People v. Bey

17 Citing cases

  1. People v. Williams

    156 A.D.3d 1224 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017)   Cited 31 times

    However, inasmuch as we have found that defendant's conviction was not against the weight of the evidence, it was necessarily supported by legally sufficient evidence (see People v. Gaston, 147 A.D.3d 1219, 1220 n.2, 47 N.Y.S.3d 753 [2017] ). Thus, defendant's challenge to the grand jury proceeding, which involves the sufficiency of the evidence presented to the grand jury, is precluded (see id.; People v. Marks, 198 A.D.2d 542, 543, 603 N.Y.S.2d 243 [1993], lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 898, 610 N.Y.S.2d 165, 632 N.E.2d 475 [1993] ; People v. Bey, 179 A.D.2d 905, 906–907, 579 N.Y.S.2d 187 [1992], lvs denied 79 N.Y.2d 918, 1046, 582 N.Y.S.2d 78, 584 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 590 N.E.2d 1206, 412 [1992] ).Next, we consider defendant's challenge to County Court's Molineux and Sandoval rulings. At a brief combined Molineux/Sandoval hearing held immediately prior to jury selection, defendant opposed the People's request to use defendant's 2009 conviction for burglary in the third degree, under Molineux, as proof of defendant's intent to commit the instant crimes and, under Sandoval, to challenge defendant's credibility by showing that he had engaged in conduct that placed his own interests above those of society.

  2. People v. Wallace

    53 A.D.3d 795 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)   Cited 9 times

    As for the victim's statement that she saw the knife handle, but not its blade, the issue of which witness gave the more plausible account regarding the role of the knife in their encounter was fully explored by the People and defendant's counsel during cross-examination and in the closing arguments, leaving it to the jury to decide whose testimony to credit. Credibility is generally an issue for the trier of fact "whose province it is to believe all or part of a witness's testimony, even though it is at times confusing and inconsistent" ( People v Bey, 179 AD2d 905, 907, lvs denied 79 NY2d 918, 1046). In addition to the undisputed presence of the knife, the victim testified that defendant had told her he would kill her if she screamed.

  3. People v. Lee

    16 A.D.3d 704 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 9 times

    Additionally, as defendant was convicted after a trial, his challenge to the denial of his motion directed at the sufficiency of the proof before the grand jury is precluded ( see CPL 210.30; People v. Young, 296 AD2d 588, 589, lvs denied 99 NY2d 536, 538, 541; People v. Bey, 179 AD2d 905, 906-907, lvs denied 79 NY2d 918, 1046). We have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find

  4. People v. Young

    296 A.D.2d 588 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 17 times

    In contrast toPelchat, however, defendant was convicted after trial, not as the result of a guilty plea. He therefore is precluded from raising this claim directed at the proof before the Grand Jury (see, People v. Bryant, 234 A.D.2d 605, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1032; People v. Bey, 179 A.D.2d 905,lvs denied 79 N.Y.2d 918, 1046). With regard to defendant's claim that the verdict finding him guilty of both attempted murder and reckless endangerment is inconsistent, we note that he failed to preserve the issue for our review by appropriate objection before the jury was discharged, at a time when the alleged error could have been corrected (see, People v. Alfaro, 66 N.Y.2d 985;People v. Robinson, 258 A.D.2d 817, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 978).

  5. People v. Bryant

    234 A.D.2d 605 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)   Cited 13 times

    Accordingly, the defendant is precluded from raising this issue on appeal ( see, CPL 210.30; People v Bey, 179 AD2d 905, 907; People v Lewis, 125 AD2d 918, 919). We note that even if the testimony of the recanting witness before the Grand Jury was false, the Grand Jury testimony of the police officer/victim was sufficient to establish reasonable cause to believe that the defendant was the shooter, and the defendant's claim that the integrity of the Grand Jury proceedings was impaired is without merit ( see, People v Avilla, 212 AD2d 800; cf., People v Pelchat, 62 NY2d 97, supra).

