Opinion
A122270
7-10-2009
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. SONCIERA BOMAR-ROYAL, Defendant and Appellant.
Not to be Published in Official Reports
Defendant Sonciera Bomar-Royal pleaded no contest to one count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)), arising from a pattern of welfare fraud. The court placed her on probation and imposed a standard search condition. Defendant contends the search condition is not reasonably related to the crime or the circumstances of the case, and is thus an abuse of discretion. We disagree because the search condition is reasonably related to the crime and, in any event, is a proper means to measure defendants rehabilitation by ensuring she is obeying all laws. Accordingly, we affirm.
I. FACTS
Because of defendants no contest plea, we take the facts from the probation report.
On March 12, 2004, defendant applied for Cash Aid and Food Stamps, listing her children-including her son G.-as living in her household. On October 18, 2004, John Freitas, a welfare fraud investigator for the City of Napa, was assigned to investigate an allegation that defendant was receiving Cash Aid and Food Stamps for G., despite the fact that she did not have care, custody, and control of the child. It was alleged that G. had, in fact, been living in American Canyon with his grandmother, Marie K., for several years.
On February 17, 2005, Marie K. told Freitas that she had cared for G. for most of his life. She took him to and from school and provided him with food, clothing, and shelter. According to Marie K., defendant had very little involvement with G., did not help with his financial support, and in fact continually borrowed money from Marie K. G. only spent the night with defendant on "rare occasion[s]."
On February 18, 2005, Freitas met with defendant at his office. Defendant adamantly denied that Marie K. had care, custody, and control of G. Defendant told Freitas that G. spent only a couple of nights a week at Marie K.s house. Defendant claimed she took G. to and from school on the days G. spent with her in Napa. Freitas asked defendant several times to be truthful, but she persisted in denying that Marie K. had custody of G. Defendant claimed G. spent no more than three nights a week with his grandmother.
On March 1, 2005, Freitas confirmed that G. was enrolled in school in American Canyon. The schools contact information card listed Marie K. as the emergency contact for G.
Freitas contacted the Napa Housing Authority and shared the information from his investigation. The Authority computed the amount of welfare funds defendant was overpaid due to falsely claiming G. as a member of her household. Defendant was mailed a notice of action stating the amount of the funds overpaid due to her fraud.
On March 30, 2005, defendant went to G.s American Canyon school and filled out a new contact information card, listed herself as the primary emergency contact for G.
On April 18, 2005, Freitas spoke with two of Marie K.s neighbors, who told him they saw Marie K. with G. on a daily basis. The neighbors were convinced that G. lived with Marie K.
That same day, Freitas appeared, at defendants request, at a Housing Authority hearing regarding the overpayment. At the hearing, defendant stated that G. stayed at Marie Ks house four days a week. This statement alone disqualified defendant from claiming welfare funds for G., because it showed that G. lived with defendant less than 50 percent of the time.
The Housing Authority ruled that defendant had committed fraud by obtaining welfare funds through misstating the composition of her household.
When defendant applied for aid on March 12, 2004, and for each successive re-evaluation of welfare eligibility through June 14, 2005, defendant signed a Statement of Facts attesting to who was in her home and what constitutes welfare fraud.
The Napa County District Attorney charged defendant in a felony complaint with one count of welfare fraud (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 10980, subd. (c)(2)), spanning the period from March 12, 2004, to June 30, 2005 (count 1); twelve counts of perjury (Pen. Code, § 118, subd. (a)), spanning the period from March 12, 2004, to June 14, 2005, for her welfare application, Statements of Facts, and other documents falsely attesting that G. lived in her home (counts 2 through 13); and one count of grand theft (Pen. Code, § 487, subd. (a)), for unlawfully taking $25,020 in welfare funds (count 14).
Defendant pleaded no contest to count 14, in exchange for dismissal of the remaining counts, three years formal probation, and restitution. The trial court sentenced defendant to three years probation and ordered restitution. The court also imposed numerous probation conditions, including the standard condition that defendant "[s]ubmit [her] person, residence, vehicle and property to search and seizure by a Probation Officer or any law enforcement officer, at any time of the day or night, with or without a warrant, and with or without probable cause." The trial court rejected defendants objection that the search condition "is an inappropriate [condition] for welfare fraud," ruling the condition to be "reasonably related to the charges in this case."
II. DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the search condition is not reasonably related to the crime or the circumstances of the case, and is thus an abuse of discretion. We disagree because the search condition is reasonably related to the crime. The condition is also a proper means to measure defendants rehabilitation by ensuring she is obeying all laws.
Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (j), authorizes the sentencing court to "impose . . . reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer. . . ." This statute grants trial courts broad discretion to prescribe probation conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect the safety of the public. (People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614, 619 (Richards ); People v. Mason (1971) 5 Cal.3d 759, 764 (Mason).)
