Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People presented clear and convincing evidence that he did not genuinely accept responsibility for his conduct (see People v Gonzalez, 194 A.D.3d 1083, 1083; People v Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923, 924; People v Fields, 186 A.D.3d 1541, 1541). In particular, although the defendant initially admitted his guilt to the police and pleaded guilty, the People presented evidence that the defendant thereafter minimized his culpability, including to the Department of Probation and when interviewed for an "Adult Psychosexual Risk Evaluation."

The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s application for a downward departure and designated him a level two sex offender. [1] Contrary to the defendant’s contention, the People presented clear and convincing evidence that he did not genuinely accept responsibility for his conduct (see People v. Gonzalez, 194 A.D.3d 1083, 1083, 148 N.Y.S.3d 497; People v. Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923, 924, 140 N.Y.S.3d 733; People v. Fields, 186 A.D.3d 1541, 1541, 129 N.Y.S.3d 512). In particular, although the defendant initially admitted his guilt to the police and pleaded guilty, the People presented evidence that the defendant thereafter minimized his culpability, including to the Department of Probation and when interviewed for an "Adult Psychosexual Risk Evaluation."

After a hearing to determine the defendant's risk level designation pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA), at which the defendant argued against an assessment of points under risk factor 12 (acceptance of responsibility) and sought a downward departure from his presumptive risk level two designation, the Supreme Court designated the defendant a level two sex offender. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People presented clear and convincing evidence that he did not genuinely accept responsibility for his conduct (see People v Berdejo, 192 AD3d 923; People v Fields, 186 AD3d 1541; People v Fonteboa, 149 AD3d 880). Although the defendant pleaded guilty, the People presented evidence of statements he made during his interview with the Department of Probation, and recounted in the presentence investigation report (see People v Mingo, 12 NY3d 563, 572-573), indicating that he denied his culpability by asserting that he was told to plead guilty to avoid a longer sentence.

The People established by clear and convincing evidence, including the victim’s grand jury testimony, that the defendant engaged in two or more acts of sexual contact against her, at least one of which was an act of sexual intercourse, separated by at least 24 hours (see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 10 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]; People v. Holmes, 222 A.D.3d 791, 202 N.Y.S.3d 378; People v. Green, 216 A.D.3d 1115, 1117, 189 N.Y.S.3d 698). The Supreme Court also properly assessed 10 points under risk factor 12, as the People established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant failed to accept responsibility for his actions (see People v. Gonzalez, 194 A.D.3d 1083, 1083, 148 N.Y.S.3d 497; People v. Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923, 924, 140 N.Y.S.3d 733). [2–4] Contrary to the defendant’s further contention, the Supreme Court did not err in denying his request for a downward departure from the presumptive risk level (see People v. Johnson, 11 N.Y.3d 416, 422, 872 N.Y.S.2d 379, 900 N.E.2d 930; People v. Abdullah, 210 A.D.3d 704, 178 N.Y.S.3d 94; People v. Wolm, 209 A.D.3d 682, 684, 175 N.Y.S.3d 332; People v. Sofo, 168 A.D.3d 891, 892, 90 N.Y.S.3d 290; see also People v. Champagne, 140 A.D.3d 719, 720, 31 N.Y.S.3d 218).

The Supreme Court also properly assessed 10 points under risk factor 12, as the People established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant failed to accept responsibility for his actions (see People v Gonzalez, 194 A.D.3d 1083, 1083; People v Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923 , 924).

In response, the defendant failed to seek a downward departure from the presumptive risk level. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly assessed 10 points under risk factor 12, as the People established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant failed to accept responsibility for his actions (seePeople v. Gonzalez, 194 A.D.3d 1083, 1083, 148 N.Y.S.3d 497 ; People v. Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923, 924, 140 N.Y.S.3d 733 ). In any event, since the defendant was a presumptive level three sex offender pursuant to an automatic override, the points assessed on the risk assessment instrument were irrelevant (seePeople v. Hraklis, 214 A.D.3d 681, 681, 182 N.Y.S.3d 916 ; People v. Wolm, 209 A.D.3d 682, 683, 175 N.Y.S.3d 332 ).

On appeal, the defendant challenges the assessment of points under risk factors 12 and 14, and the denial of his application for a downward departure. Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly assessed 10 points under risk factor 12, as the People established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant failed to accept responsibility for his actions (seePeople v. Gonzalez, 194 A.D.3d 1083, 148 N.Y.S.3d 497 ; People v. Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923, 924, 140 N.Y.S.3d 733 ) and 15 points under risk factor 14 because the defendant was released without any parole, probation, or supervision (seePeople v. Bangura, 185 A.D.3d 972, 125 N.Y.S.3d 864 ; People v. Ramos, 179 A.D.3d 850, 116 N.Y.S.3d 347 ). In any event, since the defendant was a presumptive level three sex offender pursuant to an automatic override, the points assessed on the risk assessment instrument are irrelevant (seePeople v. Wolm, 209 A.D.3d 682, 683, 175 N.Y.S.3d 332 ; People v. Barr, 205 A.D.3d 741, 742, 166 N.Y.S.3d 682 ).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly assessed 10 points under risk factor 12, as the People established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant failed to accept responsibility for his actions (see People v Gonzalez, 194 A.D.3d 1083; People v Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923, 924) and 15 points under risk factor 14 because the defendant was released without any parole, probation, or supervision (see People v Bangura, 185 A.D.3d 972; People v Ramos, 179 A.D.3d 850). In any event, since the defendant was a presumptive level three sex offender pursuant to an automatic override, the points assessed on the risk assessment instrument are irrelevant (see People v Wolm, 209 A.D.3d 682, 683; People v Barr, 205 A.D.3d 741, 742)

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the People presented clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not genuinely accept responsibility for his conduct, thus warranting the assessment of 10 points under risk factor 12 (see Correction Law § 168-n[3]; Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 15-16 [2006]). Although the defendant formally admitted his guilt by entering a plea of guilty, the People presented evidence that the defendant thereafter denied or minimized his culpability. Thus, the Supreme Court properly concluded that the defendant had not genuinely accepted responsibility (see People v Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923, 924; People v Fields, 186 A.D.3d 1541, 1541; People v Fonteboa, 149 A.D.3d 880, 881; People v Benitez, 140 A.D.3d 1140, 1140-1141).

With respect to risk factor 12, we reject defendant's contention that the court erred in determining that he failed to accept responsibility for his crime. Although defendant admitted to the police that he had sexual contact with the victim and later defendant pleaded guilty to sexual abuse in the first degree, we agree with the court that defendant minimized his conduct when discussing his offense with the probation officer who prepared the presentence investigation report, thus warranting the assessment under risk factor 12 (see People v Berdejo, 192 A.D.3d 923, 924 [2d Dept 2021], lv denied 37 N.Y.3d 912 [2021]; People v Askins, 148 A.D.3d 1598, 1599 [4th Dept 2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 912 [2017]; People v Dubuque, 35 A.D.3d 1011, 1011 [3d Dept 2006]). Thus, "[t]aking all of defendant's statements together, we conclude that they 'do not reflect a genuine acceptance of responsibility as required by the risk assessment guidelines'" (Askins, 148 A.D.3d at 1599).