Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. TA089188, Gary R. Hahn, Judge.
Nancy L. Tetreault, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Susan D. Martynec and Lance E. Winters, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
JACKSON, J.
INTRODUCTION
Defendant William Blumberg appeals from a judgment of conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of continuous sexual abuse of a child (Pen. Code, § 288.5, subd. (a)), two counts of lewd acts with a child under age 14 (id., § 288, subd. (a)), and two counts of lewd acts with a child aged 14 or 15 (id., § 288, subd. (c)(1)). The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for a term of 21 years and 4 months.
On appeal, defendant claims instructional and evidentiary error and challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support one of his convictions. We affirm.
FACTS
A. Background
Defendant married Wife 1, a woman with two daughters, Stepdaughter 1 and Stepdaughter 2. Defendant and Wife 1 had one daughter of their own, Daughter 1. The marriage was dissolved in 1986 or 1987.
Defendant then married Wife 2, who had a son, Stepson 1. Wife 2 was pregnant by another man at the time. She had a son, Stepson 2, whom she and defendant raised as their own. Defendant and Wife 2 also had three daughters of their own, Daughter 2, Daughter 3, and Daughter 4. Wife 2 also had two nieces, Niece 1 and Niece 2, who lived with her and defendant from time to time.
In 2002, Wife 2 was convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced to prison. Defendant took responsibility for the children in her absence. They moved to House 1 in Paramount.
B. Count 1: Continuous Sexual Abuse of Daughter 3
Daughter 3 was born in 1992. In 2002, shortly after the move to House 1, Daughter 3 was going to sleep in the living room, when defendant began rubbing her shoulders and back, over her clothes. The way he rubbed her made her feel uncomfortable.
Daughter 1 lived with defendant and her half-sisters in House 1 for a period of time. She observed that defendant shared a bedroom with Daughters 2, 3 and 4, even though he could have shared a bedroom with their half-brother, Stepson 2.
Defendant later moved his family to his sister’s house in Cerritos. On two occasions while they were living there, Daughter 3 was lying in bed while defendant was sitting nearby, using the computer. He reached over and grabbed her buttocks.
The family then moved back to House 2 in Paramount. On a number of occasions while they were living there, defendant touched Daughter 3’s breasts, buttocks and vagina. She recalled one occasion in which defendant rubbed her breasts under her bathing suit after the family returned from a trip to San Diego. On another occasion, defendant was rubbing her shoulders, vagina and buttocks, and Daughter 3 told him to stop. Defendant told her she was “just being stupid” and he continued rubbing her. Daughter 3 did not tell anyone about this, because she was afraid of what they would think and afraid of defendant.
During the last week of December 2006, Daughter 3 told her boyfriend about the molestation. He told her to tell someone, but she did not want to because of the holidays, and because she thought defendant would stop touching her in the new year.
C. Count 2: Lewd Acts with Daughter 3
During the week of January 22, 2007, defendant touched Daughter 3 all over, over her clothing. When defendant and Daughter 3 were sitting on the couch in the living room, watching television, defendant rubbed her breasts and vagina.
On February 9, 2007, Daughter 3 was upset and told her boyfriend that defendant was still molesting her. At that time, Stepson 1 and his girlfriend were living with defendant’s family. Daughter 3’s boyfriend called the home and told Stepson 1’s girlfriend about the molestation. She called Daughter 1, who came for Daughter 3 and took her to her own house. Daughter 3 told Daughter 1 what defendant had been doing to her. The following day, Daughter 1 took Daughter 3 to the sheriff’s station, where they reported the molestation.
D. Counts 3 and 4: Lewd Acts with Niece 2
Niece 2 was born in 1992. When Niece 2 was 10 years old, she lived next door to House 1. One night, she, Daughter 3 and Daughter 4 were trying to sleep in the top bunk of her bunk bed in her upstairs bedroom, while Niece 1 was in her own bed across the room. The nieces’ parents were downstairs with defendant, drinking. Defendant came upstairs to the bedroom. He rubbed Daughter 3’s and Daughter 4’s heads. He also rubbed Niece 2’s stomach and arms over her clothes, in a way that made her feel uncomfortable.
