Opinion
No. 1-15-1415
10-26-2018
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAYRON BOOKER, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 10 CR 15962 Honorable Stephen J. Connolly, Judge Presiding. JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The defendant-appellant's conviction is reversed and remanded for a new trial. The trial court's ruling on the defendant's motion in limine to exclude hearsay evidence resulted in misleading testimony and prejudiced the defendant. ¶ 2 After a jury found defendant-appellant Jayron Booker guilty of two counts of armed robbery, the trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 23 years' imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant contends that he is entitled to reversal because the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Alternatively, he argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the trial court permitted improper hearsay testimony, or because he was subject to improper cross- examination about his post-arrest silence. In the alternative, he argues that his sentence was excessive. For the following reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
¶ 3 BACKGROUND
¶ 4 In the early hours of July 21, 2010, two men, one of whom was armed, robbed Ebony Jones and Ganelli McDonald as they sat in a car. McDonald subsequently informed a detective that, according to someone in her neighborhood, a person named "Jayron" was one of the two offenders. On July 31, 2010, Jones and McDonald identified the defendant in a photo array. On August 6, 2010, the defendant was arrested and charged with two counts of armed robbery. ¶ 5 Before trial, the defendant filed a motion to quash his arrest. At a hearing on that motion, Detective Andre Watkins testified that he was assigned to the case shortly after the robbery. Detective Watkins acknowledged that the original case incident report described the first offender, who was armed, as a 20 to 25-year-old black male, approximately six feet and one inch tall, weighing 130 pounds. The second offender, who was unarmed, was described as an 18 to 25-year-old black male, approximately five feet and eight inches tall, weighing 125 pounds. ¶ 6 Detective Watkins met with Jones and McDonald on July 31, 2010, and showed them a photo array containing a photograph of the defendant. Detective Watkins explained that the defendant's photograph was selected based on a prior conversation with McDonald:
"I had, prior to compiling the photo array, I had talked to Miss McDonald who had got information in her community from a person that wished to remain anonymous that there were two subjects, one by the name of Jayron that came to the neighborhood
that early morning to stick up a dope dealer who operated at a dope house down street from that location. The dope dealer was not there and that the two subjects observed the two ladies sitting in the car with the windows down talking. And when she gave me the name Jayron, that was the point of reference that I worked from."¶ 7 Detective Watkins testified that he selected the remaining photographs for the array based on a computer search for similar individuals: "After I selected [the defendant] as the suspect, there's a link on the side of the computer screen that said 'similar demographics' and then you click on it and it gives you a set of pictures and then you click on the ones that you think are reasonable in terms of representative of comparing." From these results, Detective Watkins selected four other faces that he believed to be "a reasonable representation to not be suggestive of [the defendant] nor would take away from him." After Jones and McDonald identified the defendant in the photo array, Detective Watkins issued an investigative alert, leading to the defendant's arrest. After argument, the trial court denied the motion to quash arrest. ¶ 8 The defendant subsequently filed a pre-trial "motion to suppress identification testimony," which sought to suppress "any reference to the pre-trial identification of the accused by such witnesses who were involved in the improper pre-trial identification." The motion claimed that police conduct leading to the photo array and lineup identifications was improperly suggestive and "unnecessarily conducive to mistaken identification." ¶ 9 At a hearing on that motion, Detective Watkins again testified that he compiled the photo array after McDonald called him and gave him the name "Jayron." Detective Watkins testified that McDonald received that name "from an anonymous person in the neighborhood." Based on that name, Detective Watkins compiled the photo array by starting with the defendant's photograph and then searching the computer for individuals with "similar demographics." The trial court denied the motion to suppress, finding there was nothing suggestive or improper about the composition of the photo array or the physical lineup. ¶ 10 The defendant subsequently filed a motion in limine in which he stated his belief that McDonald told Detective Watkins that her neighbor gave McDonald "a name of one of the individuals that may have been involved" in the robbery, and that McDonald "gave Detective Watkins the name of Jayron." The motion in limine claimed that this was hearsay evidence that should be excluded from the trial. ¶ 11 The motion in limine was argued at a hearing on July 8, 2014. At that time, the State indicated that it did not intend to elicit testimony that Detective Watkins received the name "Jayron." The State indicated that, to show the "course of conduct of this investigation" it planned "to ask [McDonald] if she had a conversation with somebody from the neighborhood, without going into the contents of this information" and to elicit her testimony that she "share[d] that information with the Detective." The State also indicated that it planned to elicit testimony from Detective Watkins that, based on the information from McDonald, he "c[a]me up with a suspect by the name of Jayron Booker, and a photo of Jayron Booker that [he] later put into a photo array." ¶ 12 Defense counsel argued that the State's planned testimony was still improper hearsay "simply under the guise of" the "course of investigation" exception to the hearsay rule. Defense counsel maintained that, even if McDonald did not explicitly testify that she was told the name "Jayron," this would still amount to improper hearsay, as the "implication [would be] clear" to the jury that the information provided was the defendant's name. ¶ 13 During the hearing, the court asked defense counsel: "Assuming I were to let that in and *** [McDonald] says *** I talked to somebody who gave me the name of Jayron, are you then going to call that person as a witness to say I never talked to [McDonald]?" Defense counsel responded, "No." ¶ 14 The court subsequently remarked:
"[W]hat I'm *** tending to rule would be that simply taking the complaining witness out of that equation and simply saying the officer received information from an anonymous individual, and that the officer, based upon that information, went and obtained photographs which were then shown to the complaining witness, then at least I have taken a complaining witness and sort of eliminated her from being involved in this transaction."The court reasoned:
"I think [Detective Watkins] is allowed to testify to what he did. The question becomes how do I allow the information to get to the police officer, how do I determine the source of that information.
