Opinion
2013-05-8
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Daniel BETANCOURT, appellant.
Tully Rinckey, PLLC, Albany, N.Y. (David Fallon of counsel), for appellant. Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Michael Shollar of counsel), for respondent.
Tully Rinckey, PLLC, Albany, N.Y. (David Fallon of counsel), for appellant. Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., District Attorney, Staten Island, N.Y. (Morrie I. Kleinbart and Michael Shollar of counsel), for respondent.
WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., JOHN M. LEVENTHAL, SANDRA L. SGROI, and JEFFREY A. COHEN, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Richmond County (Rooney, J.), rendered April 22, 2008, convicting him of murder in the second degree, robbery in the first degree, and robbery in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officials.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, a review of the totality of the circumstances surrounding his questioning by the police demonstrates that his statements, which were preceded by his valid waiver of properly administered Miranda warnings ( see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694), were voluntarily made ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 415–416, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. DeCampoamor, 91 A.D.3d 669, 670–671, 936 N.Y.S.2d 256). In this regard, the actions of the police in periodically questioning him over a seven-hour period while he remained in damp clothing did not render his resulting statements involuntary ( see People v. Tarsia, 50 N.Y.2d 1, 12–13, 427 N.Y.S.2d 944, 405 N.E.2d 188;People v. DeCampoamor, 91 A.D.3d at 670–671, 936 N.Y.S.2d 256;People v. Miles, 276 A.D.2d 566, 714 N.Y.S.2d 714;People v. Starks, 139 A.D.2d 681, 682, 527 N.Y.S.2d 358). Moreover, there is no evidence that the defendant's physical condition impaired or undermined his ability to freely choose whether to make a statement ( see People v. Williams, 97 A.D.3d 769, 770, 948 N.Y.S.2d 428;People v. Legere, 81 A.D.3d 746, 747–748, 916 N.Y.S.2d 187;People v. Timmons, 54 A.D.3d 883, 884–885, 864 N.Y.S.2d 111;People v. Braithwaite, 286 A.D.2d 507, 507, 729 N.Y.S.2d 636).
Similarly, the trial court providently exercised its discretion in ruling that the prosecution could inquire into two prior uncharged crimes allegedly committed by the defendant in the event that he testified at the trial ( see People v. Hayes, 97 N.Y.2d 203, 207–208, 738 N.Y.S.2d 663, 764 N.E.2d 963;People v. Gray, 84 N.Y.2d 709, 712–714, 622 N.Y.S.2d 223, 646 N.E.2d 444). The prosecution demonstrated a good-faith factual basis for the inquiry ( see People v. De Pasquale, 54 N.Y.2d 693, 694, 442 N.Y.S.2d 973, 426 N.E.2d 467;People v. Duffy, 36 N.Y.2d 258, 262, 367 N.Y.S.2d 236, 326 N.E.2d 804,cert. denied423 U.S. 861, 96 S.Ct. 116, 46 L.Ed.2d 88;People v. Kass, 25 N.Y.2d 123, 126, 302 N.Y.S.2d 807, 250 N.E.2d 219), and the court appropriately weighed the probative value of the proposed inquiry to the issue of the defendant's credibility against the potential prejudice to the defendant in making its ruling ( see People v. Smith, 18 N.Y.3d 588, 597–599, 942 N.Y.S.2d 5, 965 N.E.2d 232;People v. Harris, 74 A.D.3d 984, 984, 902 N.Y.S.2d 190). Moreover, the mere fact that the uncharged crimes bore some similarities to the instant offenses did not warrant their preclusion ( see People v. Lewis, 101 A.D.3d 1154, 956 N.Y.S.2d 526;People v. Fotiou, 39 A.D.3d 877, 878, 834 N.Y.S.2d 319).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).