Another time when she was still 10 years old, Niece 2 was at defendant’s house, sleeping in the girls’ bedroom. She was awakened by defendant rubbing her vagina over her clothes. She was scared, but she did not tell anyone what defendant had done because she was afraid of what people would think about her.
In mid-2003, when Niece 2 was 11 years old, she spent the night at defendant’s house. She was sleeping alone in the top bunk in the girls’ bedroom, when she was awakened by defendant rubbing her leg under her pajamas. She kicked at him and rolled close to the edge of the bed, against the wall. He reached over and rubbed her vagina over her clothing.
Niece 2 did not tell anyone about what defendant had done until she was in the ninth grade. She first told Niece 1 that defendant had rubbed her arm and stomach. Then in November 2006, she told a friend when the two were at school.
E. Count 5: Lewd Acts with Niece 1
Niece 1 was born in 1989. When she was 14 or 15 years old, defendant took her, Daughters 2, 3 and 4, and Stepson 2 to defendant’s brother’s house to swim in his pool. That evening, they were on the couch in the living room watching a movie. The younger children had fallen asleep. Defendant put his hand on Niece 1’s knee and then began rubbing her inner thigh. Niece 1 felt uncomfortable but did not know what to say. Defendant took his hand away when he heard his brother coming. Niece 1 did not tell anyone about the incident until after Daughter 3 reported defendant’s molestation to the police.
F. Investigation of the Children’s Claims
Los Angeles County Deputy Sheriff Michael Abbot spoke to Daughter 3 on February 10, 2007. She told him about the numerous instances of molestation occurring since 2002, the year in which her mother was arrested.
Deputy Sheriff Alfonso Esqueda interviewed Niece 1 and Niece 2 on February 11, 2007. Niece 2 told him about the two times defendant molested her, once at her home and once at defendant’s home. Niece 1 told him about the incident at defendant’s brother’s home.
On February 12, 2007, Sheriff’s Detective Marco Soto interviewed Daughter 3. Her account of the molestation was similar to that she had given to Deputy Abbott.
Detective Soto also interviewed Niece 1 and Niece 2. Their accounts of the molestation by defendant were similar to those they had given to Deputy Esqueda.
G. Uncharged Prior Offenses Against Stepdaughter 1 and Stepdaughter 2
Stepdaughter 1 was born in 1970, and Stepdaughter 2 was born in 1972. They lived with defendant while he was married to their mother.
Sometimes while Stepdaughter 2 was washing dishes, defendant would rub his body against hers. At night, he came into her room and fondled her breasts, vagina and buttocks. Defendant also lay on top of her and rubbed his body against hers.
Defendant touched Stepdaughter 1’s vagina and buttocks under her clothing. He rubbed against her when she was washing dishes; she could feel his “private part” rubbing against her buttocks.
Stepdaughter 2 told her mother about the molestation when she was 12½ years old. She was put in foster care, and the marriage between her mother and defendant was dissolved. Stepdaughter 2 later was placed in defendant’s custody. Stepdaughter 1 never told anyone about the molestation because she did not want to be taken from her mother.
Stepdaughter 2 was placed in foster care due to physical abuse by her mother, not sexual abuse by defendant.
H. Expert Testimony
Dr. Jayme Jones, a clinical psychologist, testified regarding child sexual abuse accommodation syndrome. According to Dr. Jones, children who are sexually abused do not immediately reveal the abuse because they are taught to listen to adults, they feel helpless, and most abuse occurs in secrecy. Children instead go along with the abuse or pretend to be asleep to make the abuse more bearable. Thus, the failure to resist or call for help in the presence of others is not inconsistent with abuse. This is especially true when the abuse occurs within the family. Often, children do not reveal the occurrence of abuse until adolescence when they become bigger and more independent.
