People v. Berry

23 Citing cases

  1. People v. Bernasco

    185 Ill. App. 3d 480 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 8 times

    The court nevertheless suppressed the defendant's statement because: "Based upon the Berry case [ People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 463 N.E.2d 1044] I do not believe that this Defendant, who had no prior criminal experience and who reads at a beginning fourth-grade level and who, more importantly, comprehends at a fourth-grade level, could affectively [ sic] under those circumstances, without the aid of his parents or someone who would assist him in translating what was really happening, I don't believe he voluntarily waived his rights, even though there is no question that he did sign the Wavier of Rights Form, and there is no question that he did so without being forced to do so by anyone." In its written order the court, after finding that the defendant had an IQ of 80, a fourth-grade reading and comprehension level, and no prior criminal experience, further found:

  2. People v. Cleesen

    177 Ill. App. 3d 103 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 12 times
    Distinguishing a motion to suppress based on involuntariness from one based on lack of probable cause

    "The fundamental principle governing the admission of confessions is well known: the confession must be voluntary; otherwise it is totally inadmissible." ( People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 1044, 463 N.E.2d 1044, 1047.) The test to determine whether a confession is voluntary is whether it was made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement of any sort ( People v. Hester (1968), 39 Ill.2d 489, 237 N.E.2d 466, cert. dismissed (1970), 397 U.S. 660, 25 L.Ed.2d 642, 90 S.Ct. 1408), or whether the accused's will was overborne at the time of the confession ( People v. Kincaid (1981), 87 Ill.2d 107, 429 N.E.2d 508, cert. denied (1982), 455 U.S. 1024, 72 L.Ed.2d 144, 102 S.Ct. 1726).

  3. In re N.E.R

    512 N.E.2d 132 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 7 times
    Concluding that trial court's determination of no Miranda custody was contrary to the manifest weight of evidence where suspect was fifteen years old and officer asked suspect to talk in police car for privacy's sake, talked to suspect in unmarked car in front of suspect's home, did not recall touching suspect as he entered the front seat of the car, may have locked the door but was not certain, used accusatory questioning for about two hours, never told suspect he was free to leave, and told suspect he was not under arrest at the end of the interview

    To aid in this determination, there are several factors that should be considered, including: (1) the place of the interrogation; (2) statements or nonverbal conduct indicating an accused is not free to leave; (3) the extent of the knowledge of the law enforcement officers and the focus of their investigation; and (4) the intention of the officers. ( People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 463 N.E.2d 1044; People v. Newsome (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 1005, 454 N.E.2d 353.) The burden of proving that a defendant was not in a custodial situation and had not been deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way is on the State.

  4. People v. Travis

    170 Ill. App. 3d 873 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)   Cited 44 times
    In People v. Travis, 170 Ill. App. 3d 873, 525 N.E.2d 1137, 121 Ill.Dec. 830 (4th Dist. 1988), the court rejected the argument that such distinctions were mandatory and stated the following: "the best rule is that the jury need only be unanimous with respect to the ultimate question of defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged, and unanimity is not required concerning alternate ways in which the crime can be committed...."

    • 4-6 Defendant next contends the court erred by finding the statements were voluntarily given and not suppressing them. The fundamental principle governing the admission of confessions is that the confession must be voluntary. ( People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 1044, 463 N.E.2d 1044, 1047.) Whether a statement is voluntarily given depends on the totality of the circumstances.

  5. People v. Calhoun

    382 Ill. App. 3d 1140 (Ill. App. Ct. 2008)   Cited 11 times
    Holding that defendant understood his rights when he nodded after they were orally read

    In determining whether an interrogation was custodial, the trier of fact will scrutinize the objective circumstances surrounding the questioning and ask "what a reasonable man innocent of any crime would perceive." People v. Berry, 123 Ill. App. 3d 1042, 1046, 463 N.E.2d 1044, 1048 (1984). The trier of fact should consider the following factors: (1) the place of the interrogation, (2) statements or nonverbal conduct indicating that the defendant was not free to leave, (3) the extent of the police officers' knowledge and the focus of their investigation, and (4) the officers' intentions.

  6. People v. Salgado

    263 Ill. App. 3d 238 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)   Cited 71 times
    Holding that prior inconsistent statements contained in transcripts were a matter of public record and no less available to the defendant than to the state

    That determination must be made from the totality of circumstances, taking into account the characteristics of the defendant and the details of the interrogation. ( People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 1044.) Among relevant characteristics are the defendant's age, education, mental capacity, emotional characteristics, and experience in criminal matters.

  7. People v. Tackett

    616 N.E.2d 691 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 2 times

    ( Kokoraleis, 149 Ill. App.3d at 1007.) Such circumstances include defendant's mental ability, familiarity with the English language, age, education, and experience. ( Bernasco, 138 Ill.2d at 365; People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 1044.) Courts should also consider the duration of questioning and determine whether defendant received his constitutional rights or was subjected to any physical punishment. ( In re T.S. (1986), 151 Ill. App.3d 344, 350.) The trial court's decision on whether a defendant's confession is voluntary will not be overturned on appeal unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence.

  8. People v. Hagar

    160 Ill. App. 3d 370 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 12 times
    In Hagar, other investigators were waiting to begin their own interrogation, and one investigator testified the defendant was in a custodial setting.

    Under this objective test, the defendant may be found to be in custody for Miranda purposes even when the officers assert he or she is free to leave, if the nonverbal conduct indicates the contrary is true. ( People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 463 N.E.2d 1044.) It has even been held that an interrogation in the suspect's own home can fall within the purview of Miranda.

  9. In re T.S

    502 N.E.2d 761 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 10 times

    • 1 "The fundamental principle governing the admission of confessions is well known: the confession must be voluntary; otherwise it is totally inadmissible." ( People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 1044, 463 N.E.2d 490, 493.) The State bears a heavy burden of showing the statement or confession was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602; People v. Kincaid (1981), 87 Ill.2d 107, 429 N.E.2d 508, cert. denied (1982), 455 U.S. 1024, 72 L.Ed.2d 144, 102 S.Ct. 1726.) Where, as here, the trial court finds that the confession was voluntary, a reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether that finding is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence.

  10. People v. Madden

    148 Ill. App. 3d 988 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 7 times

    We do not agree. • 1-3 The fundamental principle governing the admission of an accused's statement is well known: the statement must be voluntary, otherwise it is totally inadmissible. ( People v. Berry (1984), 123 Ill. App.3d 1042, 1044, 463 N.E.2d 1044.) The test of whether a statement is admissible at trial is whether it has been made freely, voluntarily and without compulsion or inducement of any sort; the accused's will must not have been overcome at the time he confessed.