We reject that contention. " ‘[A] statement given freely and voluntarily’ is admissible in evidence" ( People v. Boyd , 192 A.D.3d 1659, 1660, 144 N.Y.S.3d 278 [4th Dept. 2021], quoting Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 478, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 [1966] ). To meet their initial burden when seeking to admit in evidence statements by a defendant who has limited English language proficiency, "[t]he People must establish that the defendant grasped that he or she did not have to speak to the interrogator; that any statement might be used to the subject's disadvantage; and that an attorney's assistance would be provided upon request, at any time, and before questioning is continued" ( People v. Jin Cheng Lin , 26 N.Y.3d 701, 726, 27 N.Y.S.3d 439, 47 N.E.3d 718 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; seePeople v. Hinojoso-Soto , 161 A.D.3d 1541, 1542, 77 N.Y.S.3d 248 [4th Dept. 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 938, 84 N.Y.S.3d 864, 109 N.E.3d 1164 [2018] ).

We reject that contention." '[A] statement given freely and voluntarily' is admissible in evidence" (People v Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659, 1660 [4th Dept 2021], quoting Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 [1966]). To meet their initial burden when seeking to admit in evidence statements by a defendant who has limited English language proficiency, "[t]he People must establish that the defendant grasped that he or she did not have to speak to the interrogator; that any statement might be used to the subject's disadvantage; and that an attorney's assistance would be provided upon request, at any time, and before questioning is continued" (People v Jin Cheng Lin, 26 N.Y.3d 701, 726 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Hinojoso-Soto, 161 A.D.3d 1541, 1542 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 938 [2018]).

We reject that contention." '[A] statement given freely and voluntarily' is admissible in evidence" (People v Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659, 1660 [4th Dept 2021], quoting Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 [1966]). To meet their initial burden when seeking to admit in evidence statements by a defendant who has limited English language proficiency, "[t]he People must establish that the defendant grasped that he or she did not have to speak to the interrogator; that any statement might be used to the subject's disadvantage; and that an attorney's assistance would be provided upon request, at any time, and before questioning is continued" (People v Jin Cheng Lin, 26 N.Y.3d 701, 726 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v Hinojoso-Soto, 161 A.D.3d 1541, 1542 [4th Dept 2018], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 938 [2018]).

To the extent that the People suggest that the jury clearly found that defendant possessed a loaded firearm during his encounter with the witness, neither the indictment nor the jury charge reflect that the jury was specifically asked to determine whether possession pursuant to Penal Law § 265.03 occurred prior to and distinct from the subsequent shooting (see People v Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659, 1661 [4th Dept 2021]; see generally People v Parks, 95 N.Y.2d 811, 815 [2000]; People v Murray, 37 A.D.3d 247 [1st Dept 2007], lv denied 9 N.Y.3d 848 [2007]; People v Washington, 9 A.D.3d 499, 503 [3d Dept 2004], lv denied 3 N.Y.3d 682 [2004]). Accordingly, we find that the People failed to meet their burden and that the sentence for the conviction on count 2 must run concurrent to the remaining convictions (see People v Tripp, 177 A.D.3d 1409, 1410-1411 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1133 [2020]; People v Harris, 115 A.D.3d 761, 762-763 [2d Dept 2014], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 1062 [2014]; compare People v Durham, 146 A.D.3d at 1075). Noting the modification to defendant's sentence, and considering his "extensive criminal history, the brutal and senseless nature of his acts and his failure to accept responsibility for them," we reject defendant's remaining argument that his sentence is unduly harsh and excessive and decline his invitation to reduce it in the interest

As defendant further contends and the People correctly concede, County Court erred in directing that the sentences imposed for CPW in the second degree under counts 7 and 8 of the indictment run consecutively to the sentences imposed for murder in the first degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and assault in the first degree under counts 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the indictment inasmuch as there was no evidence presented that defendant possessed the gun independently of his intent to use it in the shooting (see People v Alligood, 192 A.D.3d 1508, 1510 [4th Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 970 [2021]; People v Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659, 1661 [4th Dept 2021]; People v Tripp, 177 A.D.3d 1409, 1410-1411 [4th Dept 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1133 [2020]; see generally People v Brown, 21 N.Y.3d 739, 750-752 [2013]; People v Wright, 19 N.Y.3d 359, 365 [2012]). We therefore further modify the judgment by directing that the sentences imposed on counts 7 and 8 of the indictment shall run concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts 1, 2, 5, and 6.