I. Defense
Defendant testified in his own behalf. According to defendant, his first child, Daughter 1, was born in 1980. He married her mother, Wife 1, in 1982. Their marriage was dissolved in 1986 or 1987. The dissolution was “nasty,” and it eventually involved allegations of sexual abuse by Wife 1’s daughters, Stepdaughter 1 and Stepdaughter 2. The police concluded that the allegations were unfounded. Defendant denied touching his stepdaughters inappropriately and noted that they visited him at his home after the dissolution.
Daughter 1 lived mainly with Wife 1 after the dissolution. When Daughter 1 was 15, she got pregnant. Wife 1 kicked her out, and she went to live with defendant, who obtained full custody of her.
Defendant married Wife 2 in 1995. He raised her sons, Stepson 1 and Stepson 2, as his own. He and Wife 2 had three daughters, Daughters 2, 3 and 4. After Wife 2 was sent to prison in 2002, he acted as the sole parent for all five children.
The family moved to Paramount after Wife 2 was arrested. In May 2003, they moved to House 1. They moved to defendant’s sister’s house in Cerritos in December 2004 and stayed there about four months. In May 2005, they moved to House 2 in Paramount.
Defendant never touched Daughter 3 inappropriately. He could not have touched her in the manner that she claimed while they were living at his sister’s house. There were no computers in the rooms in which he and the girls slept. The only computer in the house belonged to his sister’s husband, who kept it in his room and did not allow anyone else to use it.
When they moved to House 2, the girls began exhibiting behavioral problems. They snuck out of the house, visited inappropriate computer websites, and talked on the cell phone late at night. He also was concerned because Daughter 3 had a webpage on MySpace that misrepresented her age as 16 and included a provocative picture of her. Defendant forbade the girls from having boyfriends and told them to concentrate on their school work. Defendant believed that Daughter 3 made false accusations of sexual misconduct because she disliked the rules he set for her. Defendant also denied sexually abusing Niece 1 or Niece 2.
According to defendant’s sister Ruth, when defendant and the children stayed with her in Cerritos, defendant and Stepson 2 shared one bedroom, and the three girls shared another bedroom. The only computer in the house belonged to her husband; he kept it in his bedroom and did not allow anyone else to use it.
Ruth never saw defendant touch the children inappropriately or discipline them too harshly. It seemed to her that the children stuck “like glue” to defendant; they stayed by his side when he was at home and called him on the telephone when he was at work.
Defendant’s cousin, Alfred, never saw defendant touch the girls inappropriately or heard the girls talk about defendant touching them inappropriately. He thought defendant was a good parent but not good at disciplining his children.
Ernestina Camacho, a family friend, observed defendant at various family functions and described him as an attentive and patient parent. She never saw him touch the girls inappropriately.
Jamie Rivera was defendant’s friend and coworker. He observed a loving relationship between defendant and his children. He knew of the allegations against defendant but nonetheless would have no hesitation about leaving his young daughter in defendant’s care.
Tony Campos, who rented office space to defendant, observed that defendant had a loving relationship with his girls. He never saw defendant touch them inappropriately.
Jorge Rivera, a long-time friend of defendant, had worked as a social worker and had trained parents to work with children with behavioral problems. He never saw defendant behave inappropriately toward his children and believed defendant had a healthy relationship with them.
J. Rebuttal
The MySpace webpage to which defendant referred was one Daughter 2 had created for Daughter 3. Daughter 3 did not list her age as 16 and did not take or post the provocative photograph of herself. Someone had hacked into the webpage, so Daughter 3 no longer used it. Daughter 3 had another MySpace webpage which she had created. It listed her age as 14.
Daughter 3 stated that she loved defendant, as long as he was not touching her. She also denied that defendant had started being stricter with her and her sisters with respect to their computer and cell phone use.
