Opinion
F086219
12-19-2023
In re B.M., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. B.M., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
William Safford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Christina Hitomi Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County No. JJD074247. Sylvia J. Hanna, Judge.
William Safford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Christina Hitomi Simpson, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
THE COURT*
Minor B.M. contends on appeal that the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and disposition order must be reversed and remanded because there is insufficient evidence to support its findings that he violated Penal Code sections 69 (count 1) and 148, subdivision (a)(1) (count 2). The People disagree. We agree with minor and reverse.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On June 17, 2022, an original juvenile wardship petition was filed in Tulare County Superior Court, pursuant to Welfare &Institutions Code section 602, alleging minor committed felony resisting an executive officer (§ 69; count 1); misdemeanor resisting, delaying or obstructing a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2); and misdemeanor public intoxication (§ 647, subd. (f); count 3). Minor denied the allegations.
On July 6, 2022, the People moved to reduce count 1 to a misdemeanor, pursuant to section 17, subdivision (b).
On August 3, 2022, minor was found suitable and placed on informal probation pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 654.2.
On January 9, 2023, the probation department informed the juvenile court that minor had made "minimal efforts to comply with the terms and conditions of his [Welfare and Institutions Code] section 654.2 Informal Probation, and was recently arrested for a new offense," and "recommended the minor's grant of informal probation be dismissed and the matter proceed formally." Minor's informal probation was dismissed as unsatisfactory and the matter proceeded to formal adjudication.
On March 29, 2023, the juvenile court held a contested jurisdictional hearing. The court found counts 1 and 2 of the petition true. Count 3 was dismissed on the motion of the People.
On April 26, 2023, minor was adjudged a ward of the court and placed on probation in the custody of his mother.
On May 4, 2023, minor filed a notice of appeal.
FACTUAL SUMMARY
On June 15, 2022, at approximately 11:58 p.m., Porterville Police Officer Macklin Williams and his field training officer, Daniel Vargas, were dispatched to a residence "regarding a drunk and out of control juvenile." At the time of the incident, Williams had approximately two months of experience as a police officer. Williams was in his full police uniform.
Williams testified that when they arrived at the residence, he saw "a vehicle parked in the driveway" and two females exiting the residence. He stated that he asked them "if the juvenile we were looking for was in the vehicle that was parked in the driveway." He stated that "[t]heir response was yes."
Williams stated that he then contacted minor in the vehicle. He testified that he "initially ... asked [minor] to exit the vehicle and he refused to do so."
Williams testified that in response to minor's refusal to exit the vehicle, he "used [his] hands to attempt to pull [minor] out of the vehicle and [minor] grabbed his hands." Williams stated, "[a]t the time it seemed to me that [minor] was attempting to pull away and resist me pulling him out of the vehicle." Williams stated that he was "finally able to detain [minor]," and transported him to the juvenile detention facility.
Williams testified that after they arrived at the facility, minor "told ... Vargas that he would f[***] him up," and "requested to be released from handcuffs so he could proceed to f[***] up _ Vargas."
Williams testified that minor "was threatening . . . Vargas with physical violence, and his demeanor made it appear that he intended to do so." Williams stated that they "had multiple employees at the [j]uvenile [d]etention [f]acility with [them] to assist [minor] out." When asked whether the threats made against Vargas delayed he and Vargas in the performance of their duties, Williams testified that he could not remember the "exact circumstances," but that "it was delayed in having [minor] exit the vehicle."
Defense Case
On cross-examination, Williams testified that when he attempted to arrest minor "for a violation of ... Section 647[, subd.] (f)" in the driveway of the residence, he could not remember whether the driveway was surrounded by a gate, stating, "I can't recall the entire front yard of the residence."
Section 647, subdivision (f) prohibits "public intoxication."
Williams testified that when minor said he wanted to "f[***] up" Vargas, minor was in handcuffs in the back of the patrol car with the doors closed but he could not recall whether the doors were locked. He stated that before minor made the statements, minor told him, while smiling, to turn on his body camera so his statements would be caught on camera. Williams stated that he could not recall whether he laughed in response to minor's statements or if he asked Vargas if he actually felt threatened, stating, "I can't testify to everything that happened, only what I documented in my report."
The juvenile court then asked Williams whether minor was in the vehicle when he arrived at the residence. Williams responded that minor was in the vehicle with the driver's side door open.
