Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC892797
McAdams, J.
Defendant Joyce Lynn Blevins entered a no-contest plea to a charge of receiving stolen property. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to suppress evidence discovered in a warrantless search of her vehicle. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
The events that gave rise to this proceeding took place on January 11, 2008, when a police search of defendant’s vehicle disclosed drug paraphernalia and stolen checks.
Procedural History
In January 2008, a two-count felony complaint was filed in Santa Clara County against defendant and her co-defendant, Jesse Jose Ortega. The complaint charged defendant and Ortega with possession of stolen property and possession of drug paraphernalia. (Pen. Code, § 496, subd. (a); Health & Saf. Code, § 11364.) Following a preliminary examination, both defendant and Ortega were held to answer the charges. An information was then filed containing the same two charges. In February 2008, defendant pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In May 2008, defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence seized from her vehicle. (§ 1538.5.) The court conducted a hearing on the suppression motion the following month. Both sides submitted written argument prior to the hearing. After hearing evidence and oral arguments, the court denied the motion.
The court refused to permit defense counsel to file a supplemental memorandum on the day of the hearing. That memorandum was later filed at defendant’s change of plea hearing in July 2008.
At a hearing in July 2008, defendant entered a no-contest plea to count 1, possession of stolen property; count 2 was dismissed. At the same hearing, all charges against Ortega were dismissed.
At the sentencing hearing held in September 2008, defendant was placed on formal probation for three years and given a nine-month county jail sentence to be served at House on the Hill.
Evidence Presented at the Suppression Hearing
At the hearing on the suppression motion, held June 20, 2008, the court received testimonial and documentary evidence concerning the circumstances of the challenged vehicle search. Three witnesses testified: San Jose Police Officers Timothy Ramos and Leonard Lao, and defendant.
Testimony by Officer Ramos
On January 11, 2008, Officer Ramos was dispatched to the Hawaiian Mobile Home Park, located on Snell Avenue in San Jose. He was responding to a complaint by the park manager of a “suspicious vehicle” parked on the property with “people inside that were possibly naked and doing drugs.” The vehicle “was possibly a minivan with a car cover over it.” It was in “a parking spot in front of space 196.”
When he arrived at the specified location, Ramos found a vehicle with a cover that appeared to match the description in the dispatch. Under the cover, Ramos noticed, the passenger door was about halfway open and a pair of legs was visible, indicating that a person was “standing between the door and the inside of the car underneath the car cover.”
Ramos lifted the car cover before identifying himself as a police officer. He did so as a matter of officer safety, because he “didn’t know what was going on inside that car.” Upon lifting the car cover, Ramos saw Ortega standing outside of the passenger door “shuffling through some stuff on the backseat.” Ramos also saw defendant lying down “in the back.” Ramos “didn’t know who had control, which person.” The interior of the vehicle “was very untidy, like people were staying in there, living in there.” Defendant and Ortega were both clothed, and Ramos saw no evidence that either had been using drugs.
For “officer safety reasons again,” Ramos ordered defendant and Ortega out of the vehicle; they complied. While Ramos was obtaining identifying information from the two, Officer Lao arrived. Using the information from defendant and Ortega, Ramos “ran their names through dispatch.” The “returns” from dispatch indicated that Ortega “was on probation, and it was searchable probation.” After again lifting the cover to check the license plate, Ramos also “ran” the vehicle’s license. The vehicle was registered to defendant, but the registration was expired.
Ramos searched Ortega, finding nothing “in his possession.” Ramos then “searched the car in the immediate area where” Ortega had been standing. In a pouch or map pocket attached to the back of the front passenger seat, Ramos discovered a glass pipe, which he recognized as the type used for smoking controlled substances. It had “residue in it,” but no heat or smell.
Ramos then searched the rest of the vehicle. There were “many bags in the car.” In one of them, Ramos found a checkbook and several pieces of identification, including a driver’s license, social security card, and registration card, all belonging to a third party. The checkbook had carbon copies of several checks made out to defendant. Ramos contacted the bank and learned that the checks had been reported lost or stolen.