So, the source of that information is not the complaining witness, the complaining witness is simply a conduit for the information to the police officer.
The source of the information is this other individual, the first. So if we take the complaining witness out of the equation,
then the police officer simply indicates that I received information from an anonymous individual, and based upon that information, I then did a computer search and then obtained a number of different photographs, or however you want to phrase it."The State's Attorney responded that this approach "would be fine." The court thus denied the defendant's motion in limine. ¶ 15 At trial, the State's first witness was Ebony Jones. Jones testified that on the evening of July 20, 2010, she and McDonald drove back to McDonald's house after meeting for dinner. As they talked in Jones' parked car, two men approached. The men initially walked by without saying anything, but then returned and asked Jones and McDonald if they "had any weed." Jones and McDonald responded negatively and the men walked away. Shortly thereafter, the same men approached the driver's side of the car and "came to [Jones'] window." ¶ 16 Jones identified the defendant as the man who was "was more in the car." She recalled that the defendant "stuck his hand into my window" and said "give us your money, your purses." She recalled that the defendant reached into the car and was "feeling around the back seat." Meanwhile, the second male, who was armed, "lean[ed] up against" the side-view mirror, "pointing the gun into the car." Jones said the gun appeared to be "a small silver handgun." At one point, the male with the gun "slid it back to load it, cocked it, I guess," so that "the bullet was chambered." ¶ 17 Jones testified that the defendant "reached into the front driver's side window" and attempted to "take the keys out" of the car. Jones stated that "[h]e was right in my face" and "practically face to face with me." Jones recalled that, when the defendant reached for the car keys, McDonald "reached up to *** block him" and offered the defendant her purse. The defendant took the purse, as well as Jones' cell phone. ¶ 18 According to Jones, the defendant told the man with the gun to "shoot those bitches" but the second man did not fire the gun. The men then walked away, out of Jones' view. She recalled hearing the defendant yell to the other man "you should have shot them" before the men ran away. Jones estimated that "less than five minutes" passed between the time the men first approached and when they finally left. She agreed that she could see the defendant's face the "whole time." ¶ 19 Jones further testified that on July 31, 2010, she was contacted by police about viewing a photo array. Jones met a detective, viewed the array and identified a photograph of the defendant as "the one who came in the car, who was doing the talking" during the robbery. On August 6, 2010, Jones viewed a lineup at the police station and again identified the defendant. ¶ 20 On cross-examination, Jones agreed that she viewed the photo array ten days after the incident. On re-direct examination, Jones testified that she was "one-hundred percent sure" when she identified the defendant in both the photo array and physical lineup. ¶ 21 The State then called Detective Watkins, who testified that he was assigned to investigate the robbery and contacted the victims by telephone on July 24, 2010. The prosecutor elicited the following testimony from Detective Watkins:
"Q. And after this telephone contact, I'm going to go to July 31st, did you subsequently receive information, anonymous information, without being specific, anonymous information regarding this case?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. Can you tell the Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury what you did with this information that you received?Detective Watkins testified that, based on the suspect's photo, the computer generated additional photos that he used to complete a photo array. ¶ 22 Detective Watkins testified that on July 31, 2010, he separately showed the photo array to Jones and McDonald, both of whom identified the photograph of the defendant. On August 6, 2010, Detective Watkins arranged a physical lineup that included the defendant. Jones and McDonald separately viewed the lineup, and both identified the defendant. ¶ 23 Elsewhere in Detective Watkins' direct examination, the prosecutor again elicited testimony about the "anonymous" information used to find the defendant's photograph:
A. I inputted it into a computer system at the area headquarters, and conducted an investigation to receive results of a suspect.
Q. And were you able to, after you put this into the computer system, were you able to receive a potential suspect?
A. Yes.
Q. And can you tell the Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury what you did then after you received those results?
A. I obtained the suspect[']s name and identification number in which I was able to get a photo."
"Q. Detective, you testified after your phone interviews with the victims that subsequently on July 31st you received information from an anonymous person regarding this case.
