We note Article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution (Proposition 8) precludes the exclusion of evidence as a remedy for violation of state or federal search and seizure provisions "`unless exclusion is compelled by the federal Constitution.'" ( People v. Plyler (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 535, 544; People v. Blardony (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 791, 794.) The minor does not cite, nor has our research revealed, any federal Constitutional provision prohibiting a peace officer from detaining a juvenile arrested for a misdemeanor offense and searching the minor at the police station.

Valenzuela's first contention, however, the asserted pretextual nature of the stop, was the gist of his suppression motion and requires more attention. In reviewing the denial of that motion, we must view the record in the light most favorable to respondent ( People v. Aguilar (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 632, 637), uphold all express and implied factual findings of the trial court that are supported by substantial evidence, then independently apply the proper federal constitutional standards to those facts ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1301; People v. Blardony (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 791, 794; People v. Trujillo (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1219, 1223-1224). Our first task is to consider whether the stop here was pretextual, a legal matter we review de novo.