Testimony by Officer Lao
While Ramos searched the vehicle, Officer Lao stayed with defendant and Ortega.
Lao spoke with Ortega, who confirmed that he was on probation. Ortega also told Lao that he was in “a dating relationship” with defendant and that he had been “moving things into the car.”
Lao also spoke with defendant, who told him that the vehicle “was her car” and that she had remained at the mobile home park “for four days” because “she did not have any gas for it.” Lao did not recall defendant voicing any objection to the search.
During the search, Ramos told Lao about finding the checkbook. Ramos “may have” indicated which specific bag contained the checkbook, but Lao “did not pay attention to the bag” and could not recall which bag it was.
Testimony by Defendant
Defendant testified that she asked Lao why Ramos was searching her vehicle. Defendant told Lao that she “wasn’t on probation,” and that she “didn’t consent to him searching the vehicle.”
Documentary Evidence
The court received in evidence two minute orders showing that Ortega was on probation and subject to a search condition. The court also admitted 13 photographs of the vehicle and its contents, taken by Lao on the day of the search.
Trial Court’s Ruling
After hearing brief oral arguments from both sides, the court ruled from the bench.
The court was “not persuaded by the People’s probable cause argument.” Nevertheless, the court determined “that the search was appropriate based upon the probation search conditions that were in effect with respect to the co-defendant, Mr. Ortega.” The court upheld the seizure of the checkbook and other documents, making a “finding that the bags in question were sufficiently gender neutral.”
Based on these determinations, the court denied defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence discovered in the search of her vehicle.
Appeal
Following sentencing in September 2008, defendant filed this timely appeal.
Defendant contends: (1) the dispatch call did not provide a legal basis for a detention, let alone a search; (2) in lifting the cover, the police engaged in an impermissible search of the vehicle; and (3) the search of the vehicle’s interior cannot be justified as a probation search.
Representing respondent, the Attorney General argues: (1) the detention was lawful based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity; (2) contrary to the trial court’s determination, there was probable cause to search the vehicle; and (3) the search of the vehicle was a valid probation search.
DISCUSSION
“The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is well established. We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, express or implied, where supported by substantial evidence. In determining whether, on the facts so found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, we exercise our independent judgment.” (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362; accord, People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 465.) In assessing the reasonableness of searches and seizures, we apply federal constitutional standards. (People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1156, fn. 8.) At the trial court, the “prosecution has the burden of establishing the reasonableness of a warrantless search.” (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 972.) On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating error. (Schnabel v. Superior Court (1993) 5 Cal.4th 704, 718.) We will affirm the trial court’s ruling if it is correct on any applicable theory of law. (People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976.)
With those principles of appellate review in mind, we consider the specific contentions raised here. We proceed chronologically through defendant’s claims. As to each, we first summarize and then apply the governing legal principles.
I. Response to the Dispatch Call
Defendant first challenges the officer’s response to the dispatch call, asserting that the call did not provide the reasonable suspicion needed for a detention, much less the probable cause needed for a search. Respondent disagrees, arguing that there was both reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and probable cause to search the vehicle.
A. Legal Principles
“The Fourth Amendment protects an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy against unreasonable intrusion on the part of the government.” (People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 971.) Both searches and detentions implicate the Fourth Amendment. (Terry v. Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 16; In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 895.)
1. Probable Cause Required for Search
To justify a search, the officer must have probable cause, which means “ ‘a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found,’ [citation]....” (Alabama v. White (1990) 496 U.S. 325, 330.) Probable cause to search thus exists “where the known facts and circumstances are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable prudence in the belief that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found....” (Ornelas v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 690, 696.)
With respect to vehicles, “the police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause.” (California v. Acevedo (1991) 500 U.S. 565, 579.) “If there is probable cause to believe a vehicle contains evidence of criminal activity, United States v. Ross ... authorizes a search of any area of the vehicle in which the evidence might be found.” (Arizona v. Gant (2009) __U.S.___ [129 S.Ct. 1710, 1721], citing United States v. Ross (1982) 456 U.S. 798, 820-821.) Known as the “automobile exception,” this “exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is rooted in the historical distinctions between the search of an automobile or other conveyance and the search of a dwelling.” (People v. Superior Court (Nasmeh) (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 85, 100.) In part, those distinctions recognize a vehicle’s inherent mobility. (Ibid.; California v. Carney (1985) 471 U.S. 386, 392-393, 394, fn. 3.) And in part, they acknowledge a reduced expectation of privacy in a vehicle compared to a dwelling. (Arizona v. Gant, at p. 1710.)
