People v. Bourg

7 Citing cases

  1. People v. Hodges

    624 P.2d 1308 (Colo. 1981)   Cited 9 times

    The defendant argues that in order to satisfy the specific intent requirement set forth in the "hard sale" statute the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant initiated and solicited the sale in question. In support of this proposition, the defendant cites People v. Bourg, 191 Colo. 309, 552 P.2d 504 (1976); People v. Patterson, 187 Colo. 431, 532 P.2d 342 (1975); People v. Bowers, 187 Colo. 233, 530 P.2d 1282 (1975). However, as we clearly indicated in Mundt v. People, 195 Colo. 145, 576 P.2d 165 (1978), those earlier decisions do not stand for the proposition that a conviction under the "hard sale" statute cannot be obtained if the police initiated or solicited the sale.

  2. State v. Vail

    274 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. 1979)   Cited 54 times
    Holding that "[w]here the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict rendered by the [district] court, the double jeopardy clause bars a new trial"

    Our conclusion is consistent with those of other jurisdictions which have considered similar equal protection challenges to such classification. See, United States v. Kiffer, 477 F.2d 349 (2 Cir. 1973), certiorari denied sub nom., Harmash v. United States, 414 U.S. 831, 94 S.Ct. 165, 38 L.Ed.2d 65 (1973); English v. Virginia Probation and Parole Bd., 481 F.2d 188 (4 Cir. 1973); United States v. Gramlich, 551 F.2d 1359 (5 Cir. 1977), certiorari denied, 434 U.S. 866, 98 S.Ct. 201, 54 L.Ed.2d 141 (1977); Kehrli v. Sprinkle, 524 F.2d 328 (10 Cir. 1975), certiorari denied, 426 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 3165, 49 L.Ed.2d 1183 (1976); Kenny v. State, 51 Ala. App. 35, 282 So.2d 387, certiorari denied, 291 Ala. 786, 282 So.2d 392 (1973); Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); State v. Wadsworth, 109 Ariz. 59, 505 P.2d 230 (1973); People v. Bloom, 270 Cal.App.2d 731, 76 Cal.Rptr. 137 (1969); People v. Bourg, Colo., 552 P.2d 504 (1976); People v. Stark, 157 Colo. 59, 400 P.2d 923 (1965); State v. Rao, 171 Conn. 600, 370 A.2d 1310 (1976); Kreisher v. State, 319 A.2d 31 (Del. 1974); Blincoe v. State, 231 Ga. 886, 204 S.E.2d 597 (1974); State v. Renfro, 56 Haw. 501, 542 P.2d 366 (1975); State v. O'Bryan, 96 Idaho 548, 531 P.2d 1193 (1975); People v. McCaffrey, 29 Ill. App.3d 1088, 332 N.E.2d 28 (1975); Ross v. State, 360 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind.App. 1977); State v. Leins, 234 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa 1975); State v. Sliger, 261 La. 999, 261 So.2d 643 (1972); State v. Donovan, 344 A.2d 401 (Me. 1975); Commonwealth v. Leis, 355 Mass. 189, 243 N.E.2d 898 (1969); State v. Stock, 463 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1971); State v. White, 153 Mont. 193, 456 P.2d 54 (1969); Egan v. Sheriff, Clark County, 88 Nev. 611, 503 P.2d 16 (1972); State v. Nugent, 125 N.J. Super. 528, 312 A.2d 158 (1973); People v. Morehouse, 80 Misc.2d 406, 364 N.Y.S.2d 108 (Sup.Ct. 1975); State v. Strong, 245 N.W.2d 277 (S.D. 1976); Gaskin v. State, 490 S.W.2d 521 (Tenn. 1973), app

  3. People v. Bloom

    195 Colo. 246 (Colo. 1978)   Cited 32 times
    Holding defendant was entitled to ameliorative benefits of July 1975 amendment that removed marijuana from list of narcotic drugs and reclassified it as a dangerous drug

    We have specifically considered and rejected this argument in a number of cases. People v. Bourg, 191 Colo. 309, 552 P.2d 504; People v. Steed, 189 Colo. 212, 540 P.2d 323; People v. Summit, 183 Colo. 421, 517 P.2d 850. They are dispositive of the issue here.

  4. People v. Pratt

    553 P.2d 70 (Colo. 1976)   Cited 7 times

    Upon remand, the district court should enter a judgment re-sentencing the defendant under the "soft sale" statute. See People v. Bourg, 191 Colo. 309, 552 P.2d 504; People v. Morris, supra; People v. Steed, 189 Colo. 212, 540 P.2d 323 (1975); People v. Patterson, 187 Colo. 431, 532 P.2d 342 (1975). The judgment of the trial court is reversed and this case is remanded for entry of a judgment against this defendant for violation of the "soft sale" statute and sentencing thereunder.

  5. People v. Farris

    812 P.2d 654 (Colo. App. 1991)   Cited 2 times

    The penalty statute then in effect provided, pursuant to C.R.S. 1963, 48-5-20(2)(b), a general penalty for any violation of § 48-5-2, with a harsher penalty to be imposed for certain of those activities collectively called "hard sale offenses" that required proof of the perpetrator's specific intent to induce and aid another person to unlawfully use and possess the drug. See C.R.S. 1963, 48-5-20(1) and 48-5-20(2)(c); People v. Pratt, 191 Colo. 362, 553 P.2d 70 (1976); People v. Bourg, 191 Colo. 309, 552 P.2d 504 (1976). Because § 48-5-2 defined such a broad range and variety of illegal activities, and because of the disparate sentencing that could be imposed for "hard sale" offenses, it was then required that offenses be charged with particularity so as to specify the crime being charged and the potentially applicable penalty.

  6. People v. Johnson

    644 P.2d 34 (Colo. App. 1980)   Cited 7 times
    Finding an amendment that altered the required mens rea was one of substance because it resulted in a "different and more serious offense"

    Third degree assault is a lesser included offense of second degree assault, People v. Thompson, supra, and the evidence adduced at trial was thus also sufficient to support a conviction of the lesser offense. Therefore, we reverse the second degree assault convictions and remand the case to the trial court for entry of judgment of conviction of third degree assault as defined in § 18-3-204, C.R.S. 1973 (1978 Repl. Vol. 8). See People v. Naranjo, 200 Colo. 1, 612 P.2d 1099 (No. 79SA457, announced May 19, 1980); People v. Bourg, 191 Colo. 309, 552 P.2d 504 (1976). The other judgments are affirmed.

  7. People v. Macias

    44 Colo. App. 203 (Colo. App. 1980)   Cited 6 times

    Defendant finally argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the charge that he initiated or solicited the transaction in question. The evidence, as a whole, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, People v. Bourg, 191 Colo. 309, 552 P.2d 504 (1976), establishes that defendant had the specific intent to initiate and solicit the sale in question. The evidence reveals that defendant engaged in affirmative acts, and attempted to transfer a sufficiently large amount of heroin from which it could be reasonably inferred that he possessed the heroin with the intent to initiate or solicit the sale.