Without going into that information, did you use that information to access your computer system?¶ 24 At this point, defense counsel requested a sidebar, in which it requested that the "prior three questions" be stricken. Defense counsel argued that the court's ruling on the motion in limine was that the State "could not [e]licit the name from the Detective." The trial court denied the request, remarking: "My ruling was *** the police are allowed to testify to the process he went through to do these things, and I wanted to restrict him from actually having to indicate that the information flowed through one of the complaining witnesses, but he is allowed to testify to how he arrived, he received information, he then did a search for this individual." ¶ 25 On cross-examination, Detective Watkins acknowledged that the photograph of the defendant used in the 2010 photo array was from 2004. He agreed that the defendant's height of six feet and one inch was "off by at least five inches" compared to the initial description provided to police of the unarmed offender, and that the defendant weighed approximately 46 pounds more than the weight estimated in that initial description. After defense counsel asked about the defendant's age, the State stipulated that he was born in July 1976, so that he was 34 at the time of his arrest. ¶ 26 Following Detective Watkins, the State called McDonald, who testified that she was in the passenger's seat of Jones' car during the robbery. McDonald recalled that two men initially approached the car and asked where they could get "weed." A few minutes later, the men approached the driver's side of the car. She recalled that one of them had a gun "and the other guy, the short guy *** came into the car, and he started reaching into the car." She testified that the defendant, whom she identified in court, told Jones and McDonald to "give us the money, give us your purses." Meanwhile, the other man was "standing right there" with a gun pointed at Jones. McDonald described the firearm as a "little silver gun." ¶ 27 McDonald recalled that the defendant "tried to take the keys out of the car" but she "told him no, and I gave him my purse." McDonald saw the defendant's face as he reached into the car. She recalled that, after the defendant took McDonald's purse and Jones's cell phone, the defendant "looked at the other guy and told him to kill those bitches." She also heard the defendant tell the armed man to "go back and kill them" before the men ran away. ¶ 28 The State then elicited McDonald's testimony that on July 31, 2010, she was contacted by Detective Watkins and identified a photograph of the defendant as the person who reached into the car. McDonald subsequently identified the defendant in a physical lineup on August 6, 2010. McDonald stated that she was "one hundred percent" certain when she made both identifications. ¶ 29 On cross-examination, McDonald agreed that when she first spoke to police shortly after the robbery, she described the armed offender as approximately six feet and one inch tall, and 20 to 25 years old. She initially described the second, unarmed offender as approximately five feet and eight inches tall, 125 pounds, and "in [his] twenties." ¶ 30 McDonald acknowledged that after she viewed the photo array and identified the defendant, Detective Watkins told her the defendant's full name. She admitted that she subsequently attempted to look up the defendant on Facebook. She stated that she did this before she viewed the physical lineup. On redirect examination, McDonald testified that when she tried to find the defendant on Facebook, she did not actually view any photo of him, as she "had to go through almost fifteen to twenty different Jayrons' pictures before you can get to a page but it was private though." Thus, she agreed that the photo array was the only image she had seen of the defendant before she viewed the physical lineup. On re-cross examination, McDonald admitted that, after the physical lineup, she again went on Facebook, found the defendant's Facebook page, and viewed a photograph of him. ¶ 31 The State rested after McDonald's testimony. The defendant's motion for a directed verdict was denied. ¶ 32 The first defense witness was Chicago Police Officer Candice Brown, who testified that she responded to the scene on the night of the robbery. Officer Brown created a case report based on her conversation with Jones and McDonald. According to her case report, the unarmed offender was described as five feet and eight inches tall, 125 pounds, and approximately 18 to 25 years old. The victims described the gun used in the offense as black. ¶ 33 Following Officer Brown, the defense called Curtis Yonker, an investigator with the Public Defender's Office, who stated that he had spoken to McDonald about the case on three occasions. He went to her home in July 2011, but she would not discuss the case at that time. In April 2012, he spoke with McDonald and she told him that she had viewed the defendant's Facebook page "the day after the incident." Yonkers later spoke to McDonald in August 2013, at which time McDonald told him that she had viewed the defendant's Facebook page "a couple of week[s]" after the robbery. Yonkers also testified that McDonald described the gun as a "rusty revolver." ¶ 34 The defense then called Clifford Rome, Jr., who testified that the defendant had worked for Rome's catering business since 2001 and had advanced to a position with "a lot of responsibility." Rome testified that, as of July 2010, the defendant worked between 40 to 60 hours per week. On July 20, 2010, the defendant worked from 2 p.m. to 9 p.m. Rome agreed that the defendant had a reputation for peacefulness. ¶ 35 Talisa Smith (Talisa) testified that she had known the defendant for 22 years, and that they had two children together. As of July 2010, Smith and the defendant lived together with their children as well as Smith's three other children. ¶ 36 On the evening of July 20, 2010, Talisa was home with her aunt, Sharonda Smith (Sharonda), and a number of friends who came to celebrate the birthday of the defendant's cousin. Talisa recalled that there were five adults at the gathering, who played cards and listened to music. Talisa testified that the defendant arrived home from work "about 9:30, 9:45." Around 10 p.m., the defendant "gave the kids a bath and put them to bed," after which the defendant went in a room to play video games. ¶ 37 Talisa stated that the last guest left the home at approximately 2:00 or 2:30 a.m. She recalled that the defendant walked the last guest to the door, after which he and Talisa went to bed. The defendant was still in bed when she woke up to go to work. Talisa testified that the defendant was a good father and that he had a reputation as a peaceful person. ¶ 38 The defense then called Talisa's aunt, Sharonda. Sharonda testified that on the evening of July 20, 2010, she and her five-year-old daughter were at Talisa's and the defendant's home to celebrate a birthday. Sharonda recalled that she arrived around 7 p.m. and stayed until about midnight. The defendant arrived sometime after 9 p.m. Sharonda did not see the defendant leave the house, and she recalled that the defendant yelled goodbye to her when she left. Sharonda also testified that the defendant had a reputation as a "peaceful person." ¶ 39 The