2. Reasonable Suspicion Required for Detention
In contrast to the requisite predicate for a search, “a temporary detention may be justified by circumstances falling short of probable cause to arrest a suspect.” (People v. Harris (1975) 15 Cal.3d 384, 388.) For an investigatory detention, the officer need only have a “reasonable suspicion” of criminal activity. (Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 328.) “ ‘Where there is a rational belief of criminal activity with which the suspect is connected, a detention for reasonable investigative procedures infringes no constitutional restraint.’ ” (People v. Harris, at p. 389.)
The United States Supreme Court has “described reasonable suspicion simply as ‘a particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity, [citation]....” (Ornelas v. United States, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 696.) In determining whether reasonable suspicion exists, the court examines the totality of the circumstances. (Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 330.) That “approach requires the consideration of both the quantity and quality of all the information possessed by the police [citation].” (People v. Jordan (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 544, 554.) Each case turns on its own facts. (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 892.) But “the facts must be such as would cause any reasonable police officer in a like position, drawing when appropriate on his training and experience [citation], to suspect the same criminal activity and the same involvement by the person in question.” (Id. at p. 893.)
“Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause not only in the sense that reasonable suspicion can be established with information that is different in quantity or content than that required to establish probable cause, but also in the sense that reasonable suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show probable cause.” (Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 330.) Like probable cause, reasonable suspicion “is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Both factors–quantity and quality–are considered in the ‘totality of the circumstances–the whole picture,’ [citation] that must be taken into account when evaluating whether there is reasonable suspicion.” (Ibid.) “Thus, if a tip has a relatively low degree of reliability, more information will be required to establish the requisite quantum of suspicion than would be required if the tip were more reliable.” (Ibid.)
Courts have found reasonable suspicion based on an “unverified tip” where “the information carried sufficient ‘indicia of reliability’ to justify a forcible stop.” (Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 328.) Among the relevant factors are the “informant’s ‘veracity,’ ‘reliability,’ and ‘basis of knowledge’....” (Ibid.) “ ‘In the case of confidential citizen informers, the mere fact that they make their identity known to the police is, itself, some indication of their honesty.’ ” (People v. Lombera (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 29, 32.) Thus, as a rule, “private citizens who are witnesses to or victims of a criminal act, absent some circumstance that would cast doubt upon their information, should be considered reliable.” (People v. Ramey (1976) 16 Cal.3d 263, 269.) “This does not, of course, dispense with the requirement that the informant - whether citizen or otherwise - furnish underlying facts sufficiently detailed to cause a reasonable person to believe that a crime had been committed and the named suspect was the perpetrator; and the rule also presupposes that the police be aware of the identity of the person providing the information and of his status as a true citizen informant.” (Ibid.)
Depending on the circumstances, corroboration of a tip may be required to meet the reasonable suspicion standard. (Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 329; see id. at p. 332 [“anonymous tip, as corroborated, exhibited sufficient indicia of reliability to justify the investigatory stop”].) However, “neither a previous demonstration of reliability nor subsequent corroboration is ordinarily necessary when witnesses to or victims of criminal activities report their observations in detail to the authorities.” (People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 269.)
B. Application
1. Reasonable Suspicion
In this case, we agree with the trial court’s implicit determination that Ramos had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant and Ortega.
In defendant’s words, the mobile home park manager who called the police “was a presumptively reliable citizen informant, as to her own observations.” (See People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 269.) But defendant argues that “the reliability of the information she provided could not be determined because there was no evidence that she witnessed the described events” personally. (Ibid.)