Richards was disapproved on an unrelated ground in People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1126. Mason was disapproved on an unrelated ground in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, 486, fn. 1 (Lent).
A reviewing court will not invalidate a condition of probation unless it has no relationship to the crime for which the defendant was convicted, relates to noncriminal conduct, and mandates or prohibits conduct not reasonably related to future criminality. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486; Mason, supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 764.)
Defendant argues that the search condition is not related to the crime of welfare fraud and is not reasonably related to future criminality. She relies primarily on three cases. In People v. Kay (1973) 36 Cal.App.3d 759, defendants were convicted of assault and battery on police officers during a "sit-in" demonstration; defendants used nonconcealable weapons which were openly displayed during the affray. (Id. at pp. 761-762.) The court concluded that the search condition was not reasonably related to the offenses because "the officers saw the objects all too plainly." (Id. at p. 762.)
In People v. Keller (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 827, a search conviction was imposed on a misdemeanor conviction for the petty theft of a 49-cent ballpoint pen. (Id. at p. 830.) The court concluded that the search condition was improperly imposed because of unproven speculation about defendants involvement with drugs, which had no relation to the petty theft. (Id. at pp. 831, 838-839.) The court characterized the search condition as "the use of a Mack truck to crush a gnat." (Id. at p. 840.)
Keller was disapproved on an unrelated ground in People v. Welch (1993) 5 Cal.4th 228, 237.
In In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577, defendant was convicted of battery on a police officer. He was a member of a crowd angry at officers for trying to impound an illegally parked vehicle. He threw a beer bottle at a patrol car, spraying beer on an officer. (Id. at pp. 578-579.) The court noted there was no rationale for a search condition to search for dangerous and deadly weapons, since defendant used a common item not in itself a deadly weapon-and the court also noted that the act was an isolated situation and defendants personal circumstances did not suggest a propensity for future criminality. (Id. at pp. 581-583.)
Defendant argues that Kay, Keller, and Martinez illustrate a rule that a standard probation search condition is generally appropriate in cases involving common tangible items of criminality, such as drugs or concealed weapons. But the reasonableness of probation search conditions is not so limited. The law has evolved.
In People v. Reyes (1998) 19 Cal.4th 743 (Reyes), the Supreme Court upheld a probation search condition, emphasizing that probation is conditional freedom and the search condition is necessary to ensure "the efficacy of [ ] rehabilitative efforts" as well as to protect the public. (Reyes at p. 752.) The court made it clear that the search condition, authorizing an unexpected search of the defendant without reasonable suspicion, serves the necessary and useful purpose of determining whether the probationer is complying with the terms of probation-by determining not only whether he had disobeyed the law, but whether he obeys the law. Such information is considered a valuable measure of the effectiveness of probation supervision. (Ibid. )
In People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57 (Balestra ), the same court which decided Keller repudiated that case in light of Reyes. (Balestra, supra at pp. 66-67.) The Balestra court ruled that "Keller is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence since the date of that decision." (Id. at p. 67.) Referring to the passage of Reyes summarized above, Balestra reasoned that "a warrantless search condition is intended to ensure that the subject thereof is obeying the fundamental condition of all grants of probation, that is, the usual requirement . . . that a probationer `obey all laws. Thus, warrantless search conditions serve a valid rehabilitative purpose, and because such a search condition is necessarily justified by its rehabilitative purpose, it is of no moment whether the underlying offense is reasonably related to theft, narcotics, or firearms. . . ." (Ibid.)
In the present case, the trial court imposed the standard probation condition to "obey all laws." Under Reyes and Balestra, that condition alone justifies the search condition regardless of the nature and circumstances of the offense. Simply put, the search condition is necessary to gauge the effectiveness of rehabilitation by ensuring the defendant enjoying the grace of probation is living a law-abiding life. In addition, the nature and circumstances of defendants crime invite the need for a search condition: as the People argued below, the search condition was necessary to monitor who was actually living in defendants home to make sure she was not committing further welfare fraud.
Defendant also argues that the search condition is overbroad because the Housing Authority has the power to inspect her residence to see who is living there-thus making it unnecessary for her to waive her Fourth Amendment rights. But the Housing Authority is not charged with defendants probation supervision. Defendant also argues the search condition should be limited to her residence, and exclude her person, vehicle, and other property. But it is reasonable to postulate that evidence of crime-including but not limited to welfare fraud-may be found in defendants possession, or under her control, outside of her residence.
For instance, defendant could be claiming a certain child is living with her-but be found carrying on her person a sheaf of letters to her, spanning several months, bearing that childs return address in Florida.
We note that defendant remains protected against probation searches which are arbitrary, capricious, or oppressive. (Reyes, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 753-754.)
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur:
Margulies, J.
Graham, J.