defendant testified that in 2010, he lived with Talisa, their two biological children, and Talisa's three other children. At that time, he worked for Rome's catering business as a "utilities manager." The defendant testified that his commute to work included riding two buses, as well as the CTA Red Line train. ¶ 40 On July 20, 2010, he worked from 2 p.m. to 9 p.m., after which he took his usual route and arrived home around 9:45 p.m. At his home, there were a number of people who were "getting together for my cousin's birthday." After he spoke to the guests, he bathed the children, and put them to bed. He then went to the bedroom, where he played a video game while the guests played cards in the kitchen. He testified that the last guest left around 2:00 a.m., and that he went to sleep around 2:30 am. He denied that he left the house during the night. ¶ 41 The defendant testified that he is approximately six feet and one inch tall, and that he weighs 170 to 175 pounds. He explicitly denied involvement in the robbery. ¶ 42 On cross-examination, the defendant acknowledged that on the evening of his arrest, he agreed to speak to detectives after he was informed of his rights. The State cross-examined him as to whether he told detectives the same details he provided in his trial testimony, with respect to the bus and train route he took after work, and whether he told police the same details about the guests at his home. ¶ 43 The defendant acknowledged that police had asked him where he was on July 20 and 21, 2010, and that he told them that he was "either at work or at home." He acknowledged that he did not give the police the same details about his route from work that he had testified to, and that he did not tell police about the guests who were at his home. On re-direct examination, the defendant testified that the detectives did not ask "a particular time of day or night they wanted [him] to account for." The defense rested after the defendant's testimony. ¶ 44 In rebuttal, the State then called Detective Donovan Jackson, who interviewed the defendant after his arrest. Detective Jackson testified that the defendant denied involvement in the robbery, but that he "didn't give his exact whereabouts" during the robbery, did not tell police "the route he took home," and did not tell police about the guests at his home. On cross-examination, Detective Jackson acknowledged that police did not ask the defendant how he got home from work, or who was at his home on the night of the robbery. ¶ 45 The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty of armed robbery of McDonald and Jones. The defendant filed a motion for new trial, which was denied. ¶ 46 The trial court sentenced the defendant to two concurrent terms of 23 years' imprisonment, plus three years mandatory supervised release. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the sentence, which was denied. On April 15, 2015, the defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
A. Yes.
Q. And when you searched the computer, did you come up with a suspect?
A. Yes.
Q. Who was the suspect?
A. Jayron Booker.
[Defense objection overruled]
Q. Who was that suspect?
A. Jayron Booker.
Q. After you did that, did you go through the photo array process that you described and place fillers in the photo array?
A. Yes.
Q. And who did each victim in this case identify?
A. Jayron Booker."
The State stipulated that the photograph of the defendant was from an arrest in March 2004, when the defendant was 27 years old. The defendant was 34 years old at the time of his 2010 arrest.
The State did not elicit any testimony from McDonald that she had called Detective Watkins and provided information leading to the inclusion of the defendant in the photo array.
¶ 47 ANALYSIS
¶ 48 On appeal, the defendant first asserts that his conviction should be reversed outright because the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. He otherwise argues that he is entitled to a new trial for two independent reasons: (1) that he was denied a fair trial by the admission of Detective Watkins' "hearsay testimony that an unidentified person identified [him] as the offender" and (2) that the State improperly cross-examined him "about his post-arrest silence" by asking him whether he told police about the details of his alibi and route home from work on the date of the robbery. Finally, he argues in the alternative that his sentence was excessive and should be reduced. ¶ 49 We first address the defendant's argument that the State's evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, requiring outright reversal. He claims that Jones' and McDonald's identification testimony was unreliable since they had "mere minutes, during a very stressful situation to view the actual offenders, while a gun was pointed at their faces." The defendant also points out the lack of any physical evidence to corroborate the identifications, and notes that his alibi was "corroborated by several defense witnesses." ¶ 50 When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged on appeal, our function is not to retry the defendant or substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact. People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242 (2006). Instead, we must determine "whether, after viewing the evidence in the 16 light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citations.]" (Emphasis in original.) Id. "The weight to be given the witnesses' testimony, the credibility of the witnesses, resolution of inconsistencies and conflicts in the evidence *** are the responsibility of the trier of fact. [Citations.]" Id. Furthermore, in deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, we must "allow all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution." People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). ¶ 51 We recognize that "[a] positive identification by a single eyewitness who had ample opportunity to observe is sufficient to support a conviction. [Citation.]" People v. Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d 551, 566 (2007). "The test of positive identification is whether the witness is close enough to the accused for a sufficient length of time under the conditions adequate for observation, and when this test is met, the credible testimony of one witness is sufficient to support a finding of guilt. [Citation.]" People v. Armstead, 322 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11 (2001). ¶ 52 The defendant argues that the witnesses' identification testimony was unreliable under the relevant factors identified by our supreme court. See Piatkowski, 225 Ill. 2d at 567 (factors for assessing reliability "include (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness' degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. [Citation.]"). ¶ 53 With respect to the "opportunity to observe," he states the circumstances at the scene "were far from ideal," noting the time of night and that the robbery was a "highly stressful encounter." With respect to the witnesses' "degree of attention," he argues there is "scientific consensus that the presence of a weapon reorients the witness' attention" so that it "defies 17 established scientific belief to conclude" that Jones and McDonald could focus on the face of an unarmed offender, while another person pointed a gun at them. The defendant also