As respondent points out, however, defendant’s argument concerns a factual dispute. On appeal, we “consider the record in the light most favorable to” the respondent. (People v. Woods (1999) 21 Cal.4th 668, 673.) We thus “defer to the superior court’s express and implied factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence” in the record. (Ibid.)
Here, the evidence supports the trial court’s implicit determination that the citizen complaint of criminal activity was reliable. (Compare People v. Ramey, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 270 [rejecting defendant’s claim that citizen informant’s information was “mere speculation”]; with Florida v. J.L. (2000) 529 U.S. 266, 271 [anonymous tip lacked even “moderate indicia of reliability”].) The detention was not “predicated on mere curiosity, rumor, or hunch” by the officer. (In re Tony C., supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 893.) Rather, the officer acted on information from an identified citizen. (People v. Lombera, supra, 210 Cal.App.3d at p. 32; cf., People v. Coulombe (2000) 86 Cal.App.4th 52, 58 [reliability demonstrated where tips “were made not anonymously over the telephone, but in person to police officers”]; People v. Ramey, at p. 269 [“requisite showing of reliability in the case of a citizen informant is significantly less than that demanded of a police informer”].)
Furthermore, the information was corroborated by the officer’s own observations. (Cf. People v. Butler (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 150, 161-162 [the defendant’s vehicle “matched the description and was at the place described in the telephone call” and the officer “saw conduct he believed, based on his training and experience, was a drug transaction – the criminal conduct explicitly alleged in the telephone call”]; Alabama v. White, supra, 496 U.S. at p. 331 [“the officers did corroborate that a woman left the 235 building and got into the particular vehicle that was described by the caller”].)
2. Probable Cause
The Attorney General argues that the dispatch call, corroborated by the officer’s observations, constituted probable cause to search the vehicle. Because we conclude that the vehicle search is justified on other grounds, we need not and do not address that argument.
II. Lifting the Car Cover
According to defendant, Ramos engaged in an impermissible search of the vehicle when he lifted the cover. Respondent disagrees, citing the officer’s reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and his safety concerns. The parties also present argument concerning inevitable discovery.
In his respondent’s brief, the Attorney General asserts that the evidence from the vehicle search would have been admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. In reply, defendant argues that inevitable discovery was not raised below and that the doctrine does not apply in any event. In view of our determination that Ramos acted properly in lifting the car cover, however, we need not and do not determine whether the inevitable discovery doctrine applies here.
A. Legal Principles
Balancing the public interest against the individual’s right to freedom from arbitrary interference by law enforcement, the United States Supreme Court “has consistently approved of protective searches of persons, vehicles, and even homes, during routine and other lawful investigatory detentions, in recognition of the paramount interest in officer safety and the extraordinary risks to which law enforcement officials are exposed during such detentions.” (United States v. Stanfield (4th Cir. 1997) 109 F.3d 976, 979-980.) The court’s decisions thus recognize “the need for law enforcement officers to protect themselves and other prospective victims of violence in situations where they may lack probable cause for an arrest.” (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at p. 24.) Officer safety concerns are “both legitimate and weighty.” (Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 U.S. 106, 110 [permissible for officer to require driver to exit the vehicle].)
Circumstances giving rise to legitimate officer safety concerns include situations where the officer cannot see the suspects or their movements. For example, “the presence of windows so tinted that the vehicle’s interior compartment is not visible is, in itself, a circumstance that would cause an officer reasonably to believe that his safety might be in danger....” (U.S. v. Stanfield, supra, 109 F.3d at p. 984.) In such cases, the officer is authorized to “open a vehicle’s door to determine the number of occupants within and whether any of those occupants are armed or have access to weapons....” (Ibid.)
B. Application
1. Officer Safety
Here, Ramos testified that he lifted the cover for officer safety, in order to see inside the vehicle. In our view, doing so was like opening the door of a car with tinted windows, an action approved in U.S. v. Stanfield, supra, 109 F.3d 976. The testimony by Ramos about his safety concerns distinguishes our situation from the Woodson case cited by defendant. There, the court observed, the evidence did “not suggest” that the officer “opened the car door out of concern for his safety or that there was cause for such concern.” (State v. Woodson (1989) 236 N.J.Super. 537, 539.)
