Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. 05-090899-6
Reardon, J.
A jury convicted appellant Joe Blacknell III of evading a peace officer while driving recklessly. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2.) On appeal, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence that the officer believed that the occupant in the fleeing vehicle may have been involved in a reported shooting. We affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Facts
In June 2009, approximately 9:25 p.m., Contra Costa Deputy Sheriff Tim Allen received a dispatch report of shots fired in the area of Pennsylvania Avenue and Eighth Street in Richmond, about a quarter to half a mile from where he was located. Deputy Allen headed to the Filbert Street area to see if he could locate any possible vehicles that were related to that shooting. Two minutes after the initial dispatch report, Deputy Allen saw a truck speed past him, coming from the area where the shots had been fired. Deputy Allen made a U-turn to follow the vehicle, activated the lights and sirens of his marked patrol car and a vehicle pursuit ensued. The driver sped all over the small residential area of North Richmond, ran stop signs and stop lights, made turns without signaling and fishtailed around corners. Deputy Allen testified that he believed that the occupants of the vehicle may have been involved in the shooting that occurred in Richmond because of their efforts to get away.
During the pursuit, the truck slowed and Deputy Allen saw a silver object thrown out of the passenger’s side window. The driver proceeded to accelerate away again. Deputy Allen feared the object was a gun, based on the fact that a shooting had just occurred and the subject was fleeing. Deputy Allen notified dispatch of the location where the item was thrown and Deputy Ellison and Deputy Marchese responded. At the reported location, they found fresh tire marks, a handgun, a magazine and a bullet.
In the meantime, Deputy Allen continued his pursuit of the vehicle. At one point, he saw the vehicle’s driver’s side door open; the vehicle moved up onto the sidewalk and eventually landed on the front lawn of a home. While the vehicle was still moving, the suspect started to get out of the car. In the process, his left arm became entangled with the seat belt. Deputy Allen stopped and exited his car. He testified that he saw the suspect’s face very well for about one to two seconds and did not turn his attention from the suspect because he did not know if the suspect had a gun. The suspect eventually got out of the car, dropped a cell phone on the ground and fled. Deputy Allen was not able to catch him.
Deputy Allen conducted a search of the vehicle and found a black cell phone inside the vehicle and a silver cell phone just outside of the driver’s side door. He alerted Deputy Ellison to the presence of the phones and also provided her with a description of the person he saw flee in the car. Deputy Ellison searched the cell phones and recognized appellant in the photographs on the phone. She proceeded to show Deputy Allen a photograph of appellant from her patrol vehicle computer. Deputy Allen testified that he was 100 percent certain that appellant was the individual who fled from the vehicle that he pursued.
Defense: Appellant’s defense was that there was insufficient evidence that he was involved in the crime. He challenged the reliability of Deputy Allen’s identification with testimony by Deborah Davis, an expert in eyewitness identification. Davis identified a number of factors which impact the reliability of an eyewitness identification, including the witness’s level of distraction, the level of attentiveness and the level of stress at the time of identification. Presented with the facts of the case, Davis stated that the accuracy rate of Deputy Allen’s identification of appellant was “vanishingly small.”
B. Procedural History
In December 2009, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed an amended information charging appellant with evading a peace officer while driving recklessly. It further alleged that appellant was armed with a firearm during the commission of the offense. (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); Pen. Code, § 12022, subd. (a)(1).)
Appellant moved in limine to exclude evidence of the shooting on the grounds that the evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial. (Evid. Code, §§ 350, 352.) The court allowed the parties to further brief the issue and conducted a section 402 hearing in which Deputy Allen testified. The court held that the evidence was relevant to the officer’s state of mind and to the issue of mistaken identity, appellant’s defense. It ruled that Deputy Allen could testify that he was responding to a call of shots fired, but would not allow any evidence that appellant was involved in the shooting. The court explained that it would instruct the jury that the officer’s testimony that he was responding to shots fired was not to be considered for the truth of the matter but only for the limited purpose as to its effect on Deputy Allen. During Deputy Allen’s testimony, the court instructed the jury twice that the challenged evidence was not to be considered for the truth of the matter.
All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
Appellant moved for a mistrial after Deputy Ellison, testifying in court, referred to the photograph she showed Deputy Allen as a “mugshot, ” in violation of an earlier court order. Appellant argued that this reference, coupled with the evidence of a shooting, were unduly prejudicial and interfered with the jurors’ ability to focus on the particular questions of the case. The court denied the motion, noting that the reference to the mug shot was cured by counsel’s statement that it was a DMV photograph, and that the jury was twice instructed that the evidence of the shooting was not to be considered for the truth of the matter. The court again stated that the evidence of the shooting was relevant to Deputy Allen’s identification.
Appellant renewed his motion for mistrial following Detective Michael Rood’s testimony that he was a detective with the homicide unit. He argued that it was prejudicial to identify Detective Rood as a homicide detective, and that prejudice was enhanced by the fact that appellant was marched across the hallway every day in handcuffs. The court denied the motion but allowed a stipulation, read to the jury, as follows: “[T]here’s no evidence to link the gun that was found in this case to any shooting.”
