Common authority is not implied merely from property interests but rests upon mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes. ( Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7, 39 L.Ed.2d at 250 n.7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n.7; see also Foskey, 136 Ill.2d at 87; People v. Bochniak (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 575, 576-77.) Anyone with common authority over property has the right to permit inspection and the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. ( Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7, 39 L.Ed.2d at 250 n.7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n.7; see also Foskey, 136 Ill.2d at 87; Bochniak, 93 Ill. App.3d at 576.
People v. Montgomery (1980), 84 Ill. App.3d 695, 701-02, 405 N.E.2d 1275. Defendant cites to People v. Bochniak (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 575, 417 N.E.2d 722, cert. denied (1982), 455 U.S. 938, 71 L.Ed.2d 648, 102 S.Ct. 1427, a case concerning authority of a third person to consent to a search of a defendant's home. In Bochniak, the defendant rented a garage from his mother.
Also, we note that the cases upon which the State relies do not address the apparent authority rule in the context of our State constitutional provision, but rather analyzed and applied Federal fourth amendment jurisprudence regarding unreasonable searches and seizures. (See People v. Miller (1968), 40 Ill.2d 154, 157; People v. Harris (1990), 199 Ill. App.3d 1008, 1013; People v. Speer (1989), 184 Ill. App.3d 730, 737; People v. Vought (1988), 174 Ill. App.3d 563, 570; People v. Bochniak (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 575, 577.) Subsequent to those decisions, the United States Supreme Court adopted the apparent authority rule ( Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 110 S.Ct. 2793), which this court has since applied to fourth amendment issues (see People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill.2d 258, 299 ("[w]e now hold that, when a court is deciding whether consent was given * * *, the circumstances must have been such that the police could have reasonably believed they had been given consent to enter [citation]"); see also People v. Steinberg (1994), 260 Ill. App.3d 653, 658 (applying Rodriguez apparent authority rule)).
I also have considered other evidence that I believe would be suppressed on remand as part of the fruit of the poisonous tree, including, but not limited to: (1) the fact that defendant owned a Ford F150 because that information was elicited from defendant during his illegal arrest; (2) Jose Hernandez's consent to search the truck because the consent was invalid where the police knew at the time they obtained it that Jose lacked authority to provide such consent to search and defendant already had denied consent. See People v. Bochniak , 93 Ill. App. 3d 575, 576-77, 49 Ill.Dec. 32, 417 N.E.2d 722 (1981) ("the authority which justifies third-party consent rests on the mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes"); (3) the seizure and towing of defendant's truck to the police lot where Mr. Carlson was able to identify it; (4) the evidence recovered from the search of defendant's truck; and (5) defendant directing police officers around to various locations looking for the alleged murder weapon. When considering all of the evidence above, along with the additional evidence introduced at trial, a rational trier of fact could find the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
As discussed, her initial statements to the police indicated that she did have control and access to that bedroom, as everyone else had been evicted. Furthermore, we are equally unpersuaded by defendant's reliance on People v. Bochnaik, 93 Ill. App. 3d 575, 576-77 (1981), as that decision did not recognize the apparent authority doctrine. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion under the circumstances before us.
We reject the State's argument that the good-faith doctrine in Leon is applicable in the context of this case (see People v. Ross (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 66, 73-74, 478 N.E.2d 575) and conclude, in accordance with Payton, that Officer Votava's warrantless entry into room 219 must be considered unreasonable unless exigent circumstances were present. Our conclusion is consistent with decisions in prior Illinois cases rejecting the argument that warrantless entries and searches may be upheld if the party who consented to the entry had apparent authority to do so but lacked actual authority. (See People v. Miller (1968), 40 Ill.2d 154, 157-58, 238 N.E.2d 407, 409; People v. Bochniak (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 575, 577, 417 N.E.2d 722, 724.) Nor would the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule recently enacted by the Illinois General Assembly prevent suppression of the evidence in this case, as it was not seized pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge or pursuant to a warrantless search incident to an arrest for violation of a statute or ordinance which was subsequently invalidated.
In People v.Schlemm (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 639, 402 N.E.2d 810, cert. denied (1981), 449 U.S. 1127, 67 L.Ed.2d 115, 101 S.Ct. 948, a landlord purported to consent to a warrantless search of leased premises. In People v. Bochniak (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 575, 417 N.E.2d 722, cert. denied (1982), 455 U.S. 938, 71 L.Ed.2d 648, 102 S.Ct. 1427, the defendant's mother owned the garage she rented to defendant and retained a key to it, but did not use the garage herself. In People v. Elders (1978), 63 Ill. App.3d 554, 380 N.E.2d 10, the defendant's wife purportedly gave consent to a search of her husband's car.
In addition, only rights to enter the premises retained by Koris under the lease (paragraph 9) were "for the purpose of examining or exhibiting the same, or to make any needful repairs, or alterations thereof which Lessor may see fit to make * * *." In People v. Bochniak (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 575, 417 N.E.2d 722, this court, in affirming the granting of the lessee-defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained in the search of the demised premises, held that the lessor who retained a key had no authority to consent to the search. The facts here are the converse of those in that case. It is the lessor, not the lessee Antonelli, who is asserting an expectation of privacy.