2. Privacy Interests
In support of her claim that lifting the car cover was an impermissible search, defendant relies on a recent California appellate decision, People v. Hughston (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1062. That case does not assist her.
In Hughston, the vehicle searched was a rented Hummer. (People v. Hughston, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1065.) During a music festival held at the Mendocino County fairgrounds, the Hummer was parked in an area designated for camping. (Ibid.) The vehicle was located in a structure “composed of an aluminum frame covered with tarps; the tarps were tied to and draped over and around the frame and the Hummer. The structure completely enclosed a 10- by 30-foot area that included within it tents, an eating area, and the Hummer. A loose flap permitted ingress and egress. The front fender of the Hummer was exposed to the outside, providing a view of the vehicle’s license plate.” (Id. at pp. 1068-1069.) “Almost the entire vehicle, as well as a makeshift kitchen, sleeping bags, chairs, and tents were contained within the tarp structure.” (Id. at p. 1066.)
Based on evidence that the defendant had engaged in drug dealing at the festival, law enforcement officers arrested him, took his key to the rented Hummer, and located the vehicle at the fairgrounds. (People v. Hughston, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.) An officer “pulled aside the untied tarp flap, entered the structure and tested the key in the driver’s side door to see if it fit the lock, which it did. After opening the Hummer’s door, [the officer] searched the vehicle.” (Id. at p. 1067.) The search revealed a large quantity of illegal drugs. (Ibid.)
“The trial court concluded the automobile exception authorized the vehicle search.” (People v. Hughston, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1071.) The appellate court disagreed, observing that “in order to access the Hummer’s interior, [the officer] had to enter and pass through the tarped-off area.” (Ibid.) The court equated the tarp structure with “a large camping tent.” (Id. at p. 1069.) It concluded that the defendant “had a reasonable expectation of privacy” in the tarp structure, which the officer violated by entering. (Id. at p. 1071.) The court therefore held that the officer’s “warrantless entry into the tarp structure invalidated the subsequent vehicle search.” (Ibid.)
The facts of this case are quite different. In Hughston, the tarp covered not only the vehicle, but also “a makeshift kitchen, sleeping bags, chairs, and tents” constituting a temporary dwelling. (People v. Hughston, supra, 168 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.) On those unique facts, the Hughston court differentiated the officer’s “warrantless entry into the tarp structure” from his “subsequent vehicle search.” (Id. at p. 1071.) In this case, only the vehicle itself was under the cover. Nothing in the facts of this case suggests that defendant had a heightened privacy interest in the covered vehicle. (See Arizona v. Gant, 129 S.Ct. at p. 1710 [“a motorist’s privacy interest in his vehicle is less substantial than in his home”].)
Balancing defendant’s privacy interests against the officer’s legitimate need for safety, we agree with the trial court’s implicit determination that Ramos did not violate the Fourth Amendment by lifting the car cover.
III. Search of the Vehicle
In her final set of arguments, defendant challenges the probation search of her vehicle. She maintains (1) the scope of Ortega’s search condition was not sufficiently clear, (2) Ortega did not own or control the bag in which the stolen checks were found, and (3) the search was invalid because she objected to it. Respondent disagrees as to all three claims.
A. Legal Principles
1. Probation Searches
“Inherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.” (United States v. Knights (2001) 534 U.S. 112, 119, internal quotation marks omitted.) The United States Supreme Court recently held that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a police officer from conducting a suspicionless parole search. (Samson v. California (2006) 547 U.S. 843, 846.) Our nation’s high court has not yet addressed whether reasonable suspicion is a constitutional prerequisite for a valid probation search, but our state’s high court has.
The California Supreme Court has held that the warrantless search of a probationer pursuant to a search condition of probation may be conducted without any reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. (People v. Bravo (1987) 43 Cal.3d 600, 602, 609; People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 675.) Several justifications support this rule. One is consent, the premise being that probationers consent to waiver of their Fourth Amendment rights in order to avoid serving prison terms. (People v. Bravo, at p. 608; People v. Woods, at pp. 674-675.) Additionally, it is also the case that a probationer’s “expectation of privacy [is] significantly diminished.” (Samson v. California, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 849.) Furthermore, such “searches are justified in the probation context because they aid in deterring further offenses by the probationer and in monitoring compliance with the terms of probation.” (People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 795.)