Williams did not testify whether the vehicle was on or whether minor exhibited the intention or means to operate it.
DISCUSSION
I. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR COUNT 2 (§ 148, subd. (a))
For organizational purposes, we first address minor's contention that there is insufficient evidence to support the court's true finding on count 2 (§ 148, subd. (a)).
Minor contends the evidence on the record is insufficient under the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution to support the juvenile court's true finding that he resisted, obstructed or delayed a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1); count 2). He argues there is not substantial evidence that Williams was engaged in the performance of lawful duties when he detained minor, as required by section 148, subdivision (a)(1), because the record does not show Williams had reasonable suspicion supported by specific, articulable facts that minor was engaged in criminal activity. The People disagree. We agree with minor.
A. Law
We review the minor's contentions using the same standard of review that applies in adult criminal cases. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026.) "Specifically, we determine whether substantial evidence-'evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value'-supports the juvenile court's findings. [Citation.] We view the evidence 'in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the [findings] the existence of every fact the [court] could reasonably have deduced from the evidence.' [Citation.] We 'accept [all] logical inferences that the [court] might have drawn from the ... evidence' [citation], but reject inferences' "based on suspicion alone, or on imagination, speculation, supposition, surmise, conjecture, or guess work."' [Citation.] We will reverse only if' "it appears 'that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support'" the [court's findings].'" (In re I.A. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 767, 778.) The test is not whether guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether any "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." (Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319.)
"Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence." (In re Michael D. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 115, 126.)" 'The standard of review is the same in cases in which the prosecution relies mainly on circumstantial evidence. [Citation.]'" (People v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 804, 849.) Although we review the whole record, "[t]he uncorroborated testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction, unless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently improbable." (People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 296; see People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 489.)
A defendant violates section 148, subdivision (a)(1) where,"' "(1) the defendant willfully resisted, delayed, or obstructed a peace officer, (2) when the officer was engaged in the performance of his or her duties, and (3) the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the other person was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties." '" (Yount v. City of Sacramento (2008) 43 Cal.4th 885, 894-895; § 148, subd. (a)(1).)
"In California, the lawfulness of an arrest is an essential element of the offense of resisting or obstructing a peace officer. [Citation.] If the officer was not performing his or her duties at the time of the arrest, the arrest is unlawful and the arrestee cannot be convicted under ... section 148, subdivision (a)." (Susag v. City of Lake Forest (2002) 94 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1409.) "[B]ecause an officer has no duty to take illegal action, he or she is not engaged in 'duties,' for purposes of an offense defined in such terms, if the officer's conduct is unlawful." (People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1217, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Satele v. Superior Court (2019) 7 Cal.5th 852, 857.) "Thus, '[b]efore a person can be convicted of [a violation of section 148, subdivision (a)] there must be proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the officer was acting lawfully at the time the offense against him was committed.'" (In re Chase C. (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 107, 114, quoting In re Joseph F. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 975, 982.)
This rule applies to arrests and detentions. (See In re Chase C., supra, 243 Cal.App.4th at p. 114; see Nuno v. County of San Bernardino (C.D.Cal. 1999) 58 F.Supp.2d 1127, 1134 ["Under California law, an officer is not lawfully performing her duties when she detains an individual without reasonable suspicion .."].)
A detention occurs "when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen." (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16.) A person is detained "if 'in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave,'" or if" 'a reasonable person would [not] feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.'" (Brendlin v. California (2007) 551 U.S. 249, 254-255.)
Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a peace officer may detain somebody, that is," 'conduct a brief, investigatory stop,'" only" 'when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.'" (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 241, quoting Illinois v. Wardlow (2000) 528 U.S. 119, 123-124.)
" 'While "reasonable suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause .., the Fourth Amendment requires at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop.'" (People v. Huggins, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 241.) Reasonable suspicion requires a showing of specific, articulable facts that would cause a reasonable officer in a like position, drawing on the officer's training and experience, to believe a violation has occurred or is about to occur. (In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 893.) Reasonable suspicion is" 'something more than an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 'hunch,'" '" but something less than the fair probability required for probable cause. (People v. Bennett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 373, 387.) The courts look at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was a particularized and objective basis for the officer's suspicion. (People v. Butler (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 150, 160.)
