Opinion
No. 1-11-2381
03-18-2013
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VERNDELL BOYD, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the
Circuit Court of
Cook County.
No. 10 CR 7546
Honorable
Joseph M. Claps,
Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Cunningham and Delort concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in its assessment that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his fundamental right to a jury trial.
¶ 2 The defendant, Verndell Boyd, appeals from his bench trial conviction and subsequent sentence for robbery. On appeal, the defendant argues that his case should be reversed and remanded because he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to a jury trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 3 On April 9, 2010, the defendant, a 17-year-old tenth grade student, was arrested and charged with robbery and aggravated battery. According to the State, that night, the victim, Reginald Walker, was walking home from a church event at approximately 11:00pm when a
group of five young individuals (including the defendant) followed him and proceeded to punch and kick him and take his jacket, wallet, cell phone, and keys. After the defendant and his co-conspirators stole the items, they left the victim and ran from the scene.
¶ 4 The State asserts that the victim chased his assailants down an alley until he came upon a parked police car. He informed the officer of his situation and got into the car. The officer made a call for assistance, and he and the victim pursued the group together. Although the group scattered, the victim and officer continued to follow a few of the assailants. At some point during the chase, another police car appeared carrying the defendant in the backseat. The victim identified the defendant as one of the perpetrators. Thereafter, both the victim and defendant were taken to the police station, and the defendant was given his Miranda rights. The issuing officer perceived that the defendant understood his Miranda rights because the defendant told him the definitions of "free" and "lawyer" and answered affirmatively when asked if he attended high school and had ever read a newspaper or magazine.
¶ 5 At the arraignment on May 7, 2010, the defendant requested a behavioral clinical examination ("BCE"), which was authorized. Additionally, the circuit court and the defendant had the following conversation:
"THE COURT: Mr. Boyd, you are charged in a two-count information on or about April 9, 2010, you committed the offense of robbery involving a jacket and cell phone, keys and its contents from Reginald Walker by the use of force or threatening imminent use of force; aggravated battery, you struck Reginald Walker about the body
while on the public way. These are Class 2 and Class 3 felonies for which you have a right to trial and right to trial by jury. Do you understand the charges against you?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: You don't? Count 1 says that you robbed someone. The charge is called robbery. I didn't say that you did it. I am telling you what they say you did. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir."
* * *
"THE COURT: These are charges which you have a right to trial and right to trial by jury. Trial by jury would be 12 individuals selected from the community by yourself, your attorney and the State. They would hear all the evidence presented in the case to determine whether or not that evidence has proven you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt
which is the State's burden. Their verdict must be unanimous."
* * *
"THE COURT: Because you don't want to hear the answer. If you violate EM, Mr. Boyd, it will cause me to keep you in custody until this case is over. Prepare an order for the sheriff that the EM is not to stop him from going to school and any mandated counselling, et cetera. What date?
MS. GILL [PUBLIC DEFENDER]: June 14.
THE COURT: EM is over the State's objection. What?
MS. GILL: June 14 for return on BCX.
THE COURT: Do you understand what I have said?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: You don't?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: You don't?
THE DEFENDANT: You said EM. I don't know what EM is.
THE COURT: Electronic monitoring. You will have a bracelet on you. If you move away from the house, the sheriff will know. The sheriff will bring you to me and you will remain in custody until this case is disposed of one way or another. Understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir."
¶ 6 On June 29, 2010 and July 16, 2010, the circuit court's forensic scientist conducted the BCE, which revealed that the defendant was sane, fit to stand trial, and had the ability to understand his Miranda rights. The BCE also indicated that the defendant was prescribed the stimulant medication, Focalin XR.
¶ 7 On September 29, 2010, the defendant asked the circuit court for a pretrial investigation, which was authorized. The pretrial investigation divulged that the defendant had severe emotional disabilities. He was born addicted to cocaine and was placed in foster care due to abuse and neglect by his birth mother. He had previously been diagnosed with a depressive disorder not otherwise specified, bipolar disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder ("PTSD"), and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"). Additionally, in first grade and second
grade, the defendant was placed in a psychiatric hospital for stabbing a girl and having homicidal ideation toward his brother. He was hospitalized again in 2003. Because of his mental disorders, the defendant regularly saw a psychiatrist and therapist.