“But whether the purpose of the search is to monitor the probationer or to serve some other law enforcement purpose, or both, the search in any case remains limited in scope to the terms articulated in the search clause [citation] and to those areas of the residence over which the probationer is believed to exercise complete or joint authority [citations].” (People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 681.)
2. Search of Areas under Probationer’s Control
As California Supreme Court precedent recognizes, “if persons live with a probationer, common or shared areas of their residence may be searched by officers aware of an applicable search condition.” (People v. Robles, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 798.) Such “a consent-based search is valid when consent is given by one person with common or superior authority over the area to be searched; the consent of other interested parties is unnecessary.” (People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 675; accord, People v. Baker (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1152, 1158-1159; cf. Georgia v. Randolph (2006) 547 U.S. 103, 106 (Randolph) [“co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry” renders “warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him”].)
When executing a probation search, the searching officers may look into closed containers that they reasonably believe are in the complete or joint control of the probationer. (People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 682; People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 976-977.) “The key question” is whether the probationer has “joint ownership, control, or possession over the searched item....” (People v. Baker, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.) “The officer must reasonably suspect that the object is owned, controlled or possessed by the [probationer] for the search to be valid.” (People v. Boyd (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 736, 749.)
B. Application
With these principles in mind, we turn to defendant’s claims concerning the probation search, which must be assessed in the context of the evidentiary record.
1. Scope of Ortega’s Search Condition
According to testimony by Ramos, his information from dispatch indicated that Ortega “was on... searchable probation.” Ramos assumed the accuracy of the information and thus knew that “Ortega was on probation with a search clause.” As reflected in the minute orders admitted at the suppression hearing, Ortega was subject to a search condition, described in a pre-printed, checked-off box that reads: “Submit Search/Testing.” The record also contains what respondent characterizes as a “typical probation search clause” used in Santa Clara County – the condition imposed on defendant herself at sentencing, as shown in her waived referral. That clause provides: “The defendant shall submit his/her person, place of residence, vehicle, and any property under his/her control to search at any time without a warrant by any Peace Officer.” The minute order from defendant’s sentencing contains a pre-printed, checked-off box identical to Ortega’s, which reads: “Submit Search/Testing.” When the issue of the search clause was argued at the suppression hearing, the trial judge indicated that she was “mindful of the language that is in reports and recommendations by adult probation.”
Contrary to defendant’s arguments, the foregoing constitutes sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s implicit determination that Ortega’s probation search condition covered the search challenged here. “A trial judge views the facts of a particular case in light of the distinctive features and events of the community; likewise, a police officer views the facts through the lens of his police experience and expertise. The background facts provide a context for the historical facts, and when seen together yield inferences that deserve deference.” (Ornelas v. United States, supra, 517 U.S. at p. 699.) We defer to those inferences here.
2. Ortega’s Control of the Bag
The search of defendant’s vehicle revealed a bag containing a stolen checkbook and identification. In refusing to suppress that evidence, the trial court found the search lawful based on Ortega’s search condition.
In challenging the court’s ruling, defendant first contends: “There was no reasonable basis for Officer Ramos to conclude that anything within the van was under Mr. Ortega’s dominion and control, and arguably, therefore, subject to the probation search condition.” The record belies that contention. Ramos saw Ortega rummaging around in the vehicle, an action that implies possession or control. Ortega effectively confirmed that inference, by telling Lao that he was in “a dating relationship” with defendant and that he had been “moving things into the car.”
Defendant further asserts that “there certainly was no basis upon which the officer could believe that a bag, whether gender-specific or not, which was in the front driver seat area..., could be under the dominion and control of a person who was seen... fiddling around in an area between the passenger side front and rear seats.” Again, however, the record does not support defendant’s claim. From the testimony given by Ramos at the suppression hearing, it is unclear whether the stolen items were found in a bag “in the front driver’s seat,” or a bag in the “rear portion of the van on the flat area somewhere”. In any event, Ramos testified to his belief that Ortega “could have control of it, yes.”
