Opinion
January 9, 1992
Appeal from the County Court of Ulster County (Vogt, J.).
In May 1989, defendant was indicted for manslaughter in the second degree based upon allegations that he recklessly caused the death of the victim, Kelly Armbrust, by seizing her by the head, lifting her off the ground and shaking her for approximately one minute. Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress various inculpatory statements made by him to the police on the ground that, inter alia, they were the product of a custodial interrogation undertaken in the absence of Miranda warnings (see, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436). Following a hearing, County Court denied defendant's motion. The matter then proceeded to trial where defendant was convicted of the lesser included offense of criminally negligent homicide. Defendant was sentenced to five years' probation conditioned upon, inter alia, completion of a six-month jail term and abstinence from alcohol. This appeal followed.
Initially, we reject defendant's contention that County Court erred in denying his pretrial suppression motion. Our review of the hearing transcript reveals that defendant went to the Sheriff's Department at approximately 5:00 P.M. on November 19, 1988 and told the communications officer there that he had found the victim two to three hours earlier. Defendant then spoke briefly with Sergeant Michael Freer and was turned over to Detective Edwin Brewster for further interview. Following an initial interview with defendant and a telephone conversation with Freer, who was then at the victim's apartment, Brewster stated to defendant that the information he had given did not coincide with what was discovered at the scene. At that point, defendant broke down and admitted that he had killed the victim accidentally. Defendant was immediately advised of his Miranda rights and, after reading and signing a waiver form, gave a detailed statement in which he admitted that during an argument with the victim early that morning, he lifted her off the ground by the head and shook her, causing her to lose consciousness. Later that evening, defendant gave a more complete statement, after again being advised of his Miranda rights and executing a written waiver thereof.
In our view, the foregoing facts support County Court's determination that defendant's initial oral confession was not made during a custodial interrogation. Defendant went to the Sheriff's Department of his own accord and there is nothing in the record to indicate that, up until the time he inculpated himself, he was compelled to remain there. Defendant was interviewed in a noncoercive atmosphere and the questions asked by the officers were of an investigatory rather than accusatory nature (see, People v. Centano, 76 N.Y.2d 837, 838). Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude that a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would have thought that he or she was in custody had he or she been in defendant's position (see, People v. Yukl, 25 N.Y.2d 585, 589; People v. Baird, 155 A.D.2d 918, 919, lv denied 75 N.Y.2d 963). The fact that defendant's admission came immediately after Brewster's declaration that his story was inconsistent with information discovered at the scene does not require a different result (see, People v. Huffman, 61 N.Y.2d 795, 797).
We likewise reject defendant's claim that he was unable to knowingly and intelligently waive his constitutional rights before giving his later statements because he was both under the influence of alcohol and emotionally distraught. While it is clear that defendant was emotionally upset at the time he gave his statements, both Freer and Brewster testified that they did not detect any odor of alcohol on defendant and there was no other evidence that defendant was unable to comprehend the meaning and effect of his written waivers (see, People v Stroman, 118 A.D.2d 1006, 1008, lv denied 68 N.Y.2d 672; People v Estrada, 109 A.D.2d 977, 980). Because the record fully supports County Court's determination that defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent, it should not be disturbed (see, People v Williams, 62 N.Y.2d 285, 288).
We turn next to defendant's contention that his confession was not sufficiently corroborated as required by CPL 60.50. This argument is unavailing. Under the New York rule, the requirement of CPL 60.50 is satisfied "by the production of some proof, of whatever weight, that a crime was committed by someone" (People v. Daniels, 37 N.Y.2d 624, 629; see, People v. Booden, 69 N.Y.2d 185, 187; People v. Lipsky, 57 N.Y.2d 560, 571). Here, the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on the victim testified that, although he was unable to determine the precise cause of death solely by examination of the victim's body, he discovered a hemorrhage in the spinal canal "around the thickle sack [sic]" which indicated damage to the neck and was evidence that force was applied to the upper neck. Upon consideration of defendant's confession, the medical examiner was able to opine with a reasonable degree of medical certainty that the victim died "as a result of condusive [sic] injury to the cord * * * and * * * partial suffocation". Thus, defendant's confession furnished the key to explaining the victim's neck injury which, when explained, established the criminal act (see, People v. Lipsky, supra, at 570-571). Accordingly, we conclude that there was compliance with CPL 60.50.
We have examined defendant's remaining contentions, including that his sentence should be reduced in the interest of justice, and find them to be without merit.
Weiss, J.P., Mikoll, Yesawich Jr. and Mercure, JJ., concur. Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.