Detective Soto interviewed defendant. Regarding the incident with Niece 1, defendant said that he took the girls to his brother Aaron’s house. The children watched television in one room, while the adults talked in another. According to defendant, Niece 1 and Niece 2 were “troubled children and bad kids.”
According to Ruth, the only brother named Aaron that she had was George Aaron, who lived in Florida. She had a nephew named Aaron, who lived nearby.
DISCUSSION
A. Failure to Instruct on a Lesser Included Offense
Defendant was charged in count 1 with the continuous sexual abuse of Daughter 3, in violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a). This section provides that “[a]ny person who either resides in the same home with the minor child or has recurring access to the child, who over a period of time, not less than three months in duration, engages in three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense... or three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct, as defined in Section 288, with a child under the age of 14 years at the time of the commission of the offense is guilty of the offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child....”
The trial court instructed the jury as to continuous sexual abuse of a child based on “three or more acts of lewd or lascivious conduct.” The instruction did not refer to “three or more acts of substantial sexual conduct.”
Defendant contends that, under the circumstances, the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on lewd and lascivious conduct in violation of Penal Code section 288 as a lesser included offense. He acknowledges that lewd and lascivious acts is not ordinarily a lesser included offense of continuous sexual abuse, in that a conviction of continuous sexual abuse may be based on substantial sexual conduct which does not necessarily consist of lewd and lascivious acts. (People v. Avina (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1313-1314.) He claims that here, since the jury was instructed as to continuous sexual abuse based on lewd and lascivious acts only, lewd and lascivious conduct was a lesser included offense.
It is well established that the trial court has a duty to “instruct on lesser offenses necessarily included in the charged offense if there is substantial evidence the defendant is guilty only of the lesser. [Citation.] On the other hand, if there is no proof, other than an unexplainable rejection of the prosecution’s evidence, that the offense was less than that charged, such instructions shall not be given. [Citation.]” (People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1063-1064.) An offense is a lesser necessarily included offense if the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of the elements of the lesser offense, so that the greater offense cannot be committed without also committing the lesser offense. (People v. Birks (1998) 19 Cal.4th 108, 117; see also People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1230-1231.)
Defendant argues that the jury could have rejected the notion that rubbing Daughter 3’s shoulders and back over her clothes in 2002 constituted a lewd and lascivious act. He further argues that “[i]t is equally likely the jury might have found the purported acts of grabbing [Daughter 3’s] buttocks over her clothes [when the family was living with defendant’s sister in Cerritos] too vague to meet any reasonable standard of proof.” Finally, he suggests that “[t]he ill-defined time span” during which defendant touched Daughter 3’s breasts, buttocks and vagina while they lived in House 2 “cast[s] a doubt as to whether they met the three month time requirement of [Penal Code] section 288.5.”
Assuming arguendo the jury found that rubbing Daughter 3’s back and shoulders was not lewd and lascivious conduct, and it rejected her testimony regarding the incidents in Cerritos, the question is whether there is substantial evidence regarding the incidents occurring in House 2 that they did not constitute continuous sexual abuse of a child, either because there was evidence that they occurred over a time span of less than three months or because there was evidence there were fewer than three acts of lewd and lascivious conduct.
According to defendant, the family moved to House 2 in May 2005. Daughter 3 testified that the touching began about a month after the family moved to House 2. She testified that on numerous occasions, defendant touched her chest, buttocks and vagina. Defendant touched her chest more than five times. Specifically, she recalled a time when they were in the living room, and defendant touched her chest. Once defendant rubbed her breasts under her bathing suit after the family returned from a trip to San Diego.
Daughter 3 also testified that defendant rubbed her on the vagina more than once. She recalled one occasion when defendant was rubbing her shoulders, vagina and buttocks, and she told him to stop. Defendant told her she was “just being stupid” and he continued rubbing her. Daughter 3 testified that defendant did not stop touching her until January 2007.
