C(30) Defendant finally contends the court improperly refused to instruct the jury that the corpus delicti of the special circumstance had to be proved independently of his extrajudicial statements. The Attorney General concedes the error, but persuasively urges it was nonprejudicial. When "the corpus delicti is convincingly established independently of admissions[,] . . . the error of the omission of that instruction cannot be deemed as reversible." ( People v. Beagle, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 456.) Here, Finckel's testimony convincingly established the corpus delicti of robbery. Defendant asserts the testimony of an accomplice cannot be so used. He is wrong: the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice can establish the corpus delicti. (E.g., People v. Bowley (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 269, 271 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 859]; People v. McLaughlin (1957) 156 Cal.App.2d 291, 297 [ 319 P.2d 365].) III. Penalty Issues
In short, corroborating evidence is sufficient if it connects the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as reasonably to satisfy the finder of fact that the accomplice is telling the truth. ( People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1206-1207; People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 769 [ 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129]; People v. Bowley (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 269, 271 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 859]; People v. Singer (1963) 217 Cal.App.2d 743, 753 [ 32 Cal.Rptr. 701]; People v. Griffin (1950) 98 Cal.App.2d 1, 25 [ 219 P.2d 519]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) Introduction of Evidence at Trial, § 1765, pp. 1719-1720.) (6c) Here, it is unnecessary for us to decide whether the trial court was in error in finding that Miller was not an accomplice, because we find adequate corroboration for her testimony in the record of the trial prior to the defense presenting its case.
Recently, recordings and photographic transparencies have been held within the scope of the statute ( People v. Kageler, 32 Cal.App.3d 738 [ 108 Cal.Rptr. 235]; People v. Enskat, 20 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1 [98 Cal.Rptr. 646]). Even before the Evidence Code, our Supreme Court held that with a proper foundation and authentication, a film may be admitted not merely as illustrated evidence of a human witness but as substantive evidence of the commission of the criminal acts charged ( People v. Bowley, 59 Cal.2d 855, 861 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 471, 382 P.2d 591, 96 A.L.R.2d 1178]; People v. Bowley, 230 Cal.App.2d 269 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 859]). The courts of this state have long sanctioned the use of sound motion pictures ( People v. Hayes, 21 Cal.App.2d 320 [ 71 P.2d 321]; People v. Dabb, 32 Cal.2d 491 [ 197 P.2d 1] (re-enactment of crime); and sound recordings ( People v. Spencer, 60 Cal.2d 64 [ 31 Cal.Rptr. 782, 383 P.2d 134]).
However, we know of no requirement that for the condition to be valid the conduct proscribed be of an illegal nature — it is reasonable and valid if the conduct it forbids, even if lawful in itself, is conducive to future criminal activity of the same kind of which probationer was convicted. Similarly valid are conditions forbidding a probationer from associating with named persons or a class of persons, engaging in certain businesses ( People v. Osslo, 50 Cal.2d 75, 103 [ 323 P.2d 397]; People v. Bowley, 230 Cal.App.2d 269, 271-272 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 859]; People v. Caruso, 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 647 [ 345 P.2d 282]) or professions ( People v. Frank, 94 Cal.App.2d 740, 741-742 [ 211 P.2d 350]), frequenting certain places, having certain properties under his control ( People v. Stanley, 162 Cal.App.2d 416, 420-421 [ 327 P.2d 973]), etc., all conduct in itself valid and in which he ordinarily would have the right to engage but which, under the particular circumstances of the case, is deemed by the court to be conducive to activities of a criminal nature similar to those of which he was convicted. [9] By denoting participation in demonstrations an exercise of free speech and association, appellant seeks to persuade us that the condition of probation proscribing active participation in demonstrations is a violation of her First Amendment rights.
[Citations.]" (See also People v. Morris, 115 Cal.App.2d 312, 316 [ 252 P.2d 36]; People v. Slattery, 59 Cal.App.2d 451 [ 139 P.2d 105]; 11 Cal.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, § 28, p. 248; 54 Cal.Jur.2d, Witnesses, § 195, pp. 639-644; People v. Bowley, 230 Cal.App.2d 269, 271 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 859]; People v. Walters, 165 Cal.App.2d 326, 328 [ 331 P.2d 1037]; 19 Cal. Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 497, 498, 499, 500, pp. 265-271.) [2] The corroboration may consist of circumstantial evidence.
The objection that the condition is unreasonable or beyond the power of the court has generally been overruled. ( People v. Osslo, supra, 50 Cal.2d 75, 103, union activities which led to assault; People v. Bowley (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 269, 271 [ 40 Cal.Rptr. 859], motion picture business where 288a conviction connected with lewd film; People v. Troyn (1964) 229 Cal.App.2d 181, 182-183 [ 39 Cal.Rptr. 924], registration as a sexual offender where convicted of lesser nonregisterable but related offense; People v. Caruso (1959) 174 Cal.App.2d 624, 647 [ 345 P.2d 282], automobile business where convicted of grand theft arising in that business; People v. Stanley (1958) 162 Cal.App.2d 416, 420-421 [ 327 P.2d 973], denial of telephone to convicted bookmaker; People v. Frank (1949) 94 Cal.App.2d 740 [ 211 P.2d 350], practice of medicine by M.D. convicted of contributing to delinquency of a minor; People v. Blankenship (1936) 16 Cal.App.2d 606, 609-610 [ 61 P.2d 352], sterilization of one convicted of statutory rape.) In Osslo the court remarks, "since it could be and presumably was found that these defendants are guilty of crimes growing out of union activities, it appears not improper that restrictions be placed upon such activi
(People v. Bowley (1963) 59 Cal.2d 855, 859.) Neither was the accuracy of the photographs established by expert testimony. (People v. Bowley (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 269, 271.) Plaintiffs never stated the purpose and relevance of the aerial photographs, but they were presumably proffered to show the existence of the partially paved driveway over the disputed area in 1949, 1952, and 1956, and that Lot 116 had an easement over that part of Lot 118 in that time.
Nevertheless, it appears that Oklahoma has taken an indefensible position which can find no support from other State or Federal Courts. Although not squarely in point with the case sub judice, we think the better and prevailing view of allowing motion pictures is show by the following cases where they were held properly admitted: Motion pictures of coordination tests of defendant charged with driving intoxicated, Lanford v. People, 159 Colo. 36, 409 P.2d 829, and Housewright v. State, 154 Tex.Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417; motion pictures of the act where defendant was charged with oral copulation, People v. Bowley, 230 Cal.App.2d 269, 40 Cal.Rptr. 859; sound motion pictures of defendant making a confession, Commonwealth v. Roller, 100 Pa. Super. 125; and People v. Hayes, 21 Cal.App.2d 320, 71 P.2d 321; motion pictures of defendant in company with public official whom he was charged with attempting to bribe, Jones v. State, 151 Tex.Crim. 519, 209 S.W.2d 613; motion pictures of defendant testifying before Senate subcommittee in prosecution of defendant for perjury before the subcommittee, United States v. Moran., 194 F.2d 623, cert. denied 343 U.S. 965, 72 S.Ct. 1058, 96 L.Ed. 1362; motion picture of defendant re-enacting the crime, Grant v. State, Fla., 171 So.2d 361. The admission of motion pictures in evidence in civil actions, when properly authenticated and relevant, is now well established.