claims the "accuracy of prior description" factor weighs against reliability, given the discrepancy in the defendant's height, weight, and age, compared to the victims' initial description. He also emphasizes that 10 days elapsed between the incident and the photo array identifications, and several more days passed before the physical lineup. Although he recognizes that Jones and McDonald expressed certainty in their identifications, he urges that this deserves "little or no consideration," citing federal decisions recognizing that a witness' expressed certainty does not necessarily equate to accuracy. ¶ 54 Aside from these factors, the defendant argues that McDonald's identification is undermined by her "inconsistent testimony" about when she viewed the defendant's photograph on Facebook. He also asserts that Jones' and McDonald's identification testimony is doubtful due to the lack of physical evidence, the inconsistent descriptions of the gun, and the defendant's alibi testimony corroborated by other witnesses. ¶ 55 Despite these points, we are not persuaded that the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, was insufficient to convict the defendant. The various circumstances identified by the defendant to undermine Jones' and McDonald's identifications were all factors that the jury had an opportunity to take into account. It was the jury's function to weigh such factors, just as it was their role to assess the witnesses' credibility. The defendant essentially asks that we reweigh the evidence and replace the jury's determinations with our own. This we cannot do, especially as we are obligated to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution. Further, it is well-settled that even a single identification witness may be sufficient, whereas in this case the State presented two eyewitnesses who testified that they were certain of 18 their identification. Accordingly, we cannot find that the State's evidence was insufficient, and we reject the defendant's argument that his conviction must be reversed outright. ¶ 56 We turn to the defendant's second contention: that he was denied a fair trial by admission of "hearsay testimony that an unidentified person identified [him] as the offender." He argues that this close case was "improperly tipped in the State's favor" when the jury heard Detective Watkins' testimony that he received information from an unidentified person, which led to the defendant's inclusion in the photo array. He argues that this "rank hearsay identification" violated his "constitutional right to confront the eyewitnesses against him." ¶ 57 The defendant acknowledges the hearsay exception for statements admitted to describe the course of a police investigation, but he argues that Detective Watkins' testimony was "a misuse" of that exception. The defendant contends that Detective Watkins' testimony "unambiguously revealed the substance of the anonymous person's tip to police, namely that [the defendant] committed the robbery." Although he acknowledges that the informant's "exact words were not presented," he contends that the "only logical conclusion that a jury could draw from this evidence was that someone else (in addition to the victims) identified [him] as one of the robbers." Thus he argues that "the substance of the unidentified person's out-of-court statement incriminating [him] was presented to the jury," constituting improper hearsay. ¶ 58 He further argues that there was "no compelling reason to admit this out-of-court statement" to explain the course of investigation, as Detective Watkins "could have merely testified that he compiled a photograph array of possible suspects" without referencing information from an unidentified person. In turn, he claims his right of confrontation was violated because he was unable to cross-examine the source of the statement. He contends that 19 the admission of this testimony cannot be considered harmless error, because the evidence was "closely balanced." ¶ 59 The State responds that Detective Watkins' testimony was "not inadmissible hearsay" because it was not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that is, that the testimony "did not attempt to prove that an anonymous person identified defendant." Rather, the State contends the testimony was offered to show "the investigatory process" that led to the defendant's inclusion in the photo array. ¶ 60 The State relies on precedent recognizing that course of investigation testimony that does not reveal the substance of an out-of-court statement is not improper hearsay, even if it could lead to an inference implicating the defendant. See, e.g., People v. Gacho, 122 Ill. 2d 221, 248 (1988) (testimony that police sought out the defendant after speaking to a co-offender was "admissible although the inference logically to be drawn therefrom is that the information received motivated the officers' subsequent conduct." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). The State argues that since the substance of any conversation with the unidentified informant was not revealed, there was no hearsay violation, "even if the jury inferred that Detective Watkins learned that defendant was a suspect *** based on the anonymous information." The State otherwise argues that any error in the admission of the testimony was harmless, because the other evidence at trial "firmly established defendant's guilt." ¶ 61 We first note the applicable standard of review. "Evidentiary rulings are within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed unless the trial court has abused that discretion. [Citations.] An abuse of discretion will be found only where the trial court's ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, unreasonable, or where no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court. [Citation.] Reviewing courts generally use an abuse-of-discretion standard to 20 review evidentiary rulings rather than review them de novo. [Citation.]" People v. Caffey, 205 Ill. 2d 52, 89 (2001). ¶ 62 We recognize the well-settled precedent regarding the hearsay rule. "A defendant is guaranteed the right to confront the witnesses against him by the confrontation clauses of both the United States and Illinois Constitutions. [Citations.] Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. [Citations.] The fundamental reason for excluding hearsay is the lack of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant." People v. Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d 1080, 1084-85 (2004). "However, testimony about an out-of-court statement that is being offered for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted is not hearsay. [Citation.] Admissible nonhearsay does not implicate the confrontation clause." People v. Peoples, 377 Ill. App. 3d 978, 984 (2007). ¶ 63 "Statements are not inadmissible hearsay when offered for the limited purpose of showing the course of a police investigation where such testimony is necessary to fully explain the State's case to the trier of fact." Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1085. This " 'explanatory exception' to the hearsay rule allows the admission of statements that explain the progress of a police investigation under the rationale that such evidence is not offered for its truth." Peoples, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 984. Our precedent emphasizes that a police officer may testify about a conversation during the course of an investigation, without revealing its substance: "[T]here is a distinction between an officer testifying to the fact that he spoke to a witness without disclosing the contents of that conversation and an officer testifying to the contents of the conversation [Citation.] Under the investigatory procedure exception, the officer's testimony must be limited to show how the 21 investigation was conducted, not to place into evidence the substance of any out-of-court statement or conversation for the purpose of establishing the truth of their contents. [Citation.] The police officer should not testify to the contents of the conversation [citation] since such testimony is inadmissible hearsay." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Jura, 352 Ill. App. 3d at 1085. ¶ 64 However, "[t]estimony describing the progress of an investigation is admissible even if it suggests that a nontestifying witness implicated the defendant." Peoples, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 986 (quoting People v. Simms, 143 Ill. 2d 154, 174 (1991)). In Peoples, (which the State relies upon in this appeal), a detective testified that he spoke with a co-offender, who implicated a person named Chris who lived in or had been arrested in the neighborhood where a shooting occurred. Id. at 982. The detective testified that, based on that information, he searched a computer database, learned the defendant's full name, and included the defendant in a photo array. Id. Our court reasoned that the detective's testimony was not hearsay because it "was not offered for its truth, but rather to show the course of the police investigation that led to defendant's arrest." Id. at 986. Citing Peoples, the State similarly claims that the testimony in this case was not hearsay but properly "established the course of the police investigation." ¶ 65 Our review of the entire record leads us to conclude that Detective Watkins' testimony regarding the photo array, as shaped by the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine, amounted to error. However, we do not reach that conclusion upon the hearsay basis urged by the defendant. That is, we agree with the State that Detective Watkins' trial testimony did not constitute inadmissible hearsay. Nonetheless, as explained below, the trial court's ruling resulted in incomplete and potentially misleading testimony, resulting in prejudice to the defendant. 22 ¶ 66 The trial testimony at issue was not hearsay, as Detective Watkins did not reveal any out-of-court statement. That is, the State did not elicit the substance of the out-of-court statement, i.e., that an unidentified person provided the name "Jayron." Detective Watkins merely stated that he was provided with "information" that ultimately led him to identify the defendant as a suspect. Even if the jury could infer that the information implicated the defendant, that inference alone would not constitute a hearsay rule violation. See Peoples, 377 Ill. App. 3d at 986. Thus, we do not find that there was inadmissible hearsay. ¶ 67 Nonetheless, given the unusual circumstances presented by Detective Watkins' pretrial testimony, as compared to the trial testimony elicited after the court's ruling on the motion in limine, our analysis does not end there. Specifically, we are troubled that the trial court's resolution of the motion effectively distorted Detective Watkins' narrative, leading to incomplete and misleading testimony that arguably strengthened the State's case. The court's ruling directed the State to take McDonald "out of the equation" and have the detective testify only that he "received information from an anonymous individual" that led to the photo array. Although the ruling did not result in the admission of hearsay, that does not bar us from considering whether the resulting testimony nevertheless prejudiced the defendant. In this case, we find prejudice requiring reversal and a new trial. ¶ 68 To be clear, our concern is not with the substance of the testimony allowed by the court's ruling on the motion in limine, which was not hearsay. Rather, we are troubled by what was left out of Detective Watkins' trial testimony as a result of that ruling. Significantly, Detective Watkins' pretrial testimony (at two separate hearings) described two out-of-court statements. He testified that he received a call from one of the victims, McDonald, on July 31, 2010 reporting that she, in turn, heard from a neighbor that someone named "Jayron" was involved in the 23 robbery. However, the trial court instructed the State to take McDonald "out of the equation" in eliciting Detective Watkins' testimony. We believe that this resulted in misleading testimony. ¶ 69 From the transcript of the hearing on the motion in limine, it is clear that the trial court sought in good faith to furnish a compromise that would avoid hearsay while allowing Detective Watkins to describe his investigative process. The trial court properly recognized that it should exclude the substance of the statement—that the name "Jayron" was communicated to Detective Watkins—and instead allowed him merely to testify that he had received "information" that led to the defendant's inclusion in the photo array. However, the court did not stop there, as it also discounted McDonald as merely a "conduit" of information and thus sought to "eliminate[] her from being involved in this transaction" that led to the creation of the photo array. By essentially instructing the State to take her "out of the equation," the court did not merely bar the substance of the out-of-court statement, it barred the jury from learning that McDonald was the source of the information provided to Detective Watkins. His resulting trial testimony substantially differed from his pretrial testimony, as it implied that the photo array was based purely on "anonymous" information, independent of McDonald. As noted by the defendant's reply brief, that testimony "strongly implied that [an] unidentified, non-testifying caller identified" the defendant. ¶ 70 We have not seen a case directly addressing this precise situation, but we find it is analogous to our precedent discussing the "completeness doctrine," which provides that "if one party introduces part of an utterance *** the opposing party may introduce the remainder or so much thereof as is required to place that part originally offered in proper context so that a correct and true meaning is conveyed to the jury." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ruback, 2013 IL App (3d) 110256, ¶ 43; People v. Alvarado, 2013 IL App (3d) 120467, ¶ 12. 