Opinion
12-22-2016
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Pierre BOND, Appellant.
Susan Patnode, Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Kelly L. Egan of counsel), for appellant. Mary E. Rain, District Attorney, Canton (Marquetta Christy of counsel), for respondent.
Susan Patnode, Rural Law Center of New York, Castleton (Kelly L. Egan of counsel), for appellant.
Mary E. Rain, District Attorney, Canton (Marquetta Christy of counsel), for respondent.
Before: PETERS, P.J., McCARTHY, EGAN JR., LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ.
McCARTHY, J.Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards, J.), rendered July 14, 2014, convicting defendant upon his plea of guilty of the crime of criminal sexual act in the first degree.
Defendant pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of criminal sexual act in the first degree and waived his right to appeal. Defendant's subsequent oral motion to withdraw his plea was denied and County Court sentenced him, in accordance with the plea agreement, to a prison term of 21 years followed by 20 years of postrelease supervision. Defendant appeals.
Initially, defendant challenges his plea as not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently entered. To the extent that defendant preserved the issues in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea (see People v. Burns, 133 A.D.3d 1045, 1046, 20 N.Y.S.3d 669 [2015], lv. denied 27 N.Y.3d 1149, 39 N.Y.S.3d 383, 62 N.E.3d 123 [2016] ), the record belies his contention that County Court coerced him into pleading guilty or that any alleged errors by defense counsel rendered his plea involuntary. We note that, to the extent that defendant's challenges to the ineffective assistance of counsel involve matters outside the record, they are more appropriately addressed in a CPL article 440 motion (see People v. Perkins, 140 A.D.3d 1401, 1403, 33 N.Y.S.3d 584 [2016] ). Furthermore, defendant's challenge to the sentence imposed as harsh and excessive is precluded by the waiver of the right to appeal. The record reflects that despite defendant's illiterate cognitive impairment, the waiver was appropriately explained to defendant, who then knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived that right (see People v. Andrews, 78 A.D.3d 1229, 1233, 911 N.Y.S.2d 221 [2010], lv. denied 16 N.Y.3d 827, 921 N.Y.S.2d 191, 946 N.E.2d 179 [2011] ).
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
PETERS, P.J., EGAN JR., LYNCH and DEVINE, JJ., concur.