Opinion
November 5, 1990
Appeal from the County Court, Nassau County (Harrington, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
The defendant's conviction stems from the sale of crack-cocaine to a police informant on three separate occasions. The conversations between the defendant and the informant were tape recorded. At trial, defense counsel's requests that the court redact certain portions of the recordings in which the defendant referred to uncharged crimes, including a prior sale of crack-cocaine to another individual, were denied. Additionally, the trial court restricted defense counsel's cross-examination as to certain aspects of the informant's employment relationship with the police and her prior use of drugs. On appeal, the defendant contends that the cumulative effect of these rulings deprived him of a fair trial. We disagree.
Although the challenged statements concerning uncharged crimes would have been more appropriately redacted, we find that, viewing the record as a whole, the proof of the defendant's guilt was overwhelming and, therefore, the error was harmless (see, People v. Cook, 42 N.Y.2d 204; People v. Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230; People v. Cody, 149 A.D.2d 722).
Furthermore, the scope and extent of cross-examination is within the sound discretion of the trial court (People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198, 202). In the present case, defense counsel was afforded extensive leeway in questioning prosecution witnesses on the controverted topics. Counsel was permitted to inquire, inter alia, into how long the informant had worked for the police and how much she was paid, as well as the informant's prior addiction to cocaine and her drug use at the time of the purchases from the defendant. Therefore, the limitations imposed by the court did not constitute an improvident exercise of discretion (see, People v. Brown, 162 A.D.2d 695).
Finally, we decline to disturb the sentence (see, People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80). Brown, J.P., Lawrence, Kunzeman and Kooper, JJ., concur.