At the outset of trial, appellant raised his concern about the prejudicial effect of being marched across the hallway in handcuffs by deputies in the presence of jurors. The court properly instructed the jury not to consider that fact for any purpose. (See CALCRIM No. 204.)
The jury found appellant guilty of the felony set out in count one, evading a peace officer while driving recklessly, but rejected the firearm enhancement.
The court sentenced appellant to one year in county jail, with three years of formal probation, and ordered him to pay a number of fees and fines.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
Appellant claims that the court erred in admitting evidence that Deputy Allen believed that the occupant in the vehicle may have been involved in a reported shooting. He maintains this evidence should have been excluded either under section 350 as irrelevant, or under section 352 as more prejudicial than probative. We review the trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence under the abuse of discretion standard. We will not disturb the lower court’s evidentiary rulings unless the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice. (People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1113.)
B. Relevance
Appellant argues that the evidence of the shooting was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. (§ 350.) Evidence is admissible only if it is relevant. (Ibid.) All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by some statutory or constitutional exclusionary rule. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(2); § 351.) Relevant evidence is defined as evidence “having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.” (§ 210.) The general test of relevance is whether the evidence tends logically, naturally, and by reasonable inference to establish material facts such as identity, intent or motive. The trial court retains broad discretion in determining the relevance of evidence. (People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 132.)
In the case before us, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the evidence of the shooting relevant. The accuracy of Deputy Allen’s identification of appellant as the driver of the fleeing vehicle was a disputed material fact. The evidence of the shooting was relevant to Deputy Allen’s state of mind at the time he made the identification. The fact that Deputy Allen believed he was pursuing a suspect that may have been involved in a shooting relates to the amount of stress he was under when he made the identification, the degree of attention he was paying and the stakes involved in his identification. All of these factors were identified by appellant’s expert witness as tending to prove the accuracy of the identification. (See also CALJIC No. 2.92.) We therefore conclude the evidence of the shooting was relevant.
C. Prejudice
Appellant contends that even if the evidence of the shooting were relevant, the trial court committed reversible error in failing to exclude it as prejudicial under section 352. It is within the trial court’s discretion to exclude relevant evidence where the probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice. (§ 352.) In this context, prejudice is not synonymous with damaging. Prejudice refers to evidence which uniquely tends to evoke an emotional bias against the defendant as an individual and which has only a slight probative value with regard to the issues. (People v. Felix (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1385, 1396.) Evidence is not unduly prejudicial merely because it casts the defendant in a bad light but rather when it is of such nature as to inflame the emotions of the jury, motivating them to use the information, not to evaluate logically the point upon which it is relevant, but to reward or punish one side because of the jurors’ emotional reaction. (People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 632; People v. Branch (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 274, 286.) Here, we are satisfied that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of undue prejudice.
As discussed above, the probative value of the evidence was considerable because it bore directly on the accuracy of Deputy Allen’s identification of appellant as the driver of the fleeing vehicle.
In contrast, any prejudice within the meaning of section 352 was minimized by the trial court’s limiting instructions. During the trial, the court prohibited the introduction of any evidence that appellant was involved in the shooting and instructed the jury twice that the challenged evidence was only to be used for the limited purpose as to its effect on the officer’s state of mind. Further, the court informed the jury of the parties’ stipulation that there was no evidence linking the gun found near the vehicle to any shooting. In addition, during closing arguments the prosecutor stressed the fact that the evidence of the shooting served only one limited purpose, its effect on Deputy Allen.
Appellant also argues that any prejudicial impact was enhanced because one or more jurors may have seen him escorted into the courtroom in handcuffs. However, the customary practice of using physical restraints while escorting a defendant into the courtroom is acceptable for the protection of both the public and the defendant. Brief observations of a defendant in physical restraints by one or more jurors does not constitute prejudicial error. (People v. Jacobs (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 1135, 1141.) Here, the record indicates that jurors may have seen appellant in handcuffs while he was outside the courtroom. In an effort to ensure that appellant suffered no prejudice, the court instructed the jurors not to consider the physical restraints placed on appellant for any reason. (CALCRIM No. 204.)
Additionally, the court properly limited any prejudice caused by the reference to appellant’s “mugshot” and the identification of Detective Rood as a member of the homicide unit. The use of the term “mugshot” was remedied by the prosecutor’s characterization of the photograph as a DMV photograph. Any prejudice from the identification of Detective Rood as a member of the homicide unit was defused by the parties’ stipulation that there was no evidence to link the gun found near the vehicle to any shooting.
Moreover, the fact that the jurors did not find true the firearm enhancement demonstrates that they properly followed the court’s limiting instructions and the challenged evidence did not evoke an emotional bias against appellant. The evidence was not unduly prejudicial and was properly admitted.
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J, Sepulveda, J.