¶ 8 The investigation also revealed that the defendant had learning disabilities. When the defendant was 15 years old, his reading and math skills were at a third grade level and his writing skills were at a first grade level. His cognitive scores suggested that he was lower than average for nonverbal reasoning and was borderline for verbal reasoning. As a result of his emotional disorders and learning disabilities, the defendant was placed in a therapeutic day-school setting in 2001. He was attending this type of institution at the time of the crime and for most of the circuit court proceedings.
¶ 9 At pretrial hearings on November 30, 2010, and March 15, 2011, the defendant requested a bench trial. At another pretrial hearing on April 18, 2011, the defendant submitted a signed jury trial waiver. The following conversation took place regarding this waiver:
"THE COURT: Mr. Boyd, your case is set for trial. You have the right to a trial by jury. Your attorney has handed me a document entitled jury waiver. Is that your signature?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: That indicates to me that you wish to give up your right to a trial by jury and have a trial by judge, is that right?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes.
THE COURT: Anybody make any promises for you to do that?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Are you making that decision of your own free will?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir."
¶ 10 At the conclusion of the bench trial on April 26, 2011, the circuit court found the defendant guilty of both robbery and aggravated battery. At trial, the following conversation occurred:
"THE COURT: Okay. We have a pretrial in the file.
MS. GILL: We do have one already?
THE COURT: Yes. I wouldn't do it again.
MS. GILL: Okay. Then I would ask for -- how about May 25th.
THE COURT: Is that a good day for you?
THE FOSTER MOTHER: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: EM is vacated -- do the order -- over the State's objection.
MS. GILL: Thank you.
THE COURT: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: What's a pretrial?
THE COURT: That's a social invest -- it is a background investigation done by probation they have done it already. They put in all of the information about you, your background, your criminal history, all that good stuff.
Okay?
THE FOSTER MOTHER: Okay.
THE DEFENDANT: All right."
¶ 11 Subsequently, at the sentencing hearing on June 16, 2011, the circuit court sentenced the defendant to three years of mental health probation based on his robbery conviction (the aggravated battery count merged into this conviction), and denied his motion for a new trial. At the sentencing hearing, the defendant and the circuit court engaged in this conversation:
"THE COURT: Well, it's simple. You have 30 days from today's date to file a notice of appeal to appeal your convictions. Do you understand that part?
DEFENDANT BOYD: What is appeal?
THE COURT: An appeal is when you ask a higher court to review my findings to determine whether or not I was correct.
DEFENDANT BOYD: Yes."
Shortly after the sentencing hearing, on July 26, 2011, the circuit court denied a motion to reconsider the sentence, and the defendant filed a notice of appeal.
¶ 12 On appeal, the defendant argues that he was incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his fundamental right to a jury trial because of his mental deficiencies. We disagree.
¶ 13 The State contends that the defendant forfeited his opportunity to raise this issue on appeal because the defendant failed to object at trial and raise it in a post trial motion. Typically, if a defendant does not follow this procedure, his right to raise that issue on appeal will be forfeited. People v. Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 54, 57, 724 N.E.2d 167 (1999). The plain-error doctrine, however, is an exception to the general rule of forfeiture. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167 at 177. Under this doctrine, a reviewing court will hear a defendant's issue that would normally be
forfeited if the court finds that the issue occurs because of a "clear and obvious error" and "(t)he evidence is closely balanced; or that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant's trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process." People v. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52, 65, 902 N.E.2d 571 (2008).
¶ 14 The State argues that an invalid jury waiver is a "typical trial mistake" rather than an error that causes "breakdowns in the adversarial system" and fundamental unfairness. People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995). This is clearly incorrect, because the right to a jury trial is a substantial right that is essential to our country's judicial process. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 65; Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 57. Accordingly, this Court will assess whether the circuit court committed plain error when it accepted the defendant's jury waiver. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52 at 65.
¶ 15 It is not disputed that the defendant has the right to a jury trial as well as the right to waive a jury trial. Id. Pursuant to Section 103-6 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/103-6 (West 2010)), a defendant in a criminal proceeding may choose to waive a jury trial in order to have a bench trial. Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d 54 at 57. In order for a criminal defendant to validly waive his right to a jury trial, he must make his decision voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly in open court. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 65-66; Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 57. Whether a defendant's jury waiver is made knowingly and understandingly "depends on the facts and circumstances of each particular case." Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66.