We therefore modify the judgment accordingly. [1] As defendant further contends and the People correctly concede, County Court erred in directing that the sentences imposed for CPW in the second degree under counts 7 and 8 of the indictment run consecutively to the sentences imposed for murder in the first degree, attempted murder in the second degree, and assault in the first degree under counts 1, 2, 5, and 6 of the indictment inasmuch as there was no evidence presented that defendant possessed the gun independently of his intent to use it in the shooting (see People v. Alligood, 192 A.D.3d 1508, 1510, 140 N.Y.S.3d 809 [4th Dept. 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 970, 150 N.Y.S.3d 679, 172 N.E.3d 791 [2021]; People v. Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659, 1661, 144 N.Y.S.3d 278 [4th Dept. 2021]; People v. Tripp, 177 A.D.3d 1409, 1410-1411, 113 N.Y.S.3d 432 [4th Dept. 2019], lv denied 34 N.Y.3d 1133, 118 N.Y.S.3d 534, 141 N.E.3d 490 [2020]; see generally People v. Brown, 21 N.Y.3d 739, 750-752, 977 N.Y.S.2d 723, 999 N.E.2d 1168 [2013]; Peoplev.Wright, 19 N.Y.3d 359, 365, 948 N.Y.S.2d 228, 971 N.E.2d 358 [2012]). We therefore further modify the judgment by directing that the sentences imposed on counts 7 and 8 of the indictment shall run concurrently with the sentences imposed on counts 1, 2, 5, and 6.

Yet, Streno testified that his observations of defendant led him to believe these requests were not legitimate as defendant appeared uncomfortable and exhibited signs of withdrawal but did not require immediate medical attention. Upon our review of the record and deferring to County Court's credibility determinations, we are satisfied that defendant's statements were not rendered involuntary as defendant was not in need of immediate medical attention and was alert, though uncomfortable (see People v Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659, 1661 [4th Dept 2021]; People v Robinson, 156 A.D.3d 1123, 1131 [3d Dept 2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 1119 [2018]; compare People v McMillan, 185 A.D.3d 1208, 1212 [3d Dept 2020], lv denied 35 N.Y.3d 1114 [2020]). As such, we find that defendant's motion to suppress his statements was properly denied (see People v High, 200 A.D.3d 1209, 1211 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 1161 [2022]; People v Bowman, 194 A.D.3d 1123, 1129 [3d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 963 [2021]).

( People v. Lozada, 164 A.D.3d 1626, 1627, 84 N.Y.S.3d 630 [4th Dept. 2018] [brackets omitted], lv denied 32 N.Y.3d 1174, 97 N.Y.S.3d 588, 121 N.E.3d 215 [2019], quoting People v. Brown, 21 N.Y.3d 739, 751, 977 N.Y.S.2d 723, 999 N.E.2d 1168 [2013] ; accordPeople v. Malloy, 33 N.Y.3d 1078, 1080, 104 N.Y.S.3d 595, 128 N.E.3d 673 [2019] ). Here, however, the People's theory of the case, which the jury ultimately believed, was that defendant had already formed the specific intent to kill the victim when he procured the revolver (seePeople v. Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659, 1661, 144 N.Y.S.3d 278 [4th Dept. 2021] ; People v. Michel, 144 A.D.3d 948, 949, 41 N.Y.S.3d 112 [2d Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1148, 52 N.Y.S.3d 299, 74 N.E.3d 684 [2017] ; People v. Crosby, 265 A.D.2d 858, 858, 696 N.Y.S.2d 596 [4th Dept. 1999], lv denied 94 N.Y.2d 821, 702 N.Y.S.2d 591, 724 N.E.2d 383 [1999] ; comparePeople v. Malloy, 33 N.Y.3d at 1080, 104 N.Y.S.3d 595, 128 N.E.3d 673 ). Accordingly, the sentences on counts 1 and 3 must also be run concurrently.

We agree with the defendant that the sentence is illegal insofar as the County Court directed that the sentences imposed for tampering with physical evidence in the second degree under counts 7 and 8 of the indictment, which related to the guns, shall run consecutively to each other. The People failed to meet their burden of establishing that consecutive sentences are legal, i.e., that the two crimes were committed through separate and distinct acts (seePeople v. Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659, 144 N.Y.S.3d 278 ; People v. Houston, 142 A.D.3d 1397, 38 N.Y.S.3d 368 ). Furthermore, the sentence is excessive to the extent indicated herein (seePeople v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675 ).

We agree with the defendant that the sentence is illegal insofar as the County Court directed that the sentences imposed for tampering with physical evidence in the second degree under counts 7 and 8 of the indictment, which related to the guns, shall run consecutively to each other. The People failed to meet their burden of establishing that consecutive sentences are legal, i.e., that the two crimes were committed through separate and distinct acts (see People v Boyd, 192 A.D.3d 1659; People v Houston, 142 A.D.3d 1397). Furthermore, the sentence is excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80).