In her final argument concerning Ortega’s control over the vehicle’s contents, defendant argues that “the bag searched, a Betty Boop heart bag, obviously was the kind normally associated only with females....” Again, however, the evidentiary record does not compel that conclusion. First of all, it is not clear that the stolen items were found in that particular bag, which was one of the “many bags in the car.” Besides the one in question, which was described as “black-and-while plastic, red handles, and a heart of some size on it, with... Betty Boop” on it, there was also another bag, black with red handles. Ramos could not recall whether he found the checkbook and other stolen documents in the Betty Boop bag. Nor could Lao. Lao did recall testifying at the preliminary hearing that the bag was a “lady’s type of bag, with straps, and... red in color.” But the Betty Boop bag did not “jump out” as the one that Lao remembered. Lao could “not say that that is the bag that the checks came out of.” Though the trial judge referred to the Betty Boop bag as “the major one in question,” she did not make a specific finding that the stolen items were found in that bag. Rather, she made “a finding that the bags in question” – plural – “were sufficiently gender neutral.” Second, there is evidence that the bag containing the stolen items was not distinctly feminine. Asked whether it was a purse or not, Ramos described the bag as: “Like a duffel bag.” As for the character on the bag, Betty Boop, the judge referred to her as an “iconic pinup” seen on neck ties.
On these facts, we conclude, there was reasonable suspicion that Ortega exercised at least joint control over the bag containing the stolen items. “The lower court’s factual determination that the bag is not a distinctively feminine object is supported by the record.” (People v. Boyd, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 745; compare People v. Baker, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at p. 1159.) “Moreover, the critical issue is whether the officers reasonably suspected the handbag was owned or controlled by [the probationer]. If so, it was within the scope of the [probation] search. The appearance of the object searched is but one of many factors to consider in assessing whether the reasonable suspicion standard was satisfied.” (People v. Boyd,at pp. 745-746.) “Our independent application of the appropriate standard to the evidence presented leads us to conclude that the officers had reasonable suspicion that the handbag was owned or controlled by [a probationer] and was therefore within the scope of the [probation] search.” (Id. at pp. 750-751.)
In sum, this record provides no basis for overturning the trial court’s determination that Ramos conducted a valid search based on Ortega’s probation search condition.
3. Defendant’s Objection to the Search
In her final argument on appeal, defendant asserts that the search was invalid, despite Ortega’s search clause, because she voiced an objection to the search of her vehicle.
As legal support for her argument, defendant relies on Randolph, supra, 547 U.S. 103. In Randolph, the high court observed: “The Fourth Amendment recognizes a valid warrantless entry and search of premises when police obtain the voluntary consent of an occupant who shares, or is reasonably believed to share, authority over the area in common with a co-occupant who later objects to the use of evidence so obtained.” (Id. at p. 106.) The question before the court was “whether such an evidentiary seizure is likewise lawful with the permission of one occupant when the other, who later seeks to suppress the evidence, is present at the scene and expressly refuses to consent.” (Ibid.) The court answered that question in the negative, holding that “a physically present co-occupant’s stated refusal to permit entry prevails, rendering the warrantless search unreasonable and invalid as to him.” (Ibid.)
There are distinctions between Randolph and this case. For one thing, Randolph involved the search of a dwelling, not a vehicle. (Randolph, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 106.) For another thing, no probation search clause was involved in that case; rather, the governmental interest was limited to “a generalized interest in expedient law enforcement.” (Id. at p. 115, fn. 5.) In any event, Randolph does not assist defendant, for her claim cannot be sustained on the evidentiary record.
Defendant did testify that she told Lao that she “didn’t consent to him searching the vehicle.” But Lao did not recall defendant voicing any objection to the search. Nor did Ramos. From the trial court’s denial of the suppression motion, we may infer that it found against defendant on this point. We defer to that implied finding. (People v. Woods, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 673.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Mihara, Acting P.J., Duffy, J.