¶ 16 A defendant's waiver is knowing and understanding when he makes his decision with "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady v. United
States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). Courts are not required to communicate "any set admonition or advice." People v. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d 265, 270, 821 N.E.2d 253 (2004). However, if the facts and circumstances indicate that the defendant may not fully understand the concept of a jury waiver, then the trial court must explain the ramifications of a waiver. People v. Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d 988, 995, 679 N.E.2d 425 (1997). The key concept that the jury-waiving defendant must understand is that the judge, not a jury, will be deciding his case. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d 52 at 69. Typically, a defendant's waiver is valid if it is pronounced in open court by defense counsel without the defendant's objection. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 270.
¶ 17 We hold that the facts and circumstances of the defendant's case indicate that his jury waiver was valid. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 66. His decision was voluntary, in written form, pronounced by defense counsel in open court, and he made it with sufficient awareness that the circuit court judge, not a jury, would be deciding his case. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 65-66, 69; Brady, 397 U.S. at 748; Williamson, 311 Ill. App. 3d at 57. Although the defendant has mental deficiencies and lacked familiarity with our criminal justice system, we find that he knowingly and understandingly waived his right to a jury trial for the following three reasons.
¶ 18 First, the record indicates that the defendant would have asked for clarification if he misunderstood the concept of a jury or waiver. There were several instances where the defendant indicated that he did not comprehend a particular matter being discussed during the proceedings. He asked for clarification regarding the nature of his charges, electronic monitoring, pretrials, and appeals. Although the defendant argues that he conveyed his confusion only when the circuit court asked if he understood certain concepts, the record suggests otherwise. At the conclusion
of the bench trial on April 26, 2011, the defendant interjected a request for an explanation of a pretrial during a discussion regarding the date for the sentencing hearing. At no time during that proceeding did the court ask the defendant if he understood the meaning of a pretrial; rather, the defendant independently inquired. Accordingly, it is clear that the defendant was comfortable expressing his confusion to the court. This suggests that the defendant would have requested clarification if he did not understand his right to a jury trial or waiver.
¶ 19 Second, the fact that the defendant was fit to stand trial and had the ability to understand his Miranda rights suggests that he had the ability to understand his jury rights.
¶ 20 Third, even if the circuit court did believe that the circumstances indicated that the defendant did not completely independently understand the concept of a jury or jury waiver, the record indicates that the circuit court appropriately informed the defendant of the ramifications of his waiver at the pretrial hearing on April 18, 2011. The circuit court advised the defendant of the key concept that a defendant should comprehend when waiving his right to a jury trial: that a judge, not a jury, will be deciding his case. Bannister, 232 Ill. 2d at 69. Because of this, we now hold that the defendant's jury waiver is valid because he made it with "sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences." Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
¶ 21 This Court is not persuaded that the defendant's waiver was not knowingly and understandingly made based on the defendant's comparison between his jury waiver and the defendant's invalid jury waiver in People v. Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d 988, 679 N.E.2d 425 (1997). In Phuong, the Chinese defendant had recently immigrated to the United States, spoke very little English, had taken only a few months of school in our system, and had never been
exposed to our legal system. Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d 988 at 990. An interpreter translated the defendant's jury waiver form and she signed it prior to trial. Id. at 991. Thereafter, the circuit court informed the defendant that she had the right to trial by jury or judge without any additional explanation. Id. Because the defendant did not likely comprehend what a jury is and the circuit court did not elaborate "that a jury trial meant that members of the community would serve as fact finders in her case," this Court found that the defendant did not knowingly and understandingly waive her right to jury trial. Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 992.
¶ 22 In this case, the defendant alleges that the circuit court did not ensure that he understood his right to a jury trial and waiver because the judge, like the court in Phuong, gave an insufficient explanation without asking the defendant if he understood. However, a trial court is not required to ask if the defendant understands a jury trial or waiver in order for his waiver to be knowingly and understandingly made. Bracey, 213 Ill. 2d at 270; Phuong, 287 Ill. App. 3d at 995. Unlike the court in Phuong, at the defendant's arraignment on May 7, 2010, the circuit court elaborated that a jury trial entails 12 individuals from the community hearing evidence to establish the defendant's guilt or innocence.
¶ 23 Also unlike Phuong, the defendant is an American citizen, speaks English fluently, was educated in our school systems, and had a BCE that revealed that he had the ability to understand his Miranda rights. These facts indicate that the defendant in this case was in a better position to understand his waiver than the defendant in Phuong.
¶ 24 Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by accepting the defendant's jury waiver, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 25 Affirmed.