24 "The remaining part of the [statement] is admissible only when in fairness it is required to prevent the jury from receiving a misleading impression as to the nature of the introduced statement." Ruback, 2013 IL App (3d) 110256, ¶ 43; see also People v. Ward, 154 Ill. 2d 272, 311 (1992) ("[w]hen a portion of a conversation is related by a witness, the opposing party has a right to bring out the remainder of that conversation to prevent the trier of fact from being misled."). To be admissible under this doctrine, "the remainder of the conversation or statement must concern what was said on the same subject at the same time. [Citation.]" Ruback, 2013 IL App (3d) 110256, ¶ 43. ¶ 71 A violation of this principle constitutes reversible error, if it results in misleading testimony to the prejudice of the defendant. For example, our supreme court found reversible error where, in a prosecution for the murder of the defendant's husband, defendant's next-door neighbor was permitted to testify that the defendant knocked on her door and stated that "there were two men in her house with guns" but was excluded from relaying "the details of what the defendant said about these men." People v. Weaver, 92 Ill. 2d 545, 551 (1982). The defendant argued that, due to the court's limitation on the neighbor's testimony, the jury "may have been misled into thinking that [defendant] had given no detail about the men she claimed had entered her home" which "may have made jurors more likely to believe that her story was false." Id. at 556. Our supreme court agreed that the neighbor should also have been permitted to testify about the details provided by the defendant, "[i]n view of the possibility that the jurors would be misled into thinking that the defendant has said nothing else." Id. at 556-57; see also Alvarado, 2013 IL App (3d) 120467, ¶¶ 12-13 (affirming trial court's ruling, under "completeness doctrine," that it would be misleading to play only a portion of the defendant's videotaped 25 interrogation before the jury, as it "would not present a complete picture of the interview and would be inadequate for assessing defendant's state of mind."). ¶ 72 The same interest underlying the completion doctrine—the prevention of incomplete testimony that could mislead the jury—leads us to find error in the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine. Specifically, it was misleading for the court to limit Detective Watkins' testimony to omit the material fact that the information he relied on was provided to him by McDonald. As a result of the ruling, the jury never learned that McDonald was the person who transmitted the information that led to the defendant's inclusion in the photo array, and the defendant was deprived of any opportunity to cross-examine McDonald on that subject. Instead, based on the trial court's instruction to take McDonald "out of the equation," the jury falsely heard that Detective Watkins "received information from an anonymous person" that led to the defendant's inclusion in the photo array. That testimony plainly implied that a wholly independent source, apart from either victim, provided incriminating information leading to the defendant. While that is technically true, the judge ensured that the jury was never made aware that one of the victims played a significant role as the conduit of that information. As it turns out, that was the most significant information in the investigation which led to the defendant's arrest. ¶ 73 We believe that this was a material omission that could have strengthened the State's case in the eyes of the jury, as it weighed the conflicting evidence. The jury could have assigned great weight to the inference that, in addition to McDonald and Jones, a third anonymous source, unknown to the victims, independently contacted police and implicated the defendant. For example, if the jury otherwise doubted McDonald's and Jones' ability to accurately remember the faces of the offenders, the jury could have relied on the inference of a third witness against 26 the defendant to ease any concern that the victims' identifications were mistaken. Similarly, to the extent the jury may have hesitated to convict in light of the the defense witnesses' alibi testimony, the suggestion of an independent incriminating source could have been a material factor in convincing the jury of the defendant's guilt. ¶ 74 We recognize that evidentiary errors are only reversible if prejudicial to the defendant. People v. Barnes, 2013 IL App (1st) 112873, ¶ 41. Further, "[e]videntiary errors are harmless if properly admitted evidence overwhelmingly supports defendant's guilt. [Citation.]" People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 314 (1997). However, under the facts of this case, we cannot discount as harmless error the risk that the jury was misled. Notwithstanding our earlier conclusion that McDonald's and Jones' identification testimony was otherwise sufficient to support a finding of guilt, we cannot say that there was overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case. The State offered no physical evidence or any incriminating statement by the defendant. Rather, the case came down to whether the jury credited the victims' identification testimony, despite the defense witnesses' alibi testimony. We believe there is a significant chance that the misleading testimony, resulting from the trial court's decision on the motion in limine, tipped the balance in the eyes of the jury in favor of a guilty verdict. On this record, we are not comfortable with leaving the conviction intact. In simple terms, Detective Watkins gave knowingly inaccurate testimony with the court's permission. ¶ 75 In sum, we conclude that although the State did not elicit inadmissible hearsay, the trial court's decision to take McDonald "out of the equation" in Detective Watkins' testimony about the photo array rendered that testimony incomplete and misleading. In turn, the defendant was prejudiced and deprived of a fair trial. On that basis, we reverse and remand for a new trial. 27 ¶ 76 As we reverse and remand on this basis, we need not address the defendant's remaining claims of error. ¶ 77 We now address the State's petition for rehearing, which was filed after our original decision in this appeal on August 3, 2018, which was subsequently withdrawn. We permitted the defendant to respond to the petition and allowed the State to file a reply. Having now considered that briefing, we deny the petition for rehearing, for the reasons set forth below. ¶ 78 The State's petition does not dispute that the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine resulted in misleading testimony from Detective Watkins that prejudiced the defendant. Rather, the State's petition argues that our court cannot reverse on this basis, because the defendant "never made any such claim" on appeal, but instead contended only that the testimony was inadmissible hearsay. Alternatively, the State claims that the record shows that the defendant "acquiesced" in the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine, precluding us from reversing on that basis. We reject the State's arguments for the reasons explained. ¶ 79 The State's primary argument relies on the principle that "a reviewing court should not normally search the record for unargued and unbriefed reasons to reverse a trial court judgment. [Citations.]" (Emphasis in original.) People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 323 (2010) (holding that appellate court should not have decided sua sponte that defendant's trial counsel was ineffective on a basis other than that urged by defendant on appeal). The State's petition contends that in this case, the defendant "never made any argument *** claiming that [the] trial court's ruling on the motion in limine *** resulted in an incomplete or prejudicial presentation of the evidence" but rather that the "defendant's entire argument on appeal regarding the motion in limine was that none of the evidence should have been admitted because it amounted to improper hearsay." 