Section 647, subdivision (f) makes it a misdemeanor where the defendant "is (1) intoxicated (2) in a public place and either (3) is unable to exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others or (4) interferes with or obstructs or prevents the free use of any street, sidewalk or public way." (People v. Lively (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1368-1369; § 647, subd. (f).)
Intoxication itself is insufficient. "The public intoxication statute, ... section 647, subdivision (f), is carefully crafted to impose criminal culpability only if the publicly intoxicated person is unable to exercise care for his or her own safety or the safety of others, or is obstructing a public way." (People v. Kellogg (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 593, 596.) Thus, the offense "does not punish a person for being intoxicated." (In re Spinks (1967) 253 Cal.App.2d 748, 751.) Rather, the offense punishes a person who "appears in a public place while intoxicated to the extent he is unable to exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others." (Id. at p. 752.) "[T]he totality of the circumstances must be considered in determining whether the intoxicated person can exercise care for his or her own safety or the safety of others. An inebriated person behind the wheel of a car or power boat or plane or train poses a greater danger to himself or herself and others than the same person lying on a park bench." (People v. Lively, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1372-1373.) However, in order for a court to find defendant was unable to care for his own safety or the safety of others, there must be explicit facts in the record. (Id. at p. 1369.)
Section 647, subdivision (f) also does not prohibit intoxication in private places exposed to public view. (People v. White (1991) 227 Cal.App.3d 886, 891 [Defendant's front yard surrounded by a three and one-half foot high fence with a closed gate could not be characterized as a "public place"]; In re Koehne (1963) 59 Cal.2d 646, 649.)
B. Analysis
Here, the evidence on the record is insufficient under the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution to support the juvenile court's true finding that minor resisted, obstructed or delayed a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)). Based on the record before us, there is insufficient evidence that Williams had reasonable suspicion supported by specific, articulable facts that minor was publicly intoxicated to justify minor's detention.
Thus, there is insufficient evidence that Williams was engaged in the lawful performance of his duties when he detained minor.
The People argue that minor's detention was lawful as part of the lawful investigation into the report of the" 'drunk' and 'out of control' juvenile" at the residence.
We agree that the initial investigation of the matter was lawful, as Williams and Vargas were dispatched to investigate a report of a "drunk and out of control juvenile" at the residence. However, this does not automatically make Williams's detention of minor lawful.
Here, Williams failed to testify to specific, articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion that minor was the juvenile suspected of public intoxication or otherwise involved in criminal activity to support his detention of minor. Williams stated he was dispatched to a residence in response to a report of a "drunk and out of control juvenile," and when he arrived, he saw two females exiting the residence. He stated that he asked them if minor, sitting in a vehicle in the driveway, was "the juvenile [they] were looking for," and they said he was, so he told minor to exit the vehicle. Williams testified that when minor refused his order, he then attempted to pull him out of the vehicle. Minor grabbed Williams's hands, but Williams testified that he was "finally able to detain him." Williams did not elaborate further about why he believed minor was the "drunk and out of control juvenile." He did not give any testimony about minor's conduct or actions prior to him attempting to pull minor out of the vehicle.
In People v. Rich (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 115, the court addressed the sufficiency of evidence for reasonable suspicion of public intoxication. There, a police officer observed the defendant standing inside a small market. The officer testified that the defendant swayed, with his "head hung low" and his eye-lids "at half-mast." He stated that the defendant spoke and moved very slowly and deliberately, and that his pupils were constricted. (Id. at pp. 117-118.) Based on the officer's observations, the defendant was arrested for public intoxication. Despite the officer's testimony about the defendant's physical condition, the reviewing court held the police lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant for violating section 647, subdivision (f), stating, "There was no evidence that defendant was guilty of [public intoxication]. [The officer] described no conduct of defendant nor gave any opinion to the effect that defendant was 'in such a condition that he [was] unable to exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others' [citation] .... The described symptoms indicated only that defendant was under the influence of an opiate, not that he was incapacitated as a result." (Id. at p. 122, italics added.)
Here, there is even more of an evidentiary void than in Rich. Williams did not testify to any specific, articulable facts to support reasonable suspicion that minor was publicly intoxicated. He gave no physical description of minor that would lead a reasonable person to suspect he was intoxicated, nor did he testify to any opinion that minor was in such a state that he was unable to exercise care for his own safety or the safety of others.
