Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Napa County Super. Ct. No. CR148320
Reardon, Acting P.J.
A jury convicted appellant Giovanni Yamil Bendana of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, unlawful firearm activity and possession of ammunition. (Pen. Code, §§ 12021, subds. (a)(1), (c)(i), 12316, subd. (b)(1).) The jury also found that he had a prior serious or violent felony conviction, charged as a strike. (See § 667, subds. (b)-(i).) On appeal, Bendana argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress and objects to an inconsistency between the clerk’s sentencing minutes and the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence. We order the minutes to be corrected, but otherwise affirm the judgment.
All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
I. FACTS
In October 2009, approximately 3:30 in the afternoon, Napa County Sheriff Sergeant Joel Wilson received a dispatch report about an armed man. The information came from an anonymous informant who reported that a man in a truck had a gun in the back seat of his vehicle. The informant described the truck’s color, license plate number, its location at a Napa gas station, and named appellant Giovanni Bendana as the driver.
Sergeant Wilson spotted a truck matching this description at the Napa gas station named by the informant. The truck was poised to move northbound onto a highway. After making eye contact with the driver, Sergeant Wilson motioned for him to continue turning out of the gas station. Sergeant Wilson followed the truck and observed the driver commit two Vehicle Code violations. The truck swerved between lanes, almost striking other vehicles. The driver also changed lanes without using a turn signal.
Sergeant Wilson then signaled to the driver to stop. As Bendana was pulling over, the officer saw him reach toward the back seat and move something. Sergeant Wilson advised dispatch of this activity. Four or five marked patrol cars soon appeared to assist with a high risk felony car stop. Five officers had their weapons drawn during the stop. Bendana was ordered out of the vehicle and instructed to get on his knees. He did as he was ordered, and was handcuffed some distance from the vehicle, searched for weapons and placed in a patrol car.
At the hearing on the motion to suppress, Sergeant Wilson could not confirm whether or not Bendana had been placed in a patrol car at the time the truck was searched.
Sergeant Wilson testified that in order to protect their safety, the deputies visually cleared the vehicle to make sure no one else was inside. In the process, an officer opened a door providing access to the back seat; when the door was closed, officers could not see if the back seat floorboard area was unoccupied. Once the door was open, the grip of the shotgun was clearly visible. In the vehicle search, the deputies recovered the loaded shotgun from the back seat and a machete from the front floorboard. Another large knife, a hatchet and a slingshot were also found in the truck. At the scene, Sergeant Wilson learned that Bendana had suffered two prior felony convictions. Bendana was then arrested.
In November 2009, an information charged Bendana with possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, unlawful firearm activity and possession of ammunition. (§§ 12021, subds. (a)(1), (c)(i), 12316, subd. (b)(1).) The information alleged that the three counts were serious felonies. (§ 1192.7, subd. (c).) One of Bendana’s prior convictions was also alleged as a strike. (§ 667, subds. (b)-(i).) In December 2009, Bendana moved to suppress all evidence seized from his truck, without success. (§ 1538.5)
In January 2010, a jury found Bendana guilty on all three counts based on evidence of the seized weapons and ammunition. The jury also found that he had suffered a prior serious or violent felony conviction. (See § 667, subds. (b)-(i).) Bendana’s motion for a new trial was denied. At sentencing, the trial court orally pronounced a four-year prison sentence—a midterm of two years for being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, doubled pursuant to the Three Strikes law. Sentence on the other convictions was stayed. (§ 654.) The abstract of judgment reflects this four-year pronounced sentence, but the clerk’s minute order states that Bendana was sentenced to a total term of 12 years, an eight-year sentence having been suspended or stayed.
II. SUPPRESSION MOTION
A. Standard of Review
Bendana first contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence of the weapons and ammunition found in his truck. (U.S. Const., 4th Amend.) The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We must defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. Applying these facts, we exercise our independent judgment to decide whether the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Bush (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1048, 1051.)
Bendana may challenge the denial of his motion to suppress on appeal from the judgment of conviction. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m).)
B. Detention
Bendana argues that his initial detention lacked reasonable suspicion and thus did not justify the resulting search and seizure. A vehicle stop is a detention of the driver. (Whren v. United States (1996) 517 U.S. 806, 809-810.) A detention is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when an officer can point to specific facts that, considered in the totality of the circumstances, provide an objective manifestation that the detained person had violated the law. An officer may lawfully stop a car for Vehicle Code violations, including unsafe lane changes caused by a failure to signal. (People v. Logsdon (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 741, 744-746.) In the case before us, we conclude that Bendana’s initial detention was justified by the officer’s observations of two Vehicle Code violations. The uncontradicted evidence established that Bendana swerved between lanes and changed lanes without signaling. Both acts constituted violations of the Vehicle Code, making the stop objectively reasonable. (See Veh. Code, § 22107.) A stop which is reasonable based on the objective facts is not rendered unreasonable if the officer entertains a subjective belief that the stop might also yield evidence of another crime. (People v. Uribe (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1438.)
The fact that the officers performed a high risk felony car stop did not render the detention unreasonable, either. During a traffic stop, officers may take such steps as are reasonably necessary to protect their safety and maintain the status quo during the course of the stop. When a suspect is believed to be armed, reasonable steps may include the presence of a large number of officers; the display of weapons; the removal of the suspect from the vehicle; and the handcuffing of the suspect. (People v. Soun (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 1499, 1516-1517, 1519.) In our case, the information provided by the anonymous tip about the presence of a weapon, the location of the vehicle and its description, as well as Bendana’s movement toward the back seat of the truck where officers had been told that a gun was located were legitimate facts for the officers to take into account when deciding how to make a detention once they had an independent ground to detain him. The officers’ legitimate belief that Bendana was armed justified the high risk felony traffic stop under those circumstances. His detention was proper.
C. Search
Bendana also contends that the vehicle search was unjustified. In some circumstances, an officer making a traffic stop may conduct a warrantless search of the passenger compartment of a vehicle. The search is limited to those areas of the vehicle in which a weapon may be placed or hidden. Such a search is permissible if an officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific, articulable facts that, taken together with the reasonable inferences from those facts, reasonably justify the officer’s belief that the suspect is dangerous and may gain immediate control of weapons. (Michigan v. Long (1983) 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-1050.) This vehicle search may be conducted even after a defendant has been removed from the vehicle and is under police control. (at pp. 1051-1052; see People v. Bush, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1052.)
The parties stipulated that Bendana had an expectation of privacy and that the search was conducted without a warrant.
Here, we are satisfied that specific and articulable facts justified the officers’ search of Bendana’s truck for weapons. Those facts include the information from the anonymous informant that Bendana had a gun in his back seat and his movement toward that location. These facts provided a reasonable suspicion that Bendana was dangerous and justified the officers’ search of the vehicle for weapons. The initial search was restricted to the area where police suspected that the reported weapon was located, making it strictly circumscribed by the exigencies justifying its initiation. (See Michigan v. Long, supra, 463 U.S. at pp. 1050-1051.) Based on the totality of the circumstances, we find that the search of Bendana’s truck was reasonable. As the evidence seized from the truck was properly admitted at trial, Bendana’s motion to suppress was properly denied.
The trial court rejected this legal reasoning, denying the suppression motion on other grounds. On appeal, we consider the reasonableness of search and seizure issues anew. (See People v. Bush, supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 1051.) We review the trial court’s ruling, not its reasoning. If the ruling was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case, we will sustain it regardless of the reasoning used by the trial court. (See People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 901.)
III. SENTENCING
Bendana also contends that the clerk’s minute order of the sentencing hearing must be corrected to conform to the record of the trial court’s oral pronouncement. The trial court imposed a four-year term for one offense and stayed sentence on the other two. (§ 654.) The minute order reflects a 12-year term imposed, eight years of which was stayed or suspended. The Attorney General concedes that the minute order is incorrect. We agree with this conclusion.
An appellate court may correct clerical errors at any time to ensure that court records accurately reflect the pronounced judgment of the trial court. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 185-186.) A discrepancy between the reporter’s transcript of sentencing proceedings and the clerk’s minutes is presumed to be clerical error. Generally, the record of the oral pronouncement prevails over the clerk’s minute order. (People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471; see People v. Mitchell, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 185.)
In our case, the trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence controls. The clerk’s minute order must be amended to conform to the pronouncement of judgment.
The trial court is directed to correct the clerk’s minutes in a manner consistent with this decision. As corrected, the judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Sepulveda, J., Rivera, J.