Opinion
G061080
02-15-2023
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDUARDO DIFREDO BONILLA- GOMEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
Jill Kent, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Hilton and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 19CF1030 Steven D. Bromberg, Judge. Reversed.
Jill Kent, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Daniel J. Hilton and Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
SANCHEZ, J.
Defendant Eduardo Difredo Bonilla-Gomez appeals from his conviction for two counts each of sexual intercourse with a child 10 years or younger, sodomy with a child 10 years or younger, sexual penetration with a child 10 years or younger, and lewd acts on a child under the age of 14. Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion during jury deliberation by dismissing a juror who discussed his recollection of news reports of a case in which false accusations of molestation were made by children. Defendant also argues the trial court erred in sentencing.
We reach only the first issue and reverse. The record does not reflect a "'demonstrable reality'" (People v. Wilson (2008) 44 Cal.4th 758, 821 (Wilson)) that the juror in question considered outside evidence, as opposed to relying upon his "life experiences" (id. at p. 825).
FACTS
Defendant was charged with eight counts: two each of sexual intercourse with a child 10 years or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (a)), sodomy with a child 10 years or younger (Ibid.), sexual penetration of a child 10 years or younger (Pen. Code, § 288.7, subd. (b)), and lewd acts on a child under the age of 14 (Pen. Code, § 288, subd. (a)). His case proceeded to trial before a jury.
During jury deliberations, the jury foreperson sent a note to the trial court indicating the jury could not reach a verdict and identified possible juror misconduct. Specifically, the note stated that Juror No. 135 was "using news reports about another case" in connection with deliberations. The trial court brought a series of jurors into chambers for discussions on the record, beginning with the foreperson.
The foreperson reported that Juror No. 135 was discussing news reports of a child molestation case. The foreperson had not previously heard of the case, but had been told it was famous. The case involved a daycare center "up north" where several children had made false accusations against adults. Juror No. 135 suggested it as an example of a situation in which children lie. The foreperson indicated Juror No. 135 was still participating in deliberation. However, the foreperson expressed doubt that a verdict could be reached through additional deliberations with Juror No. 135.
Next, the trial court called in Juror No. 135. Juror No. 135 told the trial court he brought up the case in question in response to another juror who had been describing similar famous cases in which molestation had taken place, such as those involving Catholic priests or the Boy Scouts of America. Another juror remembered the case and corrected him as to the name-this was the "McMartin case." Juror No. 135 remembered very little about the case, as it had taken place a long time ago. He indicated that this discussion was quite brief. He denied considering any of these past cases in the deliberations.
When asked whether he was using outside information to evaluate the case, Juror No. 135 said he had not, but that the jurors were "all adults," who had "watched T.V. and read newspapers" and "lived lives." He indicated the jurors had been "pretty well focused on the evidence."
After Juror No. 135 left chambers, but before calling the next juror, the trial court held a brief colloquy with counsel. The trial court noted his independent recollection of the McMartin case; defense counsel remembered it as well.
Next, the trial court called in three more jurors. One juror indicated he did not have a clear recollection of the context of Juror No. 135's discussion of the McMartin case. The second juror described Juror No. 135 as discussing the McMartin case alongside the Salem Witch Trials as support for the proposition that "everyone lies," and quoted Juror No. 135 as saying "I can bring in whatever I want" when challenged as to the propriety of considering the McMartin case as part of deliberations. The last juror told the trial court Juror No. 135 was using the McMartin case as an "example" to show "that kids can make things up, and so that doesn't necessarily mean just because they're a kid they're telling the truth."
The trial court concluded Juror No. 135 had engaged in juror misconduct and dismissed him, over the defense's objection. The jury deliberated for approximately another two hours, then convicted defendant on all counts. Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by dismissing Juror No. 135 and erred in sentencing. We reach only the first of these contentions and reverse.
Challenges to a trial court's decision to dismiss a juror are governed by the "'demonstrable reality'" standard, which is a species of the abuse of discretion standard. (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 821.) This standard "requires a 'stronger evidentiary showing than mere substantial evidence'" to affirm. (Ibid.)
"'A jury's verdict in a criminal case must be based on the evidence presented at trial, not on extrinsic matters.' [Citation.] A juror commits misconduct if the juror conducts an independent investigation of the facts [citation], brings outside evidence into the jury room [citation], injects the juror's own expertise into the deliberations [citation], or engages in an experiment that produces new evidence [citation]." (Wilson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 829.) However, "'[j]urors' views of the evidence . . . are necessarily informed by their life experiences, including their education and professional work.' [Citation.] '[D]uring the give and take of deliberations, it is virtually impossible to divorce completely one's background from one's analysis of the evidence. We cannot demand that jurors, especially lay jurors not versed in the subtle distinctions that attorneys draw, never refer to their background during deliberations.... [¶] A fine line exists between using one's background in analyzing the evidence, which is appropriate, even inevitable, and injecting "an opinion explicitly based on specialized information obtained from outside sources," which we have described as misconduct.'" (Ibid.)
