Opinion
October 2, 1995
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Cirigliano, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed insofar as appealed from.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, he was properly convicted of attempted robbery in the second degree, as defined in Penal Law § 160.10 (2) (a), based upon proof that, during the course of an attempt to forcibly steal property from the victim, he inflicted physical injury upon the victim (see, People v Blake, 212 A.D.2d 382; People v. Walter R., 116 A.D.2d 673). Although there can be no attempt to accomplish an unintended result (see, People v. Campbell, 72 N.Y.2d 602), robbery in the second degree as defined in Penal Law § 160.10 (2) (a) requires both the unintended result of infliction of physical injury and the intended result of stealing property (cf., People v Campbell, supra). In this case the unintended result in fact occurred, but the intended result, the forcible stealing of property, was attempted, but not accomplished (cf., People v Esquilin, 159 A.D.2d 632). The gravamen of robbery in the second degree is the forcible stealing of property (see, Penal Law § 160.00; People v. Blake, supra; People v. Scott, 159 A.D.2d 975), which is the intended result (cf., People v. Esquilin, supra). Accordingly, an attempt to commit the crime of robbery in the second degree as defined in Penal Law § 160.10 (2) (a) is cognizable as a crime.
To the extent that the determinations of the Appellate Division, Fourth Department in People v. Miller ( 201 A.D.2d 109, lv granted 84 N.Y.2d 938) and People v. Shelton ( 209 A.D.2d 963) are to the contrary, we decline to follow them. Miller, J.P., Altman, Goldstein and Florio, JJ., concur.