In contrast, the court in In re William G. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 210 found substantial evidence supported the minor's public intoxication adjudication where a police officer testified the minor exhibited slurred speech, bloodshot eyes, a strong odor of alcohol, and was" 'very unsteady on his feet.'" (Id. at p. 214.)
Per Williams's testimony, the only evidence that anyone was publicly intoxicated at the residence was the report of a "drunk and out of control juvenile" for which the officers were dispatched. However, the report alone does not justify reasonable suspicion that minor was the suspect. "The 'reasonable suspicion' necessary to justify ... a stop is 'dependent upon both the content of the information possessed by police and its degree of reliability.'" (Navarette v. California (2014) 572 U.S. 393, 395, 397 [911 caller's tip that she had been run off the highway was sufficiently reliable where the caller identified the make and model of the vehicle, recited the license plate number, made a contemporaneous report, and used the 911 emergency system].) An officer may arrest or detain a suspect based on information received through official channels. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) However, where officers rely on a citizen's tip, that tip must be" 'reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person.'" (People v. Dolly (2007) 40 Cal.4th 458, 462, 471 [Anonymous tip by 911 caller that "light-skinned African-American male had 'just pulled a gun' on him and had mentioned a gang name" was sufficiently reliable because the caller provided key details about the perpetrator that could be corroborated by police].) "[A] tip's reliability depends upon an assessment of 'the totality of the circumstances in a given case.'" (Id. at p. 464.) Both quantity and quality matter: "if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable." (Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330.) In Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266, the court found there was no reasonable suspicion to detain and frisk a minor where police received an anonymous telephone tip claiming a young Black male in a plaid shirt standing at a bus stop was carrying a firearm, where the tipster did not explain how he knew this information or suggest any particular familiarity with the suspect, and the tip itself included no predictions of future behavior that could be corroborated to assess his credibility. (Id. at pp. 271-272.) Here, we conclude contents of the report, as testified about by Williams, were too vague on their own to justify reasonable suspicion because the record does not show that the report included any specifics identifying minor as the reported "drunk and out of control juvenile" at the residence.
Here, Williams did not state any specific, articulable facts as to why he believed minor was the publicly intoxicated juvenile in the report when he saw him sitting in the vehicle in the driveway. Williams testified that the only indication that minor was the juvenile specified in the report was that the two females answered "yes" when he asked them as they exited the residence whether minor was the "juvenile [they] were looking for." He did not elaborate further about their conversation, and there is no evidence on the record that Williams specified to the females why he was looking for a juvenile or that they knew the contents of the tip which Williams was investigating. Further, Williams testified that minor's only actions prior to his detention were sitting in a vehicle parked in the driveway of private residence when Williams and Vargas arrived and refusing to get out when Williams told him to. He did not testify to any details that would lead a reasonable person to believe minor was intoxicated or unable to care for himself or the safety of others.
Further, minor's refusal to comply with Williams's order to exit the vehicle does not support reasonable suspicion for Williams's detention of minor. Because the record does not support Williams's reasonable suspicion that minor was engaged in any unlawful activity by sitting in the vehicle in the driveway before Williams told him to get out of the vehicle, Williams had no legal authority to demand that minor exit the vehicle. Thus, failing to comply with the officer's request was not a lawful basis to detain minor.
Looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether there was a particularized and objective basis for Williams's suspicion, we conclude that a reasonable officer in a like position as Williams, drawing on the officer's training and experience, would not have reasonable suspicion to believe a violation had occurred or was about to occur. (See People v. Butler, supra, 111 Cal.App.4th at p. 160; see also In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 893.) Based on the record before us, there is no substantial evidence that Williams observed any behavior that demonstrated minor was intoxicated. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to support any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying Williams's detention of minor and, accordingly, Williams was not engaged in lawful duties when he detained him.
The People also argue that the detention was lawful pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code sections 625 and 602 because minor was a juvenile. However, minor's status as a juvenile does not change our conclusion.
"As a threshold matter, we recognize that while we apply the same standard of review, in general warrantless arrests of juveniles are not viewed in the same light as similar adult detentions." (In re R. W. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 145, 148-149.) Juvenile proceedings are "fundamentally different" from adult criminal proceedings because "[t]he [s]tate has 'a parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child.'" (Alfredo A. v. Superior Court (1994) 6 Cal.4th 1212, 1225.) Indeed,"' "juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody." '" (Id. at p. 1228.)
