People v. Borash

4 Citing cases

  1. Commonwealth v. Graziano

    96 Mass. App. Ct. 601 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    Our holding is consistent with the only case from another jurisdiction of which we are aware that addressed the issue in the same context. See People v. Borash, 354 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74-76, 289 Ill.Dec. 566, 820 N.E.2d 74 (2004) (interpreting "unclothed" -- as used in State statute virtually identical to G. L. c. 272, § 29C [vii] -- to encompass wearing of see-through clothing). Contrary to the defendant's claim, our interpretation does not render the term "unclothed" superfluous.

  2. People v. Fultz

    2013 Ill. App. 111565 (Ill. App. Ct. 2013)

    ¶ 41 The purpose of section (c)(1) of the Illinois aggravated criminal sexual abuse statute is to protect young children from premature sexual experiences with an " 'unscrupulous elder.' " People v. Borash, 354 Ill. App. 3d 70, 78 (2004), quoting People v. Gann, 141 Ill. App. 3d 34, 35 (1986). The term "sexual conduct" includes "any knowing touching or fondling by the victim or the accused, either directly or through clothing, of the sex organs, anus or breast of the victim or the accused, or any part of the body of a child under 13 years of age, or any transfer of semen by the accused upon any part of the clothed or unclothed body of the victim, for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal of the victim or the accused."

  3. Chan v. State

    969 N.E.2d 619 (Ind. App. 2012)   Cited 2 times

    36 Am.Jur.2d Forfeitures and Penalties § 8 (2011); see also Gomez v. Vill. of Pinecrest, 17 So.3d 322 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.2009), approved,41 So.3d 180 (Fla.2010); People v. Borash, 354 Ill.App.3d 70, 289 Ill.Dec. 566, 820 N.E.2d 74 (Ill.App.Ct.2004), appeal denied. Of course, application of this canon leads to the conclusion that “retail or repurchase value” should be read as meaning the price of the goods without the addition of the sales tax due on the transaction.

  4. People v. Bonner

    356 Ill. App. 3d 386 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005)   Cited 3 times

    Given this distinction, we will defer to the legislature's judgment in establishing the penalties for these offenses. See People v. Borash, 354 Ill. App. 3d 70, 77-79 (2004) (while noting that two statutes had child protection in common, the court held that the aggravated-criminal-sexual-abuse statute had a purpose distinct from the child pornography statute). Since the Act and the sexual-exploitation-of-a-child statute have distinct purposes, cross-comparison review is inappropriate.