People v. Better

12 Citing cases

  1. People v. Hoffer

    122 Ill. App. 3d 13 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 13 times
    In Hoffer the reviewing court rejected a contention that a manslaughter conviction constituted an implied acquittal of murder.

    The only mental state required to sustain a conviction of involuntary manslaughter is that of recklessness ( People v. Cates (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 681, 689, 444 N.E.2d 543), and a finding of recklessness does not, in our opinion, necessarily negate a finding of knowledge or intent. (See People v. Better (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 66-67, 337 N.E.2d 272.) "Mental states of knowledge and recklessness are not susceptible to clear distinction." ( People v. Gross (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 765, 771, 367 N.E.2d 1028.)

  2. City of Chicago v. Hanson

    105 Ill. App. 3d 1017 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 2 times

    Ultimately, a determination of what constitutes obscenity is a matter within the province of the court. People v. Better (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 337 N.E.2d 272. We note that City of Rolling Meadows v. Kohlberg recites the criteria expressed in Miller v. California (1973), 413 U.S. 15, 37 L.Ed.2d 419, 93 S.Ct. 2607. This case is at variance with the criteria enumerated in People v. Ridens and People v. Gould.

  3. People v. Hart

    101 Ill. App. 3d 343 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 8 times
    In Hart, the appellate court specifically stated that it was improper for the trial court to take into consideration the fact that the defendant was paid to work in an adult bookstore. It stated that it would have vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing had it not reversed the conviction on other grounds.

    The majority states that City of Chicago v. Kimmel (1964), 31 Ill.2d 202, is not controlling because it predated the pronouncement of "community" as being the Statewide community. However, People v. Better (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 58, was decided after the adoption of the Statewide standard in People v. Butler (1971), 49 Ill.2d 435. The Better court stated: "Concomitantly, defendants' argument that the trial court should have allowed expert testimony on the subject of contemporary community standards is without merit.

  4. Commonwealth v. Kocinski

    414 N.E.2d 378 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 6 times

    While nude dancing is protected speech ( Commonwealth v. Sees, 374 Mass. 532, 537 [1978]; Plank, supra at 469-470), when it is combined with "hard-core" sexual conduct it may lose its protected status. Conduct such as that found here has been disapproved by courts, e.g., patrons grabbing at a dancer (see United Food Corp. v. Alcoholic Beverages Control Commn., 375 Mass. 238, 241-245 [1978]; California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 111 [1972]; compare Sees, supra at 534; Plank, supra at 469), lewd exposure of the genitals, particularly when accompanied by lewd conduct (see Commissioner of Bldgs. v. Sidne Enterprises, Inc., 90 Misc.2d 386, 391 [N.Y.Sup.Ct. 1977]; People v. Ventrice, 96 Misc.2d 282, 286-288 [N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1978]), and masturbation or fondling oneself (see Commonwealth v. Grant, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 203, 204 [1979]; People v. Better, 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 65 [1965]). The defendants also argue that the Commonwealth was obliged to present expert testimony concerning the absence of serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value in the allegedly obscene matter.

  5. State v. Heinz

    193 Conn. 612 (Conn. 1984)   Cited 64 times
    Holding that less is required to establish probable cause to arrest than to make a prima facie showing of criminal activity

    Taken together with the evidence relating to the defendant's knowledge, this evidence met the requirements of our statute. See People v. Better, 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 67, 337 N.E.2d 272 (1975); Seattle v. Marshall, 83 Wash.2d 665, 672, 521 P.2d 693, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1023, 95 S.Ct. 499, 42 L.Ed.2d 297 (1974). C

  6. State v. Conforti

    688 So. 2d 350 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that section 796.07(b) is facially constitutional

    While some may find that lap dancing, like nude dancing, is a form of expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment, this court declines to stretch the circle of expression beyond the perimeters already established. State Ex Rel. Miller v. Private Dancer, 613 N.E.2d 1066, 1069 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); see People v. Better, 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 337 N.E.2d 272, 277 (1975). Our holding that the sexual conduct here is unprotected by the First Amendment also compels the conclusion that Miller v. California is inapplicable to this case.

  7. State v. Waller

    621 So. 2d 499 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)   Cited 6 times
    Requiring analysis of whether conduct is lewd to be decided by resort to the three-prong obscenity test established in Miller, 413 U.S. at 15, 93 S.Ct. at 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d at 419

    We have not been directed to any precedent requiring First Amendment protection for such private activity with one customer on the edge of a dimly lighted room, as compared to dances performed on stage to entertain a group of customers. See generally Erwin S. Barbre, Annotation, Topless or Bottomless Dancing or Similar Conduct as Offense, 49 A.L.R.3d 1084 (1973) (discussing nude dancing as public offense); People v. Better, 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 337 N.E.2d 272 (1975) (discussing standards to determine whether nude dancing is protected expression). We do not rule out the possibility that Ms. Waller's conduct in this case is protected by the First Amendment. If she raises this issue in county court and that court determines the First Amendment applies to these activities, then the circuit court is correct, and the issue of lewdness in this case should be analyzed to include the Miller three-prong test.

  8. State v. Frazier

    683 S.W.2d 346 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that even if the jury disregards the trial judge's instructions to not talk about the case until deliberations, such testimony is inadmissible unless it constitutes extraneous prejudicial information or improper outside influence

    Rule 13(e), T.R.A.P.; Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Nude dancing, while not in itself obscene, may become obscene when combined with certain sexual conduct such as lewd exposure of the genitals — e.g., Commissioner of Bldgs. v. Sidne Enterprises, Inc., 90 Misc.2d 386, 391, 394 N.Y.S.2d 777 (Sup.Ct.N.Y. Co., 1977). — or the fondling of one's own breasts and vaginal area while dancing — e.g., People v. Better, 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 337 N.E.2d 272 (1975). The dancing of defendant Probst, as described by the above-summarized testimony of the State's witness, included the rubbing of her own breasts and vaginal area, and further, could be said to constitute the lewd exposure of her genitals.

  9. County of King v. Chisman

    33 Wn. App. 809 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983)   Cited 7 times

    The record shows that the activities of the table dancers at the Booby Trap included conduct which would be extremely difficult to define as "dancing" and which was arguably obscene. Any protection that dancing might have is lost, of course, if the dancing is found to be obscene. Commonwealth v. Kocinski, 414 N.E.2d 378 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981); People v. Better, 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 337 N.E.2d 272 (1975). This case does not involve the serving of liquor and is thus not resolved by the holding of California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 34 L.Ed.2d 342, 93 S.Ct. 390 (1972).

  10. People v. Gross

    52 Ill. App. 3d 765 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977)   Cited 15 times
    In Gross, among other offenses, defendant was convicted of four counts of armed violence based upon the underlying felony of aggravated assault.

    Defendant requests a new trial on the basis that a person cannot have two mental states at the same time. In People v. Better (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 58, 337 N.E.2d 272, defendant asserted that the obscenity complaints against him did not charge an offense because they alleged two states of mind which were mutually exclusive. The court found that the provisions were not mutually exclusive since there was adequate basis in the record to show that defendant had both the knowledge of the content of the dancing and consciously disregarded the risk that nude dancing would incite indecent acts.