  6. People v. Jackson

    220 A.D.2d 688 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 3 times

    Accordingly, the defendant is precluded from raising this issue on appeal (see, CPL 210.30; People v. Bey, 179 A.D.2d 905, 907; People v. Lewis, 125 A.D.2d 918, 919). In any event, we note that had the witness testified before the Grand Jury as he did at trial, his testimony would have been sufficient to sustain the indictment.

  7. People v. Mann

    216 A.D.2d 796 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995)   Cited 6 times

    Defendant's contention that Campbell's and Lundstrom's testimony with regard to 353 Third Street are simply not credible is without merit. "Testimony will be rejected as being incredible as a matter of law when it is `incredible and unbelievable, that is, impossible of belief because it is manifestly untrue, physically impossible, contrary to experience, or self-contradictory'" ( People v. Shedrick, 104 A.D.2d 263, 274, affd 66 N.Y.2d 1015, quoting People v. Stroman, 83 A.D.2d 370, 373; see, People v. Wrigglesworth, 204 A.D.2d 758, 760). Credibility is generally an issue for the trier of fact "whose province it is to believe all or part of a witness's testimony, even though it is at times confusing and inconsistent" ( People v Bey, 179 A.D.2d 905, 907, lvs denied 79 N.Y.2d 918, 1046). While Campbell's testimony tests the limits of acceptable inconsistency and confusion, a careful review of the record reveals that such testimony was not incredible as a matter of law.

  8. People v. Brooks

    210 A.D.2d 800 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 14 times

    Watkins' testimony and the confidential informant's testimony, coupled with the testimony of defendant's niece, Diaz, who was present and had negotiated the price for the second purchase, was sufficient to establish defendant's guilt on all charges (see, Penal Law § 220.39; People v Bey, 179 A.D.2d 905, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 918, 1046; see generally, People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490). As to defendant's argument that County Court abused its discretion by sentencing him to consecutive terms of imprisonment because the two transactions occurred in a relatively short period of time during a single police operation, we find it clear that the instant facts may not be categorized as a "single act or omission" which would have required concurrent sentences (see, Penal Law § 70.25).

  9. People v. Ceruti

    209 A.D.2d 711 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994)   Cited 2 times

    The defendant's claims that the Grand Jury proceedings were defective, and that the evidence presented to the Grand Jury resulting in his indictment was legally insufficient, are not reviewable on his appeal from the ensuing judgment of conviction (see, CPL 210.30; People v. Jones, 204 A.D.2d 659; People v Cunningham, 163 A.D.2d 412; see also, People v. Bey, 179 A.D.2d 905, 906; cf., People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97; People v Alexander, 136 A.D.2d 332, 334-335). We conclude that the evidence adduced at the Huntley hearing supports the suppression court's determination that, under the circumstances surrounding the interview in the defendant's hospital room, the defendant's statements to police officials were voluntarily made (see, People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 38; People v. Eastman, 114 A.D.2d 509; People v. Pearson, 106 A.D.2d 588).

  10. People v. Marks

    198 A.D.2d 542 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)   Cited 3 times

    His testimony was supported by the bill of sale. Additional testimony was adduced from an expert who opined that the jet ski had a value of between $2,000 and $2,500 when it was in defendant's possession. In our view this testimony sufficiently established that the fair-market value of the jet ski exceeded $1,000 (see, People v Landfair, 191 A.D.2d 825, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1015; People v Vaccarella, 177 A.D.2d 990, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 833). Defendant's conviction precludes his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence before the Grand Jury (see, People v Bey, 179 A.D.2d 905, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 918; see also, CPL 210.30). Defendant next argues that his right to confront witnesses and his right against self-incrimination were violated by the People's introduction into evidence of a tape-recorded conversation he made involving, among others, an individual who was deceased at the time of trial. For this tape to be admissible without violating defendant's right of confrontation, the declarant must be unavailable and the statement must bear some indicia of reliability sufficient to justify its admission in the absence of cross-examination (see, People v Sanders, 56 N.Y.2d 51, 64). There is sufficient indicia of reliability here because the decedent's conversation was taped without his knowledge in the presence of his son, who corroborated his remarks at trial (see, People v Sanders, supra, at 65).