. 629-635. 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56, affirmed. STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, and BLACKMUN, JJ., joined.

[W]here the defendant was charged and arraigned on unrelated charges and apparently was to receive court appointed counsel on these charges, recent caselaw would suggest he could not be interrogated as to these unrelated charges without presence of counsel, unless he initiated the conversation with the police. People v Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich. 39 [ 365 N.W.2d 56] (1984). * * *

People v Frazier, 478 Mich 231, 243; 733 NW2d 713 (2007); United States v Cronic, 466 US 648, 659; 104 S Ct 2039; 80 L Ed 2d 657 (1984). People v Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 402; 521 NW2d 538 (1994), quoting People v Bladel, 421 Mich 39, 52; 365 NW2d 56 (1984). See McElhaney, 215 Mich App at 276; People v Leonard, 421 Mich 207, 224; 364 NW2d 625 (1984).

Moran, 475 U.S. 460, n 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent suggests that this view of our state constitutional right to counsel is precluded by dicta appearing in People v Bladel ( After Remand), 421 Mich. 39, 52; 365 N.W.2d 56 (1984), and People v Crusoe, 433 Mich. 666, 685-686; 449 N.W.2d 641 (1989). See RILEY, J., post, p 173, n 4.

See also People vWallach, 110 Mich. App. 37, 59; 312 N.W.2d 387 (1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds 417 Mich. 937 (1983); People v Dean, 110 Mich. App. 751, 755; 313 N.W.2d 100 (1981). However, in the 1984 decision of People v Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich. 39; 365 N.W.2d 56 (1984), aff'd sub nom Michigan v Jackson, 475 U.S. 625; 106 S Ct 1404; 89 L Ed 2d 631 (1986), this Court divided four to three in finding inadmissible several incriminating statements obtained by police during a twenty-six and one-half hour prearraignment delay. The majority dismissed with a footnote the argument that admissibility should turn on voluntariness or coercion:

Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded to this Court for reconsideration of our previous opinion in light of People v Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich. 39; 365 N.W.2d 56 (1984). In People v Bladel, supra, the Supreme Court sought to delineate and distinguish the scope of an individual's Fifth Amendment right to counsel and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, US Const, Am V and Am VI. Regarding the Fifth Amendment, the Supreme Court noted:

In United States v. Goveia, 467 U.S. 180, 104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984), the Supreme Court noted that subsequent cases had confirmed the view that the right to counsel attaches with "initiation of adversary proceedings," citing, e.g., Moore v. Illinois, supra, 434 U.S. at 226-227, 98 S.Ct., at 463-464, 54 L.Ed.2d, at 432-434 and Brewer v. Williams, supra, 430 U.S. at 398-399, 97 S.Ct., at 1239-1240, 51 L.Ed.2d at 435-437. The opinion of the Supreme Court actually decides two causes ultimately consolidated for purposes of appeal by the Supreme Court of Michigan: People v. Bladel and People v. Jackson, 421 Mich. 39, 365 N.W.2d 56 (1984). The respective homicide offenses are not related, but each cause presents a common question, to-wit:

Defendant first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to accompany him during his aforementioned polygraph examination, wherein defendant made inculpatory statements that were revealed at trial. In People v Bladel (After Remand), 421 Mich 39, 66; 365 NW2d 56 (1984), abrogated in part by People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315; 429 NW2d 781 (l988), the Supreme Court held that once a defendant has invoked his right to counsel, police may not question the defendant without counsel present unless the defendant initiates further communications. When a defendant requests a polygraph, the defendant initiates an interrogation.

A footnote in Jackson, 475 U.S., at 633-634, n. 7, quoted with approval statements by the Michigan Supreme Court to the effect that the average person does not "`understand and appreciate the subtle distinctions between the Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to counsel,'" that it "`makes little sense to afford relief from further interrogation to a defendant who asks a police officer for an attorney, but permit further interrogation to a defendant who makes an identical request to a judge,'" and that "[t]he simple fact that defendant has requested an attorney indicates that he does not believe that he is sufficiently capable of dealing with his adversaries single-handedly.'" Michigan v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 63-64, 365 N.W.2d 56, 67 (1984). Those observations were perhaps true in the context of deciding whether a request for the assistance of counsel in defending against a particular charge implied a desire to have that counsel serve as an "intermediary" for all further interrogation on that charge.

Statements obtained during an unnecessary delay in arraignment, where the delay is used as a tool to extract the statements, are not admissible. People v. Mallory, 421 Mich. 229, 241; 365 N.W.2d 673 (1985); People v. Bladel, 421 Mich. 39, 70; 365 N.W.2d 56 (1985). No facts have been offered to explain the delay in this case.