old at the time of the crime, and expressly requested a Franklin hearing. The record indicates that defendant's last parole hearing at the time the trial court ruled on his motion was in 2014 and another was coming up, but there was no evidence that defendant had already benefitted from a Franklin proceeding. This made him eligible for a Franklin proceeding. (See People v. Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 749.)
Despite defendant's eligibility for a Franklin proceeding, the trial court denied defendant's request, finding defendant was ineligible for a Franklin proceeding because: (1) he already had a meaningful opportunity to present the evidence that he would have presented under sections 3051 and 4801; and (2) the new psychological evaluation defendant sought to include in the record did not meet the requirements of section 3051, subdivision (f) (hereafter section 3051(f)).
The first reason, as defense counsel noted at the hearing, has been repeatedly rejected by our Supreme Court: "Although a defendant sentenced before the enactment of Senate Bill No. 260 could have introduced such evidence through existing sentencing procedures, he or she would not have had reason to know that the subsequently enacted legislation would make such evidence particularly relevant in the parole process. Without such notice, any opportunity to introduce evidence of youth-related factors is not adequate in light of the purpose of Senate Bill No. 260." (People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1123, 1131; accord Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 454.)
The second reason misinterprets section 3051(f). Section 3051(f) does not limit the evidence that can be put on the record in a Franklin proceeding. Rather, section 3051(f) describes the factfinding procedures for use by the Board at the youth offender parole hearing. As our Supreme Court has pointed out, section 3051(f) "implies the availability of information about the offender when he was a juvenile" so that the Board can use its factfinding procedures to produce current information for comparison, in order to determine whether the youth offender has undergone "any subsequent growth and increased maturity." (Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 283-284.) Thus, Franklin requires that the defendant "shall have the opportunity to 'place on the record any documents, evaluations, or testimony (subject to cross-examination) that may be relevant at his eventual youth offender parole hearing, and the prosecution likewise may put on the record any evidence that demonstrates the juvenile offender's culpability or cognitive maturity, or otherwise bears on the influence of youth-related factors.'" (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 458-459.)
Because the trial court's order rests on errors of law, the trial court's denial of defendant's request to initiate a Franklin proceeding is an abuse of discretion. (See People v. Benzler, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 749-750.) We will order a remand for both parties to make an accurate record of defendant's characteristics and circumstances at the time of the offense, as set forth in Franklin. (See People v. Perez (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 612, 619.) On remand, "the trial court may 'exercise its discretion to conduct this process efficiently, ensuring that the information introduced is relevant, noncumulative, and otherwise in accord with the governing rules, statutes, and regulations.'" (Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 459.)
Disposition
The order denying defendant's motion seeking a Franklin proceeding is reversed and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We concur: RENNER, J., EARL, J.