There is no evidence that the lewd and lascivious acts continued over a period of less than three months. There is no basis, “other than an unexplainable rejection of the prosecution’s evidence” (People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1063), for finding that any fewer than three instances of lewd and lascivious conduct occurred. Daughter 3 testified as to three specific instances, and multiple other instances, of lewd and lascivious conduct. There is no basis for rejecting part of the testimony as to the specific instances and accepting another part. Those three instances alone are sufficient for a conviction. Therefore, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury on lewd and lascivious conduct as a lesser included offense of continuous sexual abuse of a child. (Ibid.)
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct With Niece 1
Defendant contends the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction on count 5 of lewd and lascivious acts with Niece 1. Specifically, he contends her testimony was too vague as to the details surrounding the commission of the acts to sustain the conviction.
Niece 1 testified that when she was 14 or 15 years old, defendant took her, Daughters 2, 3 and 4, and Stepson 2 to defendant’s brother’s house to swim in his pool. That evening, they were on the couch in the living room watching a movie. The younger children had fallen asleep. Defendant put his hand on Niece 1’s knee and then began rubbing her inner thigh. Niece 1 felt uncomfortable but did not know what to say. Defendant took his hand away when he heard his brother coming. Niece 1 did not tell anyone about the incident until after Daughter 3 reported defendant’s molestation to the police.
Niece 1 was not sure at which brother’s house the lewd acts occurred; she thought the brother was Eric. She could not remember in what city or on what street the house was located. All she could remember was that the house was far from her home.
Niece 1 could not remember when the incident occurred—what month or year. She could not remember where defendant was living at that time. All she remembered about the time frame was that she was 14 or 15.
As a general rule, “[t]o assess the evidence’s sufficiency, we review the whole record to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime or special circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] The record must disclose substantial evidence to support the verdict—i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] In applying this test, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the jury could reasonably have deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] ‘Conflicts and even testimony [that] is subject to justifiable suspicion do not justify the reversal of a judgment, for it is the exclusive province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a witness and the truth or falsity of the facts upon which a determination depends. [Citation.] We resolve neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts; we look for substantial evidence. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] A reversal for insufficient evidence ‘is unwarranted unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support”’ the jury’s verdict. [Citation.]” (People v. Zamudio (2008) 43 Cal.4th 327, 357.)
As noted in People v. Jones (1990) 51 Cal.3d 294, “[c]hild molestation cases frequently involve difficult, even paradoxical, proof problems.” (Id. at p. 305.) Young victims may not be able to testify with specificity as to incidents of molestation. (See ibid.) However, “the defendant has a due process right to fair notice of the charges against him and reasonable opportunity to defend against those charges.” (Ibid.)
In order to ensure that evidence is sufficient to support a conviction and that the defendant is afforded due process of law, the child “must describe the kind of act or acts committed with sufficient specificity” to establish that the charged crime was committed. (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 316, italics omitted.) In addition, the child “must be able to describe the general time period in which these acts occurred (e.g., ‘the summer before my fourth grade,’ or ‘during each Sunday morning after he came to live with us’), to assure the acts were committed within the applicable limitation period. Additional details regarding the time, place or circumstance of the various assaults may assist in assessing the credibility or substantiality of the victim’s testimony, but are not essential to sustain a conviction.” (Ibid., italics omitted.)
A “defendant has no right to notice of the specific time or place of an offense, so long as it occurred within the applicable limitation period. ‘Beyond that,... the prosecution clearly has no duty to provide more explicit notice than human nature and science permit.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 317.) Additionally, the child’s inability to “recall or relate specific dates, locations or other details of the offenses [does not] inevitably preclude a defense.” (Id. at p. 319.)
Here, Niece 1 was able to describe the acts committed and the general time period in which they occurred—when she was 14 or 15. While she could not recall the specific date on which they occurred or the specific location of the house at which they occurred, she was able to give enough details surrounding the offense to enable defendant to provide a defense. She testified as to location—the upstairs living room at defendant’s brother’s house. She testified as to who was present—defendant had taken her, Daughters 2, 3 and 4, and Stepson 2 to the house. She testified as to the circumstances surrounding the offense—it was the evening after defendant had taken the children to swim, the children were upstairs watching a movie, and the adults were downstairs.