In the juvenile criminal justice system, warrantless detentions are governed by statute. Welfare and Institutions Code section 625 provides that "[a] peace officer may, without a warrant, take into temporary custody a minor: [¶] (a) Who is under the age of 18 years when such officer has reasonable cause for believing that such minor is a person described in [Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection ... 602 ...." (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 625, subd. (a).) Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 states, in pertinent part, that: "any minor who is between 12 years of age and 17 years of age, inclusive, when he or she violates any law of this state or of the United States or any ordinance of any city or county of this state defining crime other than an ordinance establishing a curfew based solely on age, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which my adjudge the minor to be a ward of the court." (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a).)" '[T]here is probable cause to arrest [a minor] when the facts known to the arresting officer would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that an individual is guilty of a crime. [Citation.] The standard of probable cause to arrest is the probability of criminal activity, not a prima facie showing. [Citation.]'" (In re Charles C. (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 420, 423, citing People v. Lewis (1980) 109 Cal.App.3d 599, 608.) Here, as discussed above, based on the record before us, there is insufficient evidence that "the facts known to [Williams] would lead a person of ordinary care and prudence to believe and conscientiously entertain an honest and strong suspicion that" minor was guilty of a crime. (Charles C., at p. 423.) Because the record does not show Williams had reasonable cause to believe minor violated a law, Williams was not permitted under Welfare and Institutions Code section 625 to take minor into temporary custody despite minor's status as a juvenile.
Accordingly, we conclude that Williams was not engaged in the performance of lawful duties because he did not have reasonable suspicion to detain minor supported by specific, articulable facts that minor was publicly intoxicated or otherwise engaged in criminal behavior. Thus, there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's true finding in count 2 that minor violated section 148, subdivision (a).
II. SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE FOR COUNT 1 (§ 69)
Minor contends he was deprived of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution because there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's true finding that minor committed a felony violation of section 69 (count 1) because there is not substantial evidence that the officers were engaged in the lawful performance of their duties when they detained him. The People disagree. We agree with minor.
A. Law
As discussed above," '[w]hen considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence-that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] We determine 'whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' [Citation.] In so doing, a reviewing court 'presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.'" (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 715.)
Section 69, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part, "[e]very person who attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent an executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon the officer by law," may be punished. (§ 69, subd. (a).)
A defendant can only be convicted of an offense against a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties if the officer was acting lawfully when the offense was committed. (People v. Brown (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 140, 150.)
B. Analysis
As discussed above, Williams was not engaged in the performance of lawful duties when he detained minor because the record does not show Williams had reasonable suspicion supported by specific, articulable facts that minor was engaged in illegal behavior. As the officers were not engaged in the performance of lawful duties when minor was detained, there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court's true finding that minor committed felony resisting an officer by threat (§ 69, subd. (a); count 1) when he was handcuffed in the back of the patrol car and asked for his handcuffs to be removed so he could "f[***] up" Vargas.
Again, the People argue that the officers were engaged in the performance of lawful duties because they had probable cause to investigate minor for public intoxication after he refused to comply with their investigation based on the report of a "drunk and out of control juvenile." However, as discussed above, while the officers' investigation of the report of a "drunk and out of control juvenile" was lawful, the record does not show minor's detention was lawful because Williams did not testify to specific, articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion that minor was the juvenile identified in the report. Accordingly, because the officers were not engaged in the performance of lawful duties when minor said he wanted off to "f[***] up" Vargas while handcuffed in the back of their closed patrol car, there is insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that minor violated section 69.
Further, as discussed above, minor's status as a juvenile again does not change our conclusion. While Welfare and Institutions Code section 625 permits an officer to take a minor into temporary custody if the officer has reasonable cause for believing the minor has violated a law, the record does not support reasonable cause for the officers to believe minor had violated a law. According to Williams's testimony, the report the officers were dispatched to investigate only identified a juvenile at the residence as "drunk and out of control," and the question Williams posed to the females exiting the residence, asking whether minor "was the juvenile they were looking for," was similarly vague. Thus, the record does not show that the officers had the reasonable suspicion necessary to lawfully detain minor pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 625.
As there is insufficient evidence that the officers were engaged in the performance of a lawful duty when they detained minor, there is not substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's true finding on count 1 that minor committed felony resisting a peace officer by threat (§ 69).
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and disposition order are reversed.
[*] Before Hill, P. J., Detjen, J. and Snauffer, J.