Defendant argues Juror No. 135 did not cross this fine line by discussing the McMartin case. Defendant contends this type of knowledge (memories of news reports of a famous case) is part of a juror's life experience, not outside evidence. Defendant concedes that Juror No. 135 would have been properly dismissed had he "used the Internet, investigated the law, or done research," but contends the record does not show Juror No. 135 did any of these things.
The Attorney General concedes that jurors are permitted to rely upon their life experiences in deliberation. However, the Attorney General argues the McMartin case was outside the sort of "common knowledge" that jurors may permissibly rely upon in deliberation. We disagree. The McMartin case was nationally publicized, covered by the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Washington Post, and many other news media. It is the subject of several books, an HBO made-for-television dramatization, and a documentary film. David Shaw of the Los Angeles Times won a Pulitzer Prize for his critiques of media coverage of the case. It is no accident that at least two of the jurors, the trial judge, and defendant's trial attorney had all independently heard of the case and recalled some of its details, even though it took place over 30 years before this trial.
E.g., Reinhold, The Longest Trial - A Post-Mortem; Collapse of ChildAbuse Case: So Much Agony for So Little, New York Times (Jan. 24, 1990).
E.g., Shaw, Where Was Skepticism in Media?; Pack journalism and hysteria marked early coverage of the McMartin case, Los Angeles Times (Jan. 19, 1990).
E.g., Mathews, McMartin Prosecution Halted, Ending Longest Criminal Case, Washington Post (July 28, 1990).
E.g., Eberle and Eberle, The Abuse of Innocence: The McMartin Preschool Trial (1993); Nathan and Snedeker, Satan's Silence: Ritual Abuse and the Making of a Modern American Witch Hunt (1995).
Indictment: The McMartin Trial (HBO 1995).
Uncovered: The McMartin Family Trials (Oxygen 2019).
The Attorney General also argues that even if "some generalized familiarity with the McMartin case could be said to lie within general common knowledge, the particularities of that case do not." The Attorney General contends these "particularities of the McMartin case were at the forefront of [Juror No. 135's] reliance." Again, we disagree. Juror No. 135's only recollections of the McMartin case were that it involved allegations by children of sexual abuse against adults at a daycare, that it occurred "up north," that the allegations were determined not to be true, and that it occurred a long time ago. Juror No. 135 even had to be corrected as to the name of the case by another juror. Juror No. 135 knew, at most, the basic facts of the McMartin case, all of which fall well within the "generalized familiarity with the McMartin case" that we conclude is within general common knowledge, and permissible to discuss in deliberation. And nothing in the record suggests Juror No. 135 did any outside research to fill in the gaps of his knowledge about the McMartin case.
In reality, the McMartin case arose from a preschool in Manhattan Beach, California. Juror No. 135 may have conflated his memory of the McMartin case with a similar series of cases in Kern County during the 1980s (see Jones, Who Was Abused?, N.Y. Times (Sept. 19, 2004)) or with similar cases in Washington state in the mid-1990s (see Egan, Pastor and Wife Are Acquitted on All Charges in Sex-Abuse Case, N.Y. Times (Dec. 12, 1995)).
Lastly, the Attorney General argues Juror No. 135's references to the McMartin case either forced the other jurors to accept his expertise on the facts of that case or invited them to conduct their own outside research. Neither is true. As discussed above, Juror No. 135 did not profess to have any specialized knowledge of the facts of the McMartin case; he could not even independently recall its name, which another juror independently supplied. He even told the trial judge "I don't remember much about it." Nor were the other jurors forced to conduct their own research on the facts of that case, any more than Juror No. 135 was forced to conduct his own outside research when other jurors referred to famous cases involving the Boy Scouts of America or the Catholic Church. Similarly, the Attorney General does not argue that Juror No. 135's reference to the Salem Witch Trials forced the other jurors to look up the facts of those cases.
The Attorney General does not argue this dismissal could be deemed harmless error. It is clear from the record that Juror No. 135 was the lone holdout and that his dismissal converted a likely mistrial into a conviction. We conclude the dismissal was prejudicial, requiring reversal of the judgment. However, this reversal does not create a double jeopardy bar to retrial of the case. (People v. Armstrong (2016) 1 Cal.5th 432, 454.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
WE CONCUR: O'LEARY, P. J. GOETHALS, J.