28 ¶ 80 The State's petition acknowledges that, as recognized by Givens, our court may reverse on a basis not argued by the defendant, if there is a clear and obvious error. See id. at 325 ("We agree with the general proposition that a reviewing court does not lack authority to address unbriefed issues and may do so in the appropriate case, i.e., when a clear and obvious error exists in the trial court proceedings.") In Givens, our supreme court concluded that "the appellate court stepped over the line from neutral jurist to that of an advocate for defendant to raise and rule on issues that were neither controlled by clear precedent nor dictated by an interest in a just result." Id. The State's petition argues that there was no "clear or obvious" error in this case, governed by precedent, emphasizing our comment that we found no case "addressing this precise situation." ¶ 81 Nevertheless, under the facts of this case, we do not find that the principles expressed in Givens preclude us from reversing the trial court on the basis of the clearly misleading testimony resulting from the trial court's ruling on the motion in limine. ¶ 82 We acknowledge that the defendant's argument on appeal largely challenged Detective Watkins' testimony on the basis of the hearsay rule. Nevertheless, the defendant's brief otherwise made clear his position that Detective Watkins' testimony, as shaped by the trial court's ruling, was misleading to the jury and thus prejudicial. The defendant's opening brief argued that the resulting testimony "unambiguously implied that the unknown person identified [the defendant] as committing" the robbery. The defendant's brief elsewhere argued that, to the extent the State claimed that this testimony was offered to explain the course of the investigation, its relevance was outweighed by the risk of jury confusion. The defendant's brief further argued that Detective Watkins could have simply testified that he composed a photographic array without stating that he did so "based upon information from an unidentified person" in order to 29 "minimiz[e] the risk that the jury would misuse the evidence as substantive evidence that [defendant] was the offender." The defendant's brief also argued that the State improperly sought to use the detective's testimony regarding an anonymous source "to bolster Jones and McDonald's identification of [defendant] as one of the robbers." This is the precise nature of the prejudice that we have identified. Thus, although the defendant's brief framed its challenge in the context of the hearsay rule, the defendant's arguments put the State on notice of his substantive contention that Detective Watkins' testimony presented the risk of jury confusion and prejudice. Thus, the State cannot complain that it was unaware that the misleading nature of the testimony would be under scrutiny in this appeal. ¶ 83 Although we find that defendant sufficiently argued this point, assuming arguendo that he did not, it is within our discretion to address the clearly misleading testimony created by the trial court's ruling. In other words, we have discretion to address "a clear and obvious error." Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 325. The State claims that the "clear and obvious error" exception recognized in Givens cannot apply here, because "no clear precedent exists which establishes the error this Court found." We acknowledge that we have not seen a case with similar facts. That is not surprising, since, hopefully, it is an extremely rare occurrence for a trial court to craft a ruling that distorts crucial trial testimony in a manner that materially strengthens the State's case against a defendant. ¶ 84 However, we do not read Givens as requiring "clear precedent" in case law, in order for us to conclude that there was a "clear or obvious error" in the trial court proceedings. Rather, Givens indicates that our court retains discretion to correct an error that is either "controlled by clear precedent [or] dictated by an interest in a just result." Id. (Emphasis added.) Id. In this case, we find that reversal is dictated by an interest in a just result. Fundamental fairness dictates 30 that the trial court should not resolve a motion in limine in a manner that results in misleading, factually incorrect testimony. The misleading nature of the testimony that resulted from the trial court's ruling in this case is clear and obvious. In deciding to take McDonald "out of the equation," the trial court effectively allowed Detective Watkins to testify to something that did not occur. The ruling caused Detective Watkins to suggest—falsely—that, in addition to the two robbery victims, a third, independent witness implicated the defendant. In effect, this is fabricated testimony, bolstering the State's case. Moreover, as we have already discussed, this was not a case where the State's evidence was otherwise overwhelming. Thus, the trial court's error was not only clear and obvious, but also prejudicial. ¶ 85 We also reject the State's petition, to the extent it claims that the defendant "fully acquiesced in the trial court's ruling as to the manner of presentation of" Detective Watkins' testimony. In support of this argument, the State points out that, after the trial court commented that its ruling would "take[] the complaining witness out of th[e] equation" the court asked "Does anybody have a problem with that" and defense counsel responded with a question rather than restating an objection. The State similarly relies on defense counsel's comments during 31 the sidebar at trial, when defense counsel stated that it understood the court's ruling on the motion in limine to mean that the State could elicit testimony about an "anonymous tip," but that the State could not elicit the name "Jayron." The State also notes that, elsewhere during the sidebar, defense counsel said: "[The prosecutor] already asked proper questions in that you quote an anonymous call based on what did you do, and I put that information into the computer and generated photos ***. I thought this was as far as they could go with this." The State claims that these comments demonstrate that "defense counsel accepted and fully acquiesced in the court's ruling regarding the manner in which the evidence would be presented." ¶ 86 Viewing these remarks in context of the relevant proceedings, we do not find that they evidenced defense counsel's acquiescence to the trial court's resolution of the motion in limine. First, the question posed by defense counsel was clearly an attempt to clarify the scope of the trial court's ruling, after the trial court had already decided that it would resolve the motion by permitting Detective Watkins to testify about an "anonymous" source which did not exist. Similarly, we reject the State's suggestion that defense counsel's comments during the sidebar reflected acquiescence to the substance of Detective Watkins' testimony. Rather, it is apparent that defense counsel was explaining his understanding of the scope of the court's prior ruling, and expressing his position that the State had elicited testimony (the name "Jayron") that exceeded that ruling. Thus, when reviewed as a whole and in context, we reject the State's acquiescence argument and deny the State's petition for rehearing. ¶ 87 Reversed and remanded.