We conclude the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s conviction of lewd and lascivious acts with Niece 1. It also was sufficient to protect defendant’s due process rights to notice and to present a defense.
C. Evidence of Prior Acts of Sexual Abuse
Evidence of defendant’s uncharged sexual abuse of Stepdaughter 1 and Stepdaughter 2 was admitted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1108. This section provides that “[i]n a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of a sexual offense, evidence of the defendant’s commission of another sexual offense or offenses is not made inadmissible by Section 1101, if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.” (Evid. Code, § 1108, subd. (a).)
Evidence Code section 1101, subdivision (a), prohibits, with specified exceptions, admission of “evidence of a person’s character or a trait of his or her character (whether in the form of an opinion, evidence of reputation, or evidence of specific instances of his or her conduct)... when offered to prove his or her conduct on a specified occasion.” Evidence Code section 352 provides the trial court with the discretion to exclude evidence if the probability of undue prejudice resulting from its admission substantially outweighs its probative value.
Defendant first contends that Evidence Code section 1108 violates the due process and equal protection clauses. He acknowledges, however, that the California Supreme Court has upheld the section as constitutional (People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 916-918; see People v. Waples (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1389, 1394-1395), and we are bound by its decision (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455).
Defendant next contends that even if Evidence Code section 1108 is constitutional, the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of defendant’s uncharged prior acts of sexual abuse against Stepdaughter 1 and Stepdaughter 2, in that it should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352. Specifically, defendant contends the evidence of the uncharged sexual abuse should have been excluded because it was speculative and unreliable, and because it was too remote to be of probative value.
Evidence Code section 352 gives the trial court the discretion to “exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” We will not disturb the trial court’s exercise of its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 unless the court has abused its discretion (People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1070), i.e., if its decision exceeds the bounds of reason (People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1226).
In support of his contention that the uncharged sexual abuse evidence was speculative and unreliable, defendant cites his testimony that the allegations of sexual abuse by Stepdaughter 1 and Stepdaughter 2 were “unfounded,” he was never arrested for the abuse and no case was filed against him. At the time the trial court was considering admission of the evidence, however, defendant made no offer of proof that the allegations were examined by the police and determined to be unfounded. The prosecutor noted that Stepdaughter 2’s “molestation was reported to authorities.” He indicated that defendant “was not convicted because the victim was afraid to testify and [the authorities] didn’t pursue the case at the time, but it was promptly reported to authorities back in 1986.” When Stepdaughter 1 later testified, she stated that she never told anyone at the time that defendant had molested her.
At the time the trial court considered the admission of the uncharged sexual abuse evidence, there was nothing before it to suggest that the evidence was speculative and unreliable because Stepdaughter 1’s and Stepdaughter 2’s claims of molestation had been rejected by the authorities. We thus cannot find an abuse of discretion in failing to exclude it on that basis. (Cf. People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 574.)
Defendant’s objection to the admission of the evidence was not based on the remoteness in time of the uncharged sexual abuse. However, “‘[n]o specific time limits have been established for determining when an uncharged offense is so remote as to be inadmissible. [Citation.]’” (People v. Pierce (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 893, 900.) Sexual offenses occurring as long as 23 and 30 years prior to the charged offenses have been held not to be “too old to show propensity” and thus inadmissible. (Ibid.) Moreover, substantial similarity between the prior uncharged offenses and the charged offenses “‘balance[s] out the remoteness of the prior offenses. [Citation.]’” (Ibid.; People v. Waples, supra, 79 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395.) We thus cannot say that the uncharged sexual abuse here, which occurred some 16 to 20 years prior to the charged offenses, was so remote in time as to render the trial court’s decision to admit them